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2ABSTRACT
"n this thesis I seek to analyse some major characteristics 
of the Indian rural 'oney market between the early 1950's and 
late I9601 s.
The Indian rural money market is distinguished by its duality, 
with the unorganized sector largely dominating the supply of funds 
even to-day. On the demand side, the pattern of debt a d borrowing 
has remained roughly t' e same during the period studied. Capital 
expenditure rather than family expenditure seemed to be the more 
significant variable affecting credit demand. This is reflected 
in the correlation found between higher levels of debt/borrowing 
and. larger capital exnenditure. The most important form of 
security against which loans were either borrowed or outstanding 
was oersonal. Seasonality was observed in debt and borrowing. The 
modal range of rural interest rates in India was found to be between 
18 and 25 per cent, (which is considerably 1 ess than many 
commentators have implied). Rural interest rates are largely 
explained by risk and uncertainty rather than by the monopoly rower 
of money-lenders, though, monopoly profit may have existed in some 
cases. Statistical tests showed positive correlation between inco e 
of farmers and repayments and negative correlation between the 
interest rate, on the one hand, and income, repayments and 
monetization on the other. A rise in farm income?, thus, may reduce 
the risk-* premium and, therefore, rural rates. I'1 the or .-an? zed 
sector, the primary credit co-operative societies mostly fail to 
sat" sfy the various criteria of financi al viability, though in some 
states their progress was not unsatisfactory.
3The rior defects in their working were noor quality of loan 
administrate on 1 endin'" to rising over dues, bad management and 
failure to mobilise rural, savings and link credit to marketing.
The total size of tVie two sectors of the rural m o n e y  market and 
the links between them were difficult to measure in the abserce 
of reliable data. Rough esti ates tentatively suggested a slow 
fall in the size of the unorganized market and tenuous but 
oerhaps slowly growing links between the sectors. For example, 
bazaar rates were found to be influenced by lagged Rank Rate.
The existing policies for developing these links are criticised 
and some methods are suggested for further integration. These 
include the development of co-operative paper, improving the 
quality of hur.dls, and the development of a multi-agency apnroach 
which would foster productive use of loans. Successful prosecution 
of these nolicies would lend to a rise in farm incomes. It may be 
sum- ested that this wil? reduce the rural interest rate.
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CHAPTER 1. 6
INTRODUCTION.
1.1. A well developed money market may figure crucially in the
promotion of economic development by allocating saving into 
investment in a competitive way as well as by promoting safety and 
liquidity of financial assets. The Indian rural money market is 
distinguished by its duality with its organized and unorganized 
sectors, with different business practices and rates of interest.
The organized sector consists of the commercial and co-operative 
banks and government agencies and the unorganized sector chiefly 
consists of money-lenders and indigenous bankers of different types, 
landlords, traders and merchants. Specialization has developed 
between these sectors and funds sometimes flow between them but 
their links with one another seem very weak. Against this background, 
the chief aims of the present study are:
*
(a) to investigate the nature, comoosition and working of 
organized and unorganized money markets in the Indian rural economy;
(b) to examine the factors affecting the demand side of 
agricultural credit;
(c) to analyse the nature and determinants of rural interest rates;
(d) to discuss the workings of the major organized agencies;
(e) to snecify the existing links between the dual money markets
and to derive any policy implications which may emerge,our study.
1*2. From time to time, attention has been drawn to the problems
with which we are concerned here in certain official and semi-official 
reports, but little rigorous study has so far been made of the 
agricultural credit market in India
7Moreover, the^e have been very few attempts to use quantitative 
techniques to further understanding of these problems. In the 
oresent study, we have tried to use stastical tools to analyse 
the available data on the subject as far as possible, though we 
have not ignored qualitative analysis. In this respect our study 
may claim originality.
1.3. The nature and composition of the dual rural money market
is described in detail in the second chapter. In the supply side,, 
it is emphasized that different types of rural money market differ 
considerably in their activities. The existence of a large 
unorganized sector has minimised the use of bank credit, prevented 
the growth of financial assets through which savings could be 
invested and hindered the operation of monetary policy. It is also 
shown that neither the money lenders nor the indigenous banks 
depended much upon the organized sector for funds and the degree of 
contact between the organized and unorganized financial agencies in 
the rural economy was poor. This highlighted■the necessity to 
promote further integration between these two markets. It was 
further observed that between 1951 and 1968, the growth of organized 
agencies on the suoply side of agricultural credit was not much and 
even in 1968, about two-thirds of total borrowings of the cultivators 
were provided by the unorganized agencies, particularly by the 
money lenders. This raised the problem of inadequacies of the 
“7* existing organized agencies, particularly of the co-operatives, 
which were supnosed to have been the main competitors of the 
money lenders.
8
We go on to examine the demand side of agricultural credit in 4 
chanter three. In this chapter, some hypotheses about the factors 
affecting the demand side are tested and some estimates of the 
relative changes in the significance of some of the explanatory 
variables are examined statistically. The pattern of borrowing and 
debt is analysed according to interest rate, asset groups, 
seasonality, duration and repayments. The choice of periods of our 
analysis was determined by the nature and availability of data.
Careful interpretation is sought to be made of the statistical 
estimates in view of the nature of available data.
In the fourth chapter, it is argued that the nature of Indian * 
rural money market has generated different types of interest rates.
Such notes are then described and an attempt is made to develop a 
simple model to explain the causes of 'high' interest l^ates in the 
Indian rural economy. Here we have concentrated our attention on 
the determination of 'loan' rates by such factors as risk, uncertainty 
and the monopoly position of money lenders and an empirical proof of 
our theoretical model is then given. The relationship between 
rates prevailing in the organized and unorganized sectors is also 
examined to find out how far the rates prevailing in the organized 
sector influence the rates in the unorganized sector. No attempt 
is made to develop or test a model for explaining the structure of j 
rural interest rates since the division between short and long-term 
agricultural credit is not always made very clearly by the cultivators 
and also because the relevant data for testing such a model are not 
available. Rural 'interest rates are mostly discussed in 'money! terms.
In the fifth chanter, the workings of the orimary agricultural 
credit co-operative societies is considered. The choice of credit 
co-oneratives is deliberate in view of their importance as rivals to 
money lenders. The study is at first carried out at the all- India 
level but to take account of regional variations, attemnts have been 
made to disaggregate the analysis by undertaking a state-wise study.
Here the main focus of attention is the analysis of the viability " 
of the societies between 1951 and 1968.
In the sixth chapter, the major problem of promoting integration 
between the organized and unorganized money markets is discussed and 
an attempt is made to quantify the links between the two sectors.
The criteria which are used are straightforward and they are based 
upon a number of simplifying assumptions. We try to find out 
indications of the nature and growth of linkages by using several 
indices. In this connexion, the rule of several financial agercies 
has been described to consider their e in promoting greater 
integration. It is, perhaps, too early to examine the effects of 
some recent measures like bank nationalisation and the establishment 
of rural development agencies. Nevertheless, how far the more recent 
approaches towards the agricultural sector may be combined with the 
aim of promoting integration in a dual economy has been indicated.
One approach may be to link the commercial banks with the agricultural 
credit co-operative societies. Apart from easing the credit constraint 
which is now supposed to exist, such financing has the additional 
merit of releasing more funds for non-credit societies to be granted 
by the central and state co-ooerative banks.
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Such loans may be advanced against co-operative bills and this 
may be a first sten towards developing an agricultural bill market. 
The other method is to standardise the indigenous bills of exchange, 
ie., hundls and to take necessary steps to promote their greater use. 
It is also suggested that little attention has been paid to the 
•deposit’ rates and such rates may be raised to attract more savings. 
Such a rise may induce even the money lenders to save, particularly 
in the off-peak season when agricultural activities are at a low ebb. 
A rise in deposit rates will tend to push up lending rates, but since 
the difference between lending rates in the organised and unorganized 
sector is large, the suggested increase in the deposit rate deserves 
attention.
Proposals for incorporating the indigenous banks within the 
organized sector are examined at some length and possible methods of 
achieving this are suggested. Attempts to promote linkages by a 
multipi e-credit agency approach rather than through a single - credit 
agency have been made and the possibilities of a multiple - credit 
approach are discussed and here the role of the commercial banks has 
been examined in detail. It may be reflected that gains from 
additional money flow in the agricultural sector may be beneficial 
if it brings about greater production, a larger marketed surnlus and 
increasing control over the rural money market through monetary 
techniques. Gains from integration of the dual rural money market 
may thus be observed in terms of larger income, lower rural interest 
rates, greater mobilisation of the financial and real surplus and 
stricter command over the agricultural economy by the monetary 
author!ti es.
CHAPTER 11.
['EY MARKETS IN INDIA: THE SUPPLY SIDE OF AGPJCTITTJRAI
_CP.EDIT AGENCY:
INTRODUCTION.
2.1. The major aims of this chapter are,
(i) to reveal some of the complexity of Indian rural money
markets,
(11) to provide a 'feel* for their 'modus oner end?' and
(ill) to consider critically their outstanding problems, as
reviewed in the literature.
It is penerally believed that a well-developed money market, 
by allocating saving into investment in a competitive way, plays 
an important role in the process of economic development. Further, 
a developed money market promotes liquidity and safety of financial 
assets. It •; s observed that in many under-develored countries 
money markets in rural areas are not homogeneous.^
2The Indian loney market is assuredly characterized by duality.
1 See, for example, U Tun Wai,"Interest Rates Outside the Organized 
Money Markets of Underdeveloped Countries", International Monetary 
Fund: St.-/'•" P s -ors, Vol.VI, No.l. Nove 1 1957, PP. 80-3 ':2.
2 See, V.R.Cirvante - The Indian Capital Market, Oxford University 
Press, Bombay, 1956, PP. 1-6. ECAFE: Department of Economic -
Affairs - Mobilization of Do> -.estic Capital in Certain Countri.es of 
Asia and Far East, Bangkok, 1951, P. 13. H.V.R. Iengar~- Monetary 
Policy a^f Economic Gr ov.rth v Vora & Co., Bo mb ay, 1962, P . 19 3.
C.K. Johri - Monetary Policy in a Dev cloning Economy. World Press, 
Calcutta, 1965, PP. 39-^0. H.Poy - Role of Monetary Policy in 
Bconom~ c Development, World Press, Calcutta, 1962. PP. 66 - 67.
T. S. C. Wilson, "The B ‘ less of Banking in India", R. S. Sayers( ed) -
Banking in the British Co • -.orwealth, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952, 
0 ~h 1 ~ I1 -6. J. S.G. Wilson, - monetary Policy and the Development
of Money Markets, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,London, 1966, PP.2/*3-269.
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Wilson observes: "On the one hand, we have the ’central money 
market' which includes (apart from the Reserve Bank of India) the 
exchange banks, the Imperial Bank, and the other Indian commercial 
banks; and, on the other, we have the indigenous market, which 
consists of a group of bazaar markets, each with different business 
practices and a different structure of rates. Within both these two 
main divisions quite a high degree of specialisation has developed, 
including the provision of facilities for the flow of funds within 
and between them. The chief weakness lies in the links between the 
main sections. Until these are strengthened, further integration 
will be difficult'.' 2
The main aim of this study is to test statistically - and 
rigorously - a number of generalisations about the Indian rural 
money market which have been made in the past. In this chapter, we 
shall examine the nature and working of the organized and 
unorganized financial agencies in the Indian rural economy and some 
of the major problems in their working. We are concerned, here, with 
the supply side of the agricultural credit market.
2.2. Definition of a Money Market:
At the outset, it is useful to distinguish between the money 
and capital markets. The capital markets deals with long-term money 
capital, and the money market with short-term money capital. Sometimes 
it is difficult to distinguish between the short and long-term since 
there may be considerable overlap between the two.^
1 Now the State Bank of India.
2 See, J.S.G.Wilson - op.cit., in R.S.Sayers (ed) - Banking in the 
British Commonwealth, P 203.
3 See, for example, John T.Madden and Marcus Nadler - The 
International Money Markets. Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., London,
1935, P.lll. See also, S.L.N. Simha - The Capital Market of India,
Vora & Co.,Bombay, I960, P.2.
3
However, a money market generally caters for the demand for and
supply of short-term loanable funds. To quote: " A money market is
a mechanism through which a large part of financial transactions of
a particular country or of the world are cleared...*" In the
narrower sense in which the term is generally used, however, a money
market includes only dealings in more or less standardized types of
loans, such as call loans and in credit instruments, such as
acceptances and treasury bills in which personal relations between
lender and borrower are of negligible importance. In this sense, a
money market is distinct from, but supplementary to, the commercial
banking system" " To quote another author: "In essence, a money
market is a place where the borrower and lender of short-term funds
2
are brought together".
2 .'3. Importance of a Money Market.
A money market performs several useful functions. Firstly, it 
may tend to strike equilibrium between the demand for and supply of 
loanable funds. Its essential function is to allocate savings into 
investment. By allocating savings into investment, the money market 
brings about a rational allocation of resources. Secondly, by 
promoting liquidity and ensuring safety of financial assets it 
encourages savings and investment. This is very important in an 
under-developed economy where saving and investment/habits leave much 
room for improvement. In the rural economy of under-developed 
countries, savings too often take place in the form of bullion- 
hoarding and land-holding rather than in the holding of financial 
assets. Thus, even when there is ability to save, in the absence of 
well-developed money market, the community is deprived of an array of 
financial assets which could lead saving into productive investment.^
1 See J.T.Madden and M.Nadler,op.cit., P.111.
2 See J.S.G.Wilson,op cit., in~r “S.Sayers(ed).Banking in the British 
Commonwealth, P.202. —
3 See J .G.Gurley and E*S.Shaw - Money in a Theory of Finances,
The Brookings Ins. Washington D.C. I960, P.49.
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Thirdly, a money market ensures the flow of funds from one sector to another
1
and thus promotes financial motility. Fourthly, a well-developed money 
market is vital for implementing the monetary policies of the central bank. 
Finally, an organized money market is essential for providing elasticity 
in the flow of funds.
It is important to note the relation between the money market and the 
interest rate. The rate of interest bears the same relation to the money 
market as price bears to the commodity market. Just as price is 
determined in the commodity market via the operation of demand for and
supply of goods, so the interest rate is determined in the money market
2
by the operation of the demand for and supply of loanable funds. Just 
as it may be said that the commodity market is seldom wholly perfect 
and homogeneous, so it may be argued that the money market is seldom perfect 
and homogeneous. Since there are several markets within an economy, there 
is no single interest rate. Further, such rates as exist may be subject to 
seasonal and cyclical variations depending upon forces of demand and supply. 
In the next section, the nature and composition of the Indian rural money 
market will be considered.
1 John T. Madden and Marcus Nadler, op.cit. p.130.
2 One should note, here, the distinction between the loanable fund 
and liquidity preference theories. Which of these applies will 
depend upon one's particular concern. The former is most useful 
when one is concerned with the complex of interest rates which go 
to make up 'the' rate of interest. This is my concern here. The 
second gives emphasis to the close connection between the demand 
for money and interest rates. J.R. Hicks was the first to 
clarify this. See his Value and Capital (London, 1939)>
Chapter XII. See also J.R. Hicks, 'Mr. Keynes and the Classics : 
A Suggested Interpretation', Econometrics, 1937»
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2. if. 1 Definition of Indigenous Money Market:
It has been observed that the Indian money market may be divided
into two broad sections: (1)organized and(£)unorganized. The 
unorganized market we take as that sector which operates outside 
the provisions of the Indian Banking Companies Act and maintains 
private accounts which are not audited. The organized market, 
contrawise, works under the provision of Banking Companies Act and 
maintains accounts which are open to audit and regular inspection.^
The co-operatives are included in the organized sector. Thus while 
the organized sector is amenable to control, the unorganized sector 
is not.
2.4. 2 Features_ of Indigenous Money Market:
The main features that differentiate the unorganized sector ,
2
from the organized sector of the money market are the following:
a) blending of money-lending with other types of economic activities,
b) informality in dealings with customers,
c) personal contact with borrowers,
d) simple system of maintaining accounts,
e) flexibility of loan operations, and
f) secrecy about financial transactions.
It is in the light of these special features of the indigenous 
sector that it is remarked: "It is in the methods rather than in the 
nature of business that indigenous agencies stand in marked contrast 
with modern institutions".^
1 See, M.M.S.Gubbay - Indigenous Indian Banking. Tara poreVala Sons
8f Co., Bombay, 1928, P.3-
2 For details, see, Government of India - The Indian Central Banking
Enquiry Committee, Vol.l, Part 1, Majority Report, Calcutta, 1931,
Pp* 98 - 99. Also, Reserve Bank of India ( ie, R.B.l.) All India 
Rural Credit Survey, (ie, A.I.R.C.S.) Vol.l, part 2, Bombay, 1957, ch 21
3 See, Gopal Karkal - Unorganized Money Markets in India, Lalvani 
Publishing House, Bombay, 1967, Pi9.
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Next, we shall try to analyse the effects of a dual money market on the 
economy.
y 's'
2*4, 3 Effects of a Dual Money Market. '
V
The dichotomy in the Indian money market has certain effects.
Firstly, it has led to restricted use of cheques. Secondly, to supplement
the credit needs of the economy, especially of the rural sector, it has
led to the growth of a variety of credit instruments, ^his, again, has
minimised the use of bank credit. Thirdly, it has restricted the volume
of monetary transactions and perpetuated non-monetized transactions.
Fourthly, the presence of a rudimentary and unorganized sector has deprived
society of an array of financial assets with which savings could have been
more effectively tapped and transformed into investment for the purpose of
raising the rate of growth, finally, the existence of dichotomy has
perpetuated some age-old customs like hoarding of gold which have prevented
1
the use of available resources for productive investment. All these
complex factors have created various problems for the central bank in using
2
monetary policy more effectively.
2.5 Classification of the Indian Financial Institutions:
Indian financial institutions may be classified into two broad groups: 
(a) organized, (b) unorganized; and within these into further sub-divisions. 
In diagram 1, the overall structure of financial institutions in India is 
given. Within the organized sector, Reserve Bank of India (henceforth to 
be referred to as R.B.I.), State Bank of India, the joint-stock banks and 
various co-operative credit associations are included.
1 One should, perhaps, observe that whether or not gold hoarding prevents 
productive investment depends upon the end use of the money so spent. It 
seems likely, however, that those who 3ell gold will not engage in 
’productive1 investment. However, if the gold is imported (legally or 
illegally) there is a definitely negative effect so far as productive 
investment is concerned.
2 See, H. Roy, op.cit., p. 67*
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The unorganized sector includes a variety of indigenous financial 
institutions including the following: a) Indigenous bankers,
b) Money-lenders - both nrofessional and non-orofessional,
c) Nidhis, d) Chit funds. In rural areas, money-lenders and■ ■ 1 ■ — ... mmm
indigenous bankers are the overwhelming source of finance to
cultivators. It was observed in 1931: "...the money-lender is an
indisnensable feature of Indian rural economy".'1 Little change
was noticed in 1931-2; "The bulk of the credit was supplied by
the money-lenders - professional and agriculturist - and as much
2
as about 70 per cent of the rural debt was owed to them". Other 
studies have confirmed the strength of the unorganized sector even 
in 1961 - 2.^ In view of its great importance we shall now examine 
the structure and working of the unorganized sector in greater detail.
2.6. C]assification of the Unorganized Sector:
The unorganized sector in the Indian money market may be 
classified in the way shown in diagram 2. Money-lenders and 
indigenous bankers are seen all over India, especially in Tamil Nad u 
(Madras). The nature of each one of these agencies will now be 
considered.
1 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee. 
Vol.l. Part 1. P.83, op,cit.
2. R.B.X. - A.I.P.C.S. Vol.l. Part 2, P.2.. on,cit.
3. See R .B .I.Bulletin,"All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey, 
1961-62", September, 1965, PP 1296 - 1393.
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2.7. 1 Definition of Monev-Lenders:
It is difficult to define precisely a money-lender. Such 
difficulty mainly arises in the way of distinguishing a money-lender 
from an indigenous banker since both money-lenders and indigenous 
bankers combine money-lending with other economic activities like 
trading or business, The money-lenders are sometimes defined as 
those "whose primary business is not banking but money-lending".
In another report, the distinction between indigenous banker and
2
money-lender is made in the following way: " The indigenous
banker... may also combine banking and business, but in his case 
banking is primary. This largely a difference in degree and the 
other differences between the two are of much the same nature. The 
indigenous banker finances trade and industry rather than consumption: 
the urban money-lender consumption rather than trade. Both banker 
and money-lender advance partly with, and partly without, security 
but the banker more often with than without, and the money-lender 
probably more often without than with. The banker is generally 
particular about the objects for which the money is required: the 
!?oney-lender is less careful. A further difference, and one, no 
doubt, arising from the last two, is that most of the banker’s clients 
repay punctually, and most of the money-lenders’ have to be pressed. 
The bankers, therefore, can afford to lend at 6 to 9 per cent and 
rarely goes beyond 12 per cent, but the money-lender commonly charges 
9 to 12 per cent and goes up to 18 per cent. The difference is the 
reflection of greater trouble and risk involved in the urban 
money-lender’s system1.’
/
1 Government of India - The Indian Central. Banking Enquiry Committee, 
(1931) vol. 1, Pt. 1. P. 73. op.cit.
2. Government of India - Report of the Punjab Provincial Banking 
Enquiry Committee, 1929 - 30 vol.l. Calcutta, 1930, P.130.
2
In other writings, money-lenders are sought to be distinguished 
from the indigenous bankers on the ground that while the indigenous 
bankers mainly accept denosits and deal in hundis (ie., an 
indigenous bill of exchange), money-lenders do not usually accent 
denosits or deal in hundis but are primarily concerned in money- 
lending.^ Thus indigenous bankers are defined as those other than 
Imperial Bank, the exchange banks, the joint-stock banks and
co-operative societies and the term meant any individual or private
2
firm lending money, taking deposits and dealing in hundis.
Similarly, it is said: M An indigenous banker, as distinct from a 
money-lender, or a money-lending trader, was to be identified by 
one of the two characteristics, viz., the acceptance of deposits and 
dealing in hundis, specifically associated with indigenous banking".'’ 
It is, however, argued that the above distinction between a 
money-lender and an indigenous banker is unsatisfactory.1 One 
Banking Committee could not "dissociate from the indigenous bankers 
the Multani shroffs who do not deal in deposits, but who have for all 
practical ourposes, been regarded as Bankers" In other reuorts, 
indigenous bankers are defined as "individuals or firms who deal in 
hundisf -whether they take deposits or not".^
1 See L.C.Jain - Indigenous Banking in India,McMillan.London 1929.P.3 
See also S.G.Panandikar - Banking in India, (8th ed.) Orient Longmans, 
Bombay, 1956. PP. 52 - 56.
2 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee, 
/(193D, vol.l. Part ,2^, P.73. on, cit.
3. R.B.I, - A. L . R . C . S. vol.l. Pt.2. P. 50 A* op. cit.
A. See B.C.Ghosh - A Study of the Indian Money Market, Oxford 
University Press, Calcutta, 19A3, PP 1AA - A5*
5. Government of India - Report of the Bombay Provincial Banking 
Enquiry Committee, Vol.l. Bombay, 1930, P 192.
6. Government of India - R.eport.'- of the Bengal Provincial Banking 
Enquiry Committee, vol.l. Calcutta, 1930 P.185.
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Similarly, Ghosh argued: " Dealing in hundis and not acceptance 
of deposits is thus made the distinguishing characteristic of the 
indigenous banker".''
It appears that a satisfactory way of distinguishing a 
money-lender from an indigenous banker is to state that the indigenous 
bankers are those who mainly deal in hundis and who may or may not 
accept deposits and the money-lenders are those who do not generally 
deal in hundis or accept deposits but who are mainly interested in 
money-1 ending.
2.7. 2. The Number of Money-Lenders.
It is difficult to offer an accurate estimate of the number of
jmoney-lenders or of the volume of money that they have invested in
agriculture, A pre- Independence account of the numbers of
money-lenders is given in Central Banking Enquiry Committee Report.
2
(1931).' But these figures are neither very reliable nor very 
relevant. It is further admitted that reliable data about capital 
invested by these agencies are not available.^ In another set of 
estimate in 1951-2, the number of licenses issued in 1948-9 is stated 
about six provinces/1
1 See, B,. C . Ghosh - 00 . cit, PP. 144- 45*
2 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee, 
(1931), vol 1, Pt.l. P-72, op.cit. ~
3 Ibid. P.73.
4 R.B.I. - A.I.R .C .S ., Vol 1, Pt.2. P.414, op. cit.
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A third set of estimate is provided in the census of India (1961) 
and this is shown table 2.1. We have calculated villages and village 
pouulation per money-lender to find out state-wise variations. It 
is revealed that Madras ( now Tamil Nadu) had 1.76 villages per 
money-lender whereas Assam had 321.28. Similarly, village population 
per money-lender was lowest in Madras ( 3083.1) and highest in Assam 
(1L4120.0). The table highlights much regional variation. Such 
variation may, perhaps be accounted for by the difference in the level 
and nature of economic activities, rate of growth of output in the 
agricultural sector and the availability of the alternative lending 
agencies.
2..7• 3* Classification of Money-Lenders: —
Money-lenders are generally classified as (a) professionals ^ iVot 
amd (b) non-professionals. Although the division is not watertight, 
i.t may be said that professional money-lenders are those whose 
primary concern is money-lending and non-orofessional those who are
/
mainly engaged in other activities and to whom money-lending is not 
of primary importance. It is contended that an agriculturist 
money-lender is one M whose major profession is agriculture and whose 
money-lending business is comparatively of minor importance. The 
category of professional money-lenders was defined to include all 
those who earned a substantial part of their income from money-lending 
and who could not be classified as agriculturist money-lenders”.^
The non-professional group of money-lenders includes heterogeneous 
sections like landlords, traders, pensioners, pleaders, widows etc.
This group lends their surplus funds from time to time to earn some 
income. Karkal, on the basis of his samples of observations doubted 
the presence of typical professional money-lenders in large numbers.^
1 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. vol.l. Pt.2. P.l. op.cit.
2 Gortal Karkal. - on Pit. , P. 22.
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Money-lenders are also classified as (a) rural and (b) urban.
The distinction mainly stems from the difference in the area of
onerations of money-lenders. Both types of money-lenders advance
1 ^
a large proportion of total loans against personal security.
In urban areas, both nrofessionals and trader - cum- merchant - cum -
money-lenders finance mainly trade and commerce. While most of
the village money-lenders advance kind loans, 80. if per cent of town
3
money-lenders do not ma>e such loans. Further, among the village 
money-lenders, %  per cent enquire about the purpose of loan and 
/j6 ner cent of those who enquired watched the actual utilization.
Among urban money-lenders, 78 per cent enquired the aims of loans and 
75 per cent of those who enquired did not watch the actual utilization.^  
It was also revealed that in regions other than Bihar, Bengal, Punjab, 
Rajasthan and South Deccan, the proportion of village and urban 
money-lenders who gave individual loans exceeding Rs. 500.00 was not
5
high. Nearly two-thirds of the village and urban money-lenders 
said that only 10 per cent or less of total loans advanced was
g
doubtful. Nearly 12 per cent of village money-lenders reported
that they advanced against standing crops and roughly 11 per cent
R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. j vol. 1. Pt 2, PP. Jf8A-/x85i op cit.
2 Gopal Karkal - op cit., P.28.
3 R.B.L. - A.I.R.C.S. , vol.l. Pt 2, P. Z*72, P Zf96, op.
if Ibid. P.Zf7*f and PP. Z+99 - 500.
5 Ibid" PP.Z+68 - 9 and P. Z+9/+.
6 p 'V75 and P. 502.
7 Ibid. P.A70.
of the resoondents gave loans against harvested crops and produce.^
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For the urban money-lenders, the relevant shares were 9.2 per cent
and 10.9 per cent respectively. It was found that about 7 per* cent
of the village money-lenders and about 14 per cent of urban
2
money-lenders accepted deposits. Thus deposit acceptance was not 
a very important activity of money-lenders. Again, about 14 per cent
of urban money-lenders and 10 per cent of village money-lenders
3
were also non-cultivating landowners. From the above, it follows 
that both rural, and urban money-lenders generally follow the same 
principles in granting credit.
Sometimes, cultivators themselves lend to other cultivators.
It has been pointed out that ” among the cultivators, it was mainly 
the large cultivators, and in particular the big cultivators, who 
undertook lending activities in substantial scale”.^  The nature 
of lending of this type of cultivator follow the general pattern 
of lending of village money-lenders.
1 Ibid. P.498
2 Ibid. P.477 and P. 502.
3 Ibid. P. 492
4 Ibid. P 527. It was also reported that a large proportion 
of total loans was given to big cultivators.
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2.7. 4 Importance of Money-Lenders:
In the absence of growth of institutional agencies, 
money-lenders have played an important cart in Indian agricultural 
finance. Thus, in 1951 - 2 private credit agencies consisting of 
money-lenders, relatives, 1andlords and traders accounted for about 
93 per cent of the total borrowing of cultivators. Here again, the 
professional and agriculturalist money-lenders accounted for about 
70 per cent of total borrowing. In sharp contrast, the combined 
share of all the organized agencies like banks and co-operatives was 
as low as 7.3 per cent of cultivators1 total borrowing. This is 
illustrated in table 1 .2.
Table 2.2. BORROWING OF CULTIVATORS FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES.
CREDIT Proportion of borrowing from each
AGENCY Agency to total borrowings of cultivators
(Per cent)
Government 3.3
Co-operatives 3.1
Relatives 14.2
Landlords 1.5
Agriculturist Money-lender 24.9
Professional Money-lender 44.8
Traders and Commission Agents 5.5
Commercial. Banks 0.9
Others 1.8
Source. R.B.I.- A.I.R.C.S. Vol.11, Bombay, 1954, P. 167
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In one report, it is said that the money-lender’s,
"presence has to be tolerated as a necessary evil for many years to
come".1 It was suggested that, "in implementing legislation intended
to restrict and control the activities of money-lenders, Government
should take note of the pace at which alternative machinery of
satisfactory type can be made available to agriculturists, and that
nothing would be gained by depriving the majority of the
agriculturists of even the existing facilities for credit long before
2
alternative supply could be arranged".
Three schools of thought on the question of reducing the 
predominating influence of money-lenders in India can be discerned 
over time. While one group advocated that since not much can be done 
about a change in the activities of money-lenders for quite a number 
of years to come/ they should be left/alone, the other group argued 
the elimination of money-lenders in future.L' The third group 
considered the nossibility of absorptionof money-lenders in the 
system of rural credit and introduce comnetition with money-lenders 
by establishing a suitable alternative. According to another 
school, the commercial bank should be subsidized by the state to 
extend their branches in rural areas. But such idea did not find 
much favour in the Renort of the Rural Banking Committee where it
■
was argued that banking was not 'an infant industry' to be protected.
1 Government of India, Ministry of Finance,Department of Economic 
Affairs - Renort of the Rural Banking Enauiry Committee (1950) 
Delhi, 1953, P.52.
2 Ibid. P.52.
3 Ibid. P.52.
4 See R.B.I - A.I.R.C.S. Vol.11. P. 481, especially this remark:
"It is certainly obvious that the money-lender can be alloted no
part in the scheme ^important or insignificant, notwithstanding 
a dominance which today is overwhelming". op. cit.
5 Government of Madras, B.V.Naryanaswami Naidu - Report of the 
Economist for Enquiry into Rural Indebtedness. (19UFT, Madras, 1'946 
P. 68. See also, Government of India - Report of the Agricultural 
Finance Sub-Committee, 1945* PP* 31-32.
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The Indian government broadly accepted the proposal of 
A.I.R.C.S. for gradually reducing, if not eliminating, the 
importance of money-lenders by strengthening the co-operatives as 
an alternative source for supplying rural credit. Of late, it has 
set up the Agricultural Refinance Corporation, Agricultural Credit 
Corporations and Small Farmers' Development Agencies. Later in our 
analysis, we shall try to examine how far the effects of government 
have been successful.
5 Operatlons of Monev-1enders:
It is possible to list briefly some of the major operations 
of money-lender si
a) The money-lender has a very good knowledge of the character 
and repaying capacity of the borrower.
b) The money-lender can be both rigid and elastic in his 
operations.
c) Loans are largely granted against personal security.
d) Money-lenders generally know the borrowers personally and 
the borrowers can approach the lenders easily.
e) In many cases, credit is granted for family expenditure of 
the borrowers.-^
f) The money-lender has different types and extent of control 
over the borrowers. Such forces are mainly socio-economic in 
character. Such forces are exhibited in the form of "loss of face 
or local prestige", caste disapproval or pressure through local 
self-governing bodies, ie, panchayats. The economic force lies in 
possible drying up of the source of credit.
1 For a comprehensive study,see, R.B.I- A.I.R.C.S.vol.11,PP. 171-177 
op.cit.
2 See S.B.I - A.I.R.C.S.., vol.l.Pt.2,PP. 484-485, op. cit.
3 m d .  P. 482 - 3. -------
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Within a village community, there are also other types of
control. Bailey argues that dominant castes could employ coercive
measures unon members of lower castes.^ Gough illustrated how
these coercive measures varied between paying fines to the temnle
funds operated by the high caste Brahmins and the eviction of
2
peasants from land in extreme cases. In this connexion, Srinivas 
argues: "The three main axes of power in the caste system are the 
ritual, the economic, and the political ones, and the oossession of 
power in any one sphere usually leads to the acquisition of power in 
the other tv/o. This does not mean, however, that inconsistencies do 
not occur..." Similarly, Bailey contends: "There was a high degree 
of coincidence between politico-economic rank and the ritual ranking 
of caste. This is a reflection of the general rule that those who 
achieve wealth and political power tend to rise to the ritual scheme 
of ranking".^ 1
1 See, F.G. Bailey - Tribe, Caste & Nation, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, I960, P.258.
2 See, Kathleen Gough,"The Social Structure of a Tanjore Village", 
Mckim Marriott (ed.) - Village India, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1955, P.44.
3 See, M.N.Srinivas - Caste in Modern India and other Essays.
Asia Publishing House, London, 1962, P.45.
4 Spe, F.G. Bailey - Caste and the Economic Frontier, A Village 
in pjlghland Orissa, Manchester University Press, Manchester,
3 1
But while examining the cause of land sale by peasants, Bailey
did not think that "persuasiveness of the money-lender" was the
only cause. "His character and his chicanery are an aggravating
ar.d marginal factor in a process which has more fundamental prime
causes"1 These "crime causes" were, according to Bailey, peasants
demand for cash and his initiative and not "the financial wiles of 
2 1a money-lender". Beteille has shown that some of these money­
lenders are persons of small means, eg, widows and old pensioners^ 
and with the improvement of the bargaining position of the tenant 
and provision of alternative sources of credit, the power of 
dominant caste as well as of money-lenders has declined to-day
2.7* 6 Money-lenders* Rate of Interest:
It is difficult to state precisely the interest rates charged 
by different types of money-lenders in different parts of India. 
Some such estimates are, however, available in the A.I.R.C.S.^
The evidence suggested that in some cases, such rates tended to 
be ’high'. It was also noted that existing legislative controls 
over maximum interest rate to be charged by money-lenders were 
hardly effective.^ We shall examine, at a later stage of our 
analysis, how far such 'high* rates can be explained by some such 
factors as risk, uncertainty, administrative cost and monopoly 
power of money-lenders.
1 Ibid. P.48.
2 Ibid. P.58.,
3 See Andre Beteille - Caste, Class & Power : Changing Patterns 
of Stratification in a Tanjore Village, University of California 
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1965, P 136.
4 Ibid. P.135.
?.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S., Vol.l.Pt.2. PP.488-9 and PP 558-9 op cit.
6 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S., Vol.11. P 174, pp. cit. '
3 2
2.7. 7• Malpractices of Money-lenders:
There is evidence to suggest that money-lenders, because 
of their dominance over rural credit, have had resort to several 
questionable practices. The most usual types have been:
Ma) demand for advance interest.
b) demand for a present for doing business, known as 
£irah kholal (purse opening)
c) taking of thumb impression on a blank paper with a view to 
inserting any arbitrary amount at a later date if the debtor 
becomes irregular in payment of interest.
d) general manipulation of the account to the disadvantage of 
the debtor,
e) insertion in written documents of sums considerably in excess 
of the actual money lent, and
f) taking of conditional sale deeds in order to provide against 
possible evasion of payment by the debtor".1
Moreover, it has been observed: "While it is true that the
money-lender is the most important constituent of the agricultural 
credit machinery of the country, it is not possible to justify many 
of his practices and the charges he makes for his services. Very 
often these charges are out of all proportion to the risk involved 
in the business and constitute an exploitation of the helplessness, 
ignorance and necessity of the borrower. Nor is the agricultural
economy of the country in a position to bear the strain of his
extortion. The credit dispensed by him instead of contributing to 
the agricultural prosperity of the country serves as a serious drag 
on it"."3
1 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee 
-/ (1931), vol.l. Part^, P.77. op.cit.
2 Government of India - Report of the Agricultural Finance Sub­
committee (1945) P.59, op.cit.
To what extent the money-lenders have discarded such practices 
at present i s  difficult to s a y .  But how far the operation of 
institutional sources of finance were successful in reducing such 
practices can be studied in connexion with the analysis of working 
of the organized sector in Indian agricultural economy.'1'
2.8. 1 The Indigenous Banker: Feature and Size:
It has already been observed that the distinguishing feature
of an indigenous banker lies not in accepting deposits but in
2
discounting hundis. It is very difficult to make an estimate of
their number at present. It is equally difficult to measure the 
amount of capital invested by indigenous bankers in the Indian 
money market. It is observed: "No reliable statistics of such 
persons or of the magnitude of their operations are, however, 
available, nor is it possible to distinguish clearly between bankers 
or shroffs and money-lenders. Although these persons will continue 
to play a significant role in the credit structure of the rural areas 
for years to come, it is apparent that their importance and 
activities are generally on the decline, particularly due to the 
stringent provisions of acts for the regulation of money-lenders and 
debt relief, and legislation affecting land tenures...Many of them 
appear to have restricted their activities, or withdrawn from the 
field altogether, and taken to urban trade and investment".^
However, no statistical evidence is cited to justify this 
conclusion.
1 See . ch. 6.
2 See 2.7.1. this chapter.
Government of India - Report of the Rural Banking Enquiry 
Committee (1950), PP. 15 - 16, op. cit.
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2.8. 2 Differences in the functions of Indigenous Bankers,
Money-lenders and Modern Bankers:
The differences in the functions of money-lenders and indigenous 
bankers may be briefly summarised: Whereas money-lenders usually
give loans to cultivators and petty-traders in the rural areas, 
indigenous bankers tend to give loans to trade, commerce or industry; 
money-lenders are less organized; their loans are generally smaller; 
their periodical turnover is generally less than that of the 
indigenous banker; money-lenders are present almost everywhere 
whereas indigenous bankers operate mainly in commercial centres; and 
interest rates charged by money-lenders are usually greater than 
those charged by indigenous bankers.^
The following distinctions are observed between indigenous 
bankers and modern bankers of the European type. Deposits of 
indigenous bankers form only a small proportion of total resources 
but these are generally the major source of working capital of 
modern bankers; modern bankers specialize exclusively in the banking 
business, but indigenous bankers generally combine banking with 
trading activities; both allow withdrawal of deposits, but in the 
case of modern bankers, withdrawal is usually made in cheques, while 
in the case of indigenous bankers withdrawal is made in cash.'
1 See, for illustration, Gopal Karkal - op.cit., PP. 45 - 80
2 See, L.C.Jain - o p , cit., PP. 42 - 3 .
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2.8. 8 Classification of Ind: renons Bankers:
It is possible to classify indigenous bankers broadly in three 
1
groups:
(a) those who mainly participate in banking activities,
(b) those who are mainly traders or merchants but employ their 
excess resources in banking activities,
(c) those who blend banking with trading business.
In view of the established fact that almost all indigenous 
bankers combine banking with other types of activities, it seems 
really difficult to distinguish between pure and non-professional 
indigenous bankers and to that extent the distinction which writers
V ~L
, like Karkal attempt to make, seems artificial.
In 1951-2, it was revealed that out of 199 reporting indigenous 
bankers, 82 were traders in agricultural goods, 36 were general 
merchants, Zf8 were brokers or commission agents or both, 18 were 
goldsmiths and jewellers and 39 had no occupation other than
3
indigenous banking. A further source of confusion lies in Karkalfs 
inclusion of Chettiars among both professional and non-professional 
indigenous banking sector.
As it has been observed that dealing in hundis is a major 
function of indigenous banker, it is necessary now to discuss the 
mechanism of hundi transactions.
1 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking Enouiry Committee 
(1931) VdLl Pt.l. PP. Qlt - 110, on cit.
2 See, Gopal Karkal - on, cit., P. 45*
3 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. vol 1, nt 2. PP. 506 - 7, on cit..
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2.8. l\ .1 Nature o f Hundit
In most of the available literature, the hundl is defined as 
an indigenous demand or usance bill of exchange. According to 
Jain: "... a hundi may be defined as a written order - usually
unconditional made by one person or another for the payment, on 
demand or after a specified time, of a certain sum of money to a 
person named therein". “
Jain argues that defined in this way the hundi differs in one 
important respect from the English bill of exchange, to the extent 
that a particular type of hundi - for example, JoKhami hundi - 
may not be an unconditional order though an English bill of exchange 
must be so. However, apart from some minor stylistic differences of 
hundi v/hich emanate from its drafting, the more important difference 
between the hundi and an English bill arises from the fact that 
whereas an English bill plays an important part in financing the 
country's trade, the hun di does not. Further, hundis, unlike 
English bills, do not have wide acceptance since they may not be 
drawn against commercial goods. PareKh argues that hundis are
p
genuine trade and not accommodation or finance bills.
1 L.C.Jain - op,cit. P.71.
2 H.T. PareKh - The Bombay Money Market, Oxford University Press 
Bombay, 1953, P.^7.
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However, it is difficult to say that a hundi is always a trade 
and not a finance bill. Karkal defined the hundi in a simpler way:
MHundi is the credit instrument for raising short-term finance 
generally in smaller amounts".^
This definition clearly explains the nature of hundi as an 
instrument of credit for facilitating rural finance in the short 
period.
2.8. k.2. Classification of hundis:
Hundis may be classified into two broad groups: (a) demand bills
or Darshani hundis : (b) usance bills or Muddati hundis. The
following illustration could be made to understand clearly the
2
different types of hundis.
TYPES OF HUNDI.
t___________mmbl_______________,
DARSHANI MUDDATI
DHANJOG SAHJOG FIRMANJOG DEKHANHAR DHANJOG SAHJOG FIRMANJOG JOKHAMI
The Sahjog hundi is payable to a respectable person whereas 
the Phan,jog hundi is payabl e to any ordinary nerson. Such a division
may have some sociological implications. In the case of the Sahjog
hundi, it is the duty of a banker to see when the hundi is cashed, 
the proper person receives the payment; no such obligation is involved 
in the case of Dhan.iog hundi. The Firman jog hundis are made payable 
to order. The Jokhami hundis are generally drawn against goods sent 
on condition that should the goods be lost in transit, the loss is to 
be suffered by the hundi holder. Dekhanhar hundis are generally 
payable to the bearer.
1 Gopal Karkal - op■cit., P.47.
2 L.C.Jain - on.cit., P,P.70 - 83.
3 O
Jain also describes Na.kal or an advice of a hundi.
This occurs when a broker or a merchant draws a hundi on another
merchant in another centre, he may send Nakal or advice to the
other merchant and in such Nakal, the name of the drawer, the name
of the oayee, the duration and the amount are stated. Without such
Nakal or without collaboration of such Nakal with the hundi, the
hun di s are not discounted. However, hundis are*seldom dishonoured.
Hundis may be of different amount and in the case of the
Muddati hundis, of different usance varying from 11 to 36? days.
2
Sometimes, a grace period is granted.'
2.8. k. 3 Transactions in hundi and their rates:
It is observed that the average number of demand hundis dealt 
in* per barker in 1931-2 varied from 32 in Coimbatore to A,000 in 
Ahmedabad. Taking the aggregate of all bankers, each banker dealt 
in 377 demand hundis on the average. The average amount per demand 
hundi dealt in, varied between Rs. 500#00 (Sagar) and Rs. 20,000.00 
(Shahj ah an pur). The average amount per usance hundi ranged from 
Rs. 1,100.00 (Malabar) to Rs. 5>000 (Sirohi and Satna). The 
average amount involved in hundis dealt in during one year per 
indigenous banker dealing in hundis varied from Rs.75?000.00 to 
Rs. 75 lakhs in case of demand hundis, and from about Rs. 0.31 lakhs 
to Rs. 3.35 lakhs in case of usance hundis.^
The rates of discounting hundis are different in different 
parts of the country and they may have some correlation with rates 
in the organized sector. They also show some seasonal fluctuations 
and all these are discussed later.^
1. Ibid., P. 78 - 80.
2. Ibid., P. 80.
3. R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S., vol 1, Pt.2, PP. 517 - 524 op.cit.,
If. See chapter IV.
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2.8.5•1♦ The Multani Bankers:
It is sometimes argued that aiTiong different types of indigenous 
bankers, a Multani banker plays an important role in the Indian
1
rural money market. The argument is made on the following grounds:
(a) Multani bankers' loans are generally unsecured and they are 
granted against hundis. They generally lend to the unorganized 
sector and obtain a cart of their funds from joint-stock banks by 
rediscounting hundis. In fact, they get concessional rates from 
the State Bank of India because while the Commercial banks lend to
Multani banks at 7 per cent rate, the State Bank charges per cent.
The limits up to which Multani banks may obtain loans by rediscounting
2
hundis varies between Rs. 25 crores to Rs. 30 crores.
(b) The total amount of loans granted by Multani bankers amounted 
to Rs. 100 crores in I960 - 61 in one estimate. In another 
estimation in 196^, the annual turnover of about 350 Multani 
bankers operating all over the country was about Rs. 150 crores.
The total loan is generally disbursed among 3 to 4 lakhs of rural
and urban borrowers and especially to those who do not receive
credit from joint-stock banks.
1 See, Camellia Punjabi, " Multani Bankers - Their Role in the 
Indian Money Market", The Journal of the Indian Institute of 
Bankers. vol.XXXll, No. A, October, 1961, PP-260 - 265
2 See, N.K.Karanjia, "The Role of the Indigenous Banker in India" 
Th-e Journal of the Indian Institute of Bankers. Vo] XXXV
No.2. April 196A, P.118. * ’
3 Ibid. PP 117 - 121.
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2.8. 5 • 2. Differences between Multani and other Indigenous Bankersj
Multani bankers differ from other indigenous bankers in certain 
respects:
(a) While many of the other indigenous bankers accept denosits, 
Multani bankers do not.
(b) While most of these loans of indigenous bankers are secured, 
those granted by Multani bankers are not.
(c) Contrary to the practice of other types of indigenous bankers, 
Mu? tani bankers grant loans only to traders because ba^ks discount
hundis only when they are drawn on traders.
(d) Although Multani bankers generally have large own resources, 
still contrary to the ways of other indigenous bankers, they lend 
only a small nart of their funds because otherwise the joint-3tock 
barks may refuse to provide rediscount facilities.
(e) Multani bankers generally carry out oure banking activities 
while most of the other types of indigenous bankers combine 
banking with other types of economic activities.
4 1
2.8.5*3 Operations of Multani Bankers*
The loans granted by MuIUani bankers generally vary between Rs. 2,500
-j
and Rs. 5>000 to traders not against security but against promissory
notes which are of 90 days usance. These time promissory notes are
generally discounted by commercial banks. Usually Multani bankers lend
at 12 per cent and obtain funds from joint-stock banks at 7 per cent - the
difference being their margin of profit. Judging from the angle of the
risk and uncertainty which are involved in loans granted by Multani
bankers such profit margins do not seem to be very high. Multani bankers
generally do not lend to speculators, non-traders and businessmen engaged
in film production. On average, each Multani banker deals with 300 parties
each day and this is supposed to indicate something about the scale of
2
activity of Multani bankers. However, Multani bankers sometimes rely upon 
brokers before granting credit or starting negotiations with a party. 
Further, there are other types of bank-brokers who form a link between 
joint-stock banks and Multani bankers because through these brokers,
Multani bankers obtain rediscounting facilities from the joint-stock banks 
which are generally renewed each year and at times even increased. The 
average brokerage charge per banker is about Rs. 300.00 per year since 
bank brokers are supposed to obtain Rs. 3 lakhs^ as brokerage from Multani 
bankers and since the number of such brokers is said to be about 300 in 
India.
1 At current rates of exchange, £1 = Rs. 18.00
$1 = Rs. 7«50 paisa 
Re1=100 paisa
2 See, Camellia Punjabi, op.cit., p. 263•
3 i lakh = 100,000
1 Crore =10 million.
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2.8.5. '• Pr sent P sit ion of Multanj Bankers;
It ’ m c ont en d e d tha ’ v e condition of about 300 Multani bankers
re; a: red stagnant between 1951 and 1961.“ An explanation of this
has bee::" found in the nolicy nursued by the P.P.I. As a. result of
this commercial banks have little incentive to for their liquidity
via invest::e t in Multani bills because should the commercial banks
require, they are encouraged to borrow from the P.B.I. either under
the Pill - -ket Scheme or ag'-inst government security er. Such a
policy is sunnosed to have clouded the future of Multani bankers.
Tic main objection of the P.B.I. against Mu? tani bills, is that they
2
are not me: nine trade bills but are accommodation bills. However, 
an accommodation bill is difficult to define, exccrt in terms of 
such -rtr that accommodation bills do not represent a specific
bu.s^ *.ness transaction a d in Indl a, the sts: dard practice for many 
years has bee: to borrow against hundis based on the genera1
financial stn: dir.g of the borrower rather than on any specific 
transaction. Again, had Multani bills been only accommodation bills, 
the State Bank would not have lent to Multani bankers an amount as 
high as Ps. 10 crores. It has been argued that the PBI should allow 
the commercial banks to invest in Mnltani bills uo to 5 per cent of 
the liquidity ratio a: d this would helm Mu? tmr. bankers to obtain 
fund of about Ps. 50 crores - nearly double the amount of fund that 
ti ey received in I960. ’’The Reserve Bank cannot possibly ignore the 
ron e of Multn-.l Bankers who arc one of the well-organised institutions 
in f e money market ar.d it should try to integrate them with other 
institutions of the money market". Punjabi’s nroposal certainly 
deserves careful consideration by those keen to promote further 
integration.
1 Ibid. P.265.
See, Camellia Punjabi, ’’Multani Bankers: Their Role in the Indian 
Money Market”, The Journal of the Indian Institute of Bankers, 
Vol.ixnil, Ho-.n 'January, 1962.'PP.rif3 - ZfS, ’ ’ " ~~
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2.8.6. Interest Rates charred by Indigenous Bankers:
It was argued above that the interest rates charged by 
indigenous bankers on loans were generally lower than those charged 
by money-lenders. Available statistical evidence seem to confirm 
this. In a large number of cases the interest rate varied between 
3 oer cent and 12i per cent.'1' In a few cases, of course, rates went 
up to 18 per cent. However, this will be analysed in greater detail 
at a later stage of our analysis.
2.8.7. Contact between Indigenous and Joint-Stock Banks:
In India, the commercial banks maintain an arrroved list of 
indigenous banks with whom they carry out transactions via granting 
loans and discounting hundis. The jdint-stock banks generally maintain 
a ceiling for granting credit to indigenous banks and this ceiling 
depends upon the credit - worthiness of indigenous banker.
Generally, commercial banks do not accept hundis from small traders 
with the endorsement of an indigenous banker to avoid risk. After 
the transformation of the Imperial Bank into the State Bank, the 
process of discounting hundis has not been discarded by the State 
Bank of India.
The degree of contact between the indigenous banker and the 
joint-stock banks is partly indicated by the interest rate prevailing 
in the 'bazaar1 and in the organized money market. Such contact is 
also’re flee ted in the fluctuations and trends of these two rates. 
Moreover, the volume of credit given by joint-stock banks to 
indigenous banks as a -proportion of total credit advanced can also 
indicate the degree of contact between joint-stock and indigenous 
banking.
— See, Government of India — The Indian Central Banking Enquiry 
Committee, vol.l. pt.l. PP. 100 - 102, on. citTT Also. “ ' 
R.B.I. - A.I.'R.C.S. vol.l. Pt. 2. P. 513, op. cit. ,
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It is, however, difficult to get a statistical estimate of 
such funds. To the extent that such funds are only a small 
proportion of total credit advanced by .joint-stock banks, the 
link is bound to be tenuous.
Each indigenous bank usually has accommodation facilities with
more than k or 5 joint-stock banks. Thus the annual turnover of the
banker is L to 6 times greater than his own capital.^ The size of
the annual turnover of the indigenous bank depends upon its own
funds, its borrowed capital, the magnitude of the limits set by
commercial banks and the number of accommodating banks. Generally,
indigenous bankers utilize their own funds for granting credit and
carry out other types of transactions and then try to obtain loans
2from commercial banks and other agencies. Sometimes, the 
commercial banks grant accommodation by (a) discounting the demand
promissory notes signed by two bankers, (b) discounting the hundis
signed by two bankers, (c) discounting other types of securities.^
Mostly, loans are granted not only on the basis of the type
of securities offered but also on the basis of the personal integrity
of indigenous banker.
1 Gopal Karkal - on.cit., P.68.
2 Ibid . P.68.
3 See, N. K. Karanjia - op cit., P.118.
5It is generally complained that indigenous bankers do not get 
the same facilities as other commercial banks. This might be because 
of the blending of banking with the non-banking activities of 
indigenous bankers as well as the failure to keep balances with the 
State Bank. Again, all classes of indigenous bankers do not get 
liberal assistance from commercial banks. It is said that in 
Calcutta, indigenous bankers directly approach commercial banks for 
accommodation while in Bombay, although the indigenous bankers apply 
directly to commercial banks, the negotiation takes place through 
brokers whose services are paid for by indigenous bankers.
2.8.8 Defects of Indigenous Banking:
Several defects may be noted in the working of indigenous 
2
banking in India.
(a) The indigenous banker pays very little attention to deposit - 
barking - a task which a modern banker considers essential. Failure 
in deposit banking has led to the failure to mobilize rural savings 
into nroductive investment.
(b) The indigenous banking system suffers from a lack of 
organization and effective leadership. There is little connexion 
between indigenous bankers and joint-stock banks. In fact, there 
exists too many markets with different rates on similar instruments.
(c) The small use of hundis has made the link between joint-stock 
and indigenous banking weak and this emphasizes the necessity of 
establishing a bill market for dealing with agricultural bills.
(d) A defective system of maintaining accounts is considered as 
another obstacle to bringing the indigenous banks within organized 
finance.
(e) Blending of banking with non-banking activities has prevented 
indigenous bankers from specializing in nurely banking activities.
1 Bimal 0. hhosv’ - on, cit. t P. 151. '
2 See, L.C.Jain - op^cit., Ch.Vll.
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(f) Indigenous bankers do not allow other monetary authorities 
1 ike the R.B.I. or State Bank to audit their accounts. Nor do 
they submit any periodical returns to the R.B.I.
2.3.9 Future of Indigenous Banking System:
There are two basic nroblems associated with the future of
indigenous banking in Indl a. The first is one of reformation of
the existing indigenous agencies so that they can be brought within
the organized financial, sector.' The second problem is one of
creating an alternative organized and. effecient agency to compete
with indigenous banks in order to reduce, if not eliminate, their 
2
influence. As regards the first nroblem, it may be said that the 
R.B.I. in the east, tried to integrate indigenous banks with 
organized banking by laying down the following rules:
(a) the indigenous banker should register himself as a Banking 
Comnany under the Banking Comnanies Act and thereby make himself 
automatically eligible for such facilities as are enjoyed by the 
joint-stock banks.
(b) the indigenous barker should fulfil three rules; ie
i) dissociate himself from trading activities,
ii) maintain proper accounts,
iii) submit himself to inspection.
Ironically, the first condition "was not needed and the second 
was not heeded". and as such the desired integration could not take 
place. Even now the R.B.I. has not been successful in inducing 
indigenous bankers to accent the above rules because of the 
intransigence of indigenous bankers in accepting these conditions.
1 See, L.C.-Jain - on. cit. , P. 237.
2 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. vol.11, P.329, on,cit.,
3 Ibid. P. 325, See also, R.B.I. - History of tie Reserve Bank of 
India, (1935 - 51), Bombay, 1970, PP. /;88 - 9
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2.9. 1 Nidhis and Ch? t Funds: Description.
The Nidhis and Chit Funds are mainly found in South India, 
especially in Madras.1 N1dhis are treated as quasi-banking
2
institutions which initially were mutual loan associations.
They accepted deposits either in the nature of proper deposits 
or in the nature of withdrawable share capital paid in monthly 
instalments.^ Nidhis granted loans for all purposes* Out of 
228 N1dhis in Madras in 1929, 123 were concentrated in one district. 
Total paid-up capital of all these Nidhis was about Rs. 21- crores 
and their deposits and reserve fund was roughly equal to Rs.ll crore.^' 
Generally, the members received loans at about 61 per cent interest
5
rate,' but in case of surplus funds, loans were granted even to the 
non-members. Recent estimates are not available of the financial 
position or transactions of either Nidhis or Chit Funds.
1 See, S.K. Muranjan - Modern Banking in India. New Book Co.,
Bombay, 19^0, PP. 1 if3 - lif7.
2 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee, 
vol 1, Pt.l. P.3^, o p  cit.,
3 Ibid. P.3it.
if Ibid. P.3if.
5 Government of India - Report of the Madras Provincial Banking 
Enquiry Committee, vol.1,~Calcutta, 1930, P.33.
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2.9• 2 Chit Funds:
Chit Funds .are mainly seen in Madras and in the former state
of Travancore.1 These Chit Funds are voluntary but loose
associations for mobilising rural savings. The exact number of
Chit Funds is not known. Usually, some persons decide to make
periodical payments to one among themselves - the Chit promoter
who gets the first collection as his due. Each successive collection
is given to one of the members according to different methods, the
most simple method is to give it to the members of the Chit in
rotation, the order of granting collection is decided by lottery.
2
Chits are also organized on the basis of needs. Some of these
funds are well-organized, but in many cases, they are mismanaged by 
the promoters, who happen to be dishonest. In some cases, the 
chief appeal of these funds lies in their gambling nature.^
2.9* 3 Reforms of Nidhis and Chit Funds:
Several suggestions have been made in the past for the reform 
Nidhis and Chit Funds.'' For example, a) they should be controlled 
by a special law. b) They should convert themselves into pure banks 
and function within the Banking Act, particularly, in matters of 
withdrawability of share capital, c) Nidhis should not be allowed to 
trade though they may be permitted to receive working capital in the 
form of share-capital paid up in small instalments. d) The accounts 
of the Nidhis should be duly audited and their balance - sheet 
published.
1 Ibid. PP. 195 - 219
2 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. vol.11, PP 338 - ^0, op cit.,
3 See, S.G. Panandikar - op cit., P.1A9.
A Government of India - The Ind? an Central Banking Enauiry Committee, 
vol.l, Pt.l. PP. 199 ~ 200, op.cit., ^
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As remards Chit Funds, it has been suggested that their 
promoters should be licensed and the Provincial government should 
decide whether a rrooerty qualification should not be prescribed 
for granting such licenses. Further, each Chit Fund must be 
seperately registered under orovisions of new law. However, these 
recommendations were not implemented.
The other suggestion for the reform of Chit Fund was to set 
up a 'Mutual Help Chit Fund1 where the members of the larger-sized 
primary society envisaged would associate itself to a semi- 
co-ooerative association connected with the orimary society for the 
ourrose of being able to borrow individually when occasion arises 
fro1-' the ap,r?rerate contribution.^
2
Other suggestions made include the following.
(a) The stakeholder of Chi t Fund should be the primary society.
(b) As regular contribution, a certain sum should be decided by 
the society.
(c) All villagers should be made eligible for the membership of 
Chit Fund.
(d) One-third of regular contribution should be treated as fixed 
interest bearing denosits kent in the society itself. After a 
fixed period, a member should be allowed to withdraw such deposits.
(e) Another third should be used to build up 'needs fund1. Loans 
from this fund will have a limit. This limit may be different for 
different types of subscribers.
(f) The last third of the fund collected by subscription could be 
disbursed in accordance with the prevailing practice of granting 
loans through a system of lottery.
1 See, R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. vol.11 PP. 65 - 67,op.cit.,
Ibid. PP. 339 - 340. ------
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The reforms suggested above seem to be quite useful, but 
unfortunately, until now, little has been done to transform the 
Chit Funds. At this point, we shall describe the nature and functions 
of the organized sector in agricultural finance.
2.10. 1 Structure of Organized Sector in Rural Finance:
The organised sector in the arena of rural finance consists 
of the following agencies:
(a) The Commercial banks : b) The Reserve Bank of India (R.B.I.)
(c) The State Bank of India : d) The co-operative Credit Societies
(e) Land Mortgage banks and f) Loan Offices in Bengal.
Of these agencies, the discussion of the role of land mortgage banks 
is outside the scone of our analysis because here we are not 
discussing the capital market. So far as Loan Offices are concerned, 
it may be mentioned that these offices were mainly set up in Bengal 
for granting loans against mortgage, pledge of jewellery or even 
against personal security at rates varying between 12 per cent and 
18 per cent against secured and 12 per cent to 56-i- per cent or 
112 per cent against unsecured loans.' Their total working capital 
was about Rs. 9 crores in 1929 and deposits were mobilized by paying 
higher interest rates. The importance of these loan offices are now
p
m  the wane in spite of some suggestions made for its improvement, 
and hence no attempt will be made here to analyse their working.
It has already been shown (see table 2.2) that the organized 
sector contributed only 7.3 per cent of the aggregate borrowings of 
cultivators in 1951 - 2. In 1961 - 2 their total contribution was 
about 18 per cent only. It is in the context of this role, we shall 
proceed to describe the importance ( or lack of it ) of commercial 
banks in rural credit.
1 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee 
(1931), vol.l. Pt.l, PP. 194 - 7, op.cltTT ' -----------
2 Government of India - Reoort of the Bengal Provincial.Banking . • • 
Enquiry Committee, vol.l.”PP. '214 - 220 op clt., ’ " *
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2. 10. 2 Role of Commercial Banksj_
In the history of agricultural credit in India, commercial 
banks have always nlayed a very small role.1 Thus, in 1951 - 2, 
co mercial banks accounted for only 0.9 per cent of the total amount 
borrowed by the cultivators. In 1967-8, loans granted to agriculture 
as a -orooortion of total loans advanced was only about 2. per cent.
It is possible to state several reasons to explain such minor role 
played by commercial banks. To mention a few:
a) The oroduction period in agriculture is so long that 
commercial banks do not like to make advances to cultivators because 
such loans would have to be given by violating the liquidity 
principle of bank advances.
b) The types of securities that farmers in India could generally 
offer to the commercial banks are not suitable for advancing loans 
against. In most cases, the best collateral that cultivators can 
offer is land. But there is no good market for land transactions 
in India and laws are designed in such a way as to rrevent land 
transfer. Further, there are many other problems with regard to 
title deeds and ownership. Thus even the best collateral, i.e. land, 
that the cultivators can offer may not be accepted always by 
commercial banks.
c) The prices of agricultural crops are subject to fluctuations, 
especially in a monsoon - type economy like India. In such cases, 
commercia1 banks, from the standpoint of profitability find very 
little incentive in granting credit against crops the value of which 
is subject to wide fluctuations and thereby courting the danger of 
capital loss.
See, for example, a) R.B.I.- Fjupancing of Agriculture by Commercial 
Bombay, 1969. b) R.B.I.- Organizational Framework for the ~
- nt-am -92 ci_a'1 Objectivef_ Bombay, 1969. c) R.B.I. _ Rrnort
""pyiietin^D^”^^b ^ • Karve]"BaEkingl7 
«> BiB.1. Bulletin. Deeen5er*i968/ —»bar, 1967,PP. 1635-16*1,
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d) The uneconomic nature of a large number of agricultural 
holdings had reduced credit-worthiness of agriculturists and 
hindered commercial banks from making advances to cultivators.
However, commercial banks grant loans to agriculturists 
indirectly by givinr credit to indigenous bankers and co-operatives. 
But here again, in 1951-2, less than 7 per cent of the working 
capital of State Co-onerative banks consisted of loans taken from
the commercial banks.'1' The indigenous banks mainly operate with
2
their own funds and occasionally borrow from commercial banks.
For quite some time there has been preoccupation with how 
commercial banks can play a greater role in agricultural finance.
It is argued that commercial banks could make short-term advances 
for facilitating the movement and marketing of crops. In order to 
enable the commercial banks to do that, the scheme for marketing 
of crops could be improved by,
M 1. the grading and standardization of staples and of contracts
2. proper storage facilities, and
3. creation of a properly regulated local as well as forward 
markets”.'
1 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S., vol 11, P 323, op, cit.,
2 See, for example, C.K.Johri - op cit., P.39.
3 R.B.I. Agricultural Credit Department - Statutory Report, 
Bombay, 1937, P.8.
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It is observed that in extending commercial banking facilities 
in rural areas, it is important to see that for mobilising rural 
savings into productive investment v* a derosit-acceptance in the 
rural areas, the commercial banks should not compete with 
co-ooerative credit societies. Thus, it is argued:MTf the storage 
and warehousing programme is effectively carried out and, further 
if that gives the needed stimulus to the orooer grading of more 
important agricultural commodities, commercial banks will then for 
the first time be able to lend substantially on such commodities; 
and, also for the first time, they will have agricultural bills 
which will be negotiable and which the Reserve Bank can rediscount 
for them...
Littl e progress v/as reported in the direction of commercial
p
bank advances to agriculture u p  to 1967-8. However, after 
nationalization of banks in 1969, the commercial banks have increased 
their lending to agriculture between 1969 and 1970,^ and this will 
be discussed later.
1 R.B.I. A.I.R.C.S. vol 11, P. op,cit.,
2 R.B.I. Report on Currency and. Finance, 1968-69.
3 R.B.I. Annual R eport, 1970, Bombay, 1970, PP. 62 - 6k•
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2.10. 3 The Reserve Bank of India (R.B.I.) :
The R.B.I. took a keen Interest in agricultural finance 
right from its inception.1 But, desnite its keeness, the R.B.I.Act
imposed certain limitations on the degree of help that the R.B.I.
2
could have rendered to the agriculturists. ' These limitations 
were understandable in view of the R.B.I's limited indirect 
financing to agriculture via co-operatives and inability to grant 
sufficiently long-term credit,
However, the R.B.I. continued to try to play a larger role 
in the field of agricultural credit. Thus, in January, 1938, it 
formulated a scheme for oroviding finance for the marketing of 
agricultural produce through the money-lenders. Further, it tried 
to lay down a few rules for bringing the indigenous banker into the 
fold of organized banking system. But the attempts of the R.B.I. 
for the integration of dual rural money market were, by and large, 
unsuccessful mainly because the indigenous financial agencies could 
not accept these conditions. After 1947, the R.B.I. introduced 
some changes in the legislation so that it could have granted loans 
more liberally to co-operatives for a longer ~eriod and at 
concessional rates.'
R.B.I. - History of the Reserve Bank of India (1933-31)
PP. 199-221 and PP. 467 - 492. op.cit.,
2 See, K.M.Patnaik - Monetary Pol*cy and Economic Development 
in I^dia, S. Chand & Co., New Delhi, n.d.1966'1 PP. 102 - 121.
See also, K. Subba Rao," Role of Reserve Bank in India in the 
Scheme of Agricultural Credit" R.B.I.Bulletin, Ausust. 1947.
PP. 485-92.
3 See, V. Sivaraman, " The Role of the Reserve Bank of India in 
the Scheme of Agricultural Credit", R.B.I. Bulletin. Auril 1952 
PP. 269-75. * ’
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Further, on the recommendations of the A.I.R.C.S., the R.B.I. 
started providing medium-term loans to State Co-onerative bar.ks 
from the National Agricultural Credit (Long-term operations) and 
the National Agricultural Credit (Stabilisation) Funds and long-term 
loans to Central land-mortgage banks from the National Agricultural 
(long-term operations) Fund. Again, the R.B.I. grants long-term 
loans to state governments for helping to subscribe to the 
share-capital of co-onerative credit institutions.”
The R.B.I. has surely tried to play an important role in rural 
finance. The role was inevitably indirect. We shall discuss later 
how far the R.B.I. departed from the orthodox principles of a 
central banker to promote integration of dual money market.
2. 10. /f The State Bank of India: (S.B.I.)
Under the State Bank of India Act, the Imperial Bank of India 
was converted into the State Bank of India (S.B.I.) and started its 
work from 1st, JulyT 1955* It was mainly on the recommendation of 
the A.I.R.C.S. that the Imperial Bank was nationalized to lend more 
active support for the growth of co-operative credit, to spread 
rural credit facilities all over India, to offer financial and other 
types of facilities to co-operative marketing and processing 
societi es.^
1 For details, see R.B.I. - The Reserve Bank of India - Functions 
and Working, Bombay, 1958. Also, R.B.I.- Report ~on Annual' Currency 
and Finance. 1967-68, especially table S.4Zh.
2 For detail, see, R.B.I. - Report of the All-India Rural Credit 
Review Committee, Bombay, 1969, PPw34Zl - 37Zf.
The S.B.I. was permitted to continue the commercial banking 
functions of the Imperial Bank. Hov/ever, it was desired that the 
S.B.I. would open at least 1+00 new branches within five years from 
the day of its opening. By helping to develop warehousing and 
marketing facilities, by discounting bills and hundis and by 
providing remittance facilities, the S.B.I. is expected to play a 
crucial role in rural credit. The expansion of the S.B.I. is 
impressive in terms of number of branches opened as well as in 
terms of granting rural credit indirectly. Nevertheless, uerhaps 
its success is not as big as one might have expected. The role of 
the S.B.I. will, hov/ever, be more closely examined later.
2. 10.5* 1 Co-onerative Credit Societies:
The origin of co-onerative credit societies in India for
nlaying an effective role in agricultural finance dates back to the
year 190/f when the Act related to the develooment of co-onerative
credit societies was nassed.^ But before 190h, some experiments
with co-operative societies were made in Bengal, Punjab and
Uttar Pradesh. By 1912, the total working capital of the movement
was less than Rs. 75 lakhs. To spread its growth more vigorously,
a new act was passed in 1912 whereby recognition v/as given to the
setting up of bodies like central banks and unions to finance and
supervise the societies at the primary level. The Act also made
nrovision for the registration of societies of various tynes for the
2
economic welfare of its members.
1 For detail, see Eleanor M.Hough - The Co-operative Movement in 
India, Fi fth ed. , Oxford University Press, Calcutta', 1966.
2 Government of India. The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee 
(1931), vol.l, Pt.l, PP. Ill - 153. on cit.,
It ir very disappointing to reflect that in 1951-2, co-onerative 
credit accounts for only 3.1 ^er cent of the total borrowing of 
cultivators even after about 50 years of its existence.'1 This 
represent failure for the movement and in the next section, we shall 
try to analyse some of the major causes of failure.
2. 10. 5. 2 Causes for the failure of Co-oreratives:
Several reasons may be advanced to explain the failure of 
co-oueratives in India. As early as in 1931, it was observed: 
ti ipvie fundamental principle of true co-operation is lacking.
Overdues were highly excessive. Audit is defective. Control is
2
inefficient". Further, " members of the society delay payments 
even when able to repay; understanding of the principles of 
co-operation and knowledge of essentials of rural credit are lacking; 
office-holders refrai’n from taking action against defaulters and the 
spirit of self-help is not prominent as it should be, if the 
movement is to be a. live force in the village. Even where defects 
are obvious and admitted, there is reluctance, as dangerous as it is 
regrettable, to liquidate societies whose condition is beyond remedy". 
Other defects of co-operatives consisted mainly in their inelasticity, 
dilatoriness and inadequacy/' The Central Banking Committee (1931) 
recommended, inter alia, the introduction of normal credit system 
whereby the society could fix the credit limit for each borrower in 
advance of the season and make arrangements for granting loans in due 
time. ^
1 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. Vol.11, P. 167, on.cit.,
2 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee.
(1931), vol.l, Pt.l, PR 132-/., op.cit., “
3 Ibid. P. 133.
h ibid. P. 136.
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Thus the Committe (1931) was in favour of loan sunervisi)n to make 
it more -oroductive. Other defects of co-operatives are associated 
with lack of adequate personnel and training, lack of initiative 
and personal contact, illiteracy and ignorance of the borrowers 
and dishonesty of managing committees.
Other factors contributing to an explanation of the failure 
of co-ooeratives may also be mentioned.
(a) Competition from money-lenders and other indigenous 
financial agencies was stiff. Further, the mode of operation of 
indigenous financial agencies was much more elastic and quick than 
that of co-operatives.'
(b) The co-operatives failed to satisfy, in anything other than
a limited way, two basic needs: ie., credit and marketing; thereby
2
they were ineffective.
(c) Lack of active sympathy towards the growth of co-operatives 
from organized financial institutions and even from co-ooeratives 
themselves.
(d) Co-onerative credit was largely granted to the large 
cultivators and sometimes on the basis of immovable properties 
which led to the sacrifice of the interest of small and medium 
peasants in particular and of co-onerative principle in general.^'
(e) Neglect of the needs of rural sector and bias towards the 
urban sector in getting credit.
1 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S, vol.11. PP.258-9, op. cit.,
2 Ibid. P.260.
3 Ibid. P.263.
4 Ibid. PP 234-5.
5 Ibid. P.272.
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(f) The " co-existence of three important facts, viz.,
1) the organic connexion between credit, marketing and processing,
2) the powerful, urban derived competition arrayed against co-operatives 
in each of these spheres, and 3) the weak rural-based structure of 
co-operative credit M~ explained partly the failure.
(g) The uneven competition between very weak, i.e., village and 
very strong, i.e. , urban economy within a socio economic structure 
which is based on caste (at least in the village) where the upper 
layer of that structure is connected with an administration in the 
urban sector and where such connexion was largely the end-product
of colonial rule and administration, commercialization of agriculture
and urbanization of industry, srelt disaster to co-operative
2
movement in India.
Despite this failure up to 19.51-2, some progress of 
co-orerative credit movement can be noted by 1961-2 when 
co-ooeratives accounted for about 15*5 per cent of total borrowings 
of cultivators.^ This share may have gone up to probably 2.0 to 25 
per cent in 1967-8 or more./; However, close examination will be 
made later of the workings of the credit co-operatives.^
1 Ibid. P.261
2 Ibid. PP. 278-9
3 See, P.B.I. Bulletin, September, 1965, P.1309.
h See, P.B.I. Organizational Framework for the Implementation of
Social Objective (1969) P. 5.78 o p .cit.,
5 See, Ch.V.
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/ 2. 10. 6 Government Finance;
Government financing of agriculture was rendered oossible 
during British rule by virtue of two laws;
(1) The Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883*
(2) The Agriculturists' Loans Act, 188^ +.
The first Act v/as passed to grant long-term loans and the 
second act was designed to grant short-term loans. Usually, loans 
were granted by the Government in times of famine and distress and 
such loans were treated as taccavi loans. Moreover, these loans 
had a role to nlay in giving credit to the backward areas and classes.
In 1931-2, it was revealed that taking India as a whole, 
government financed only 3.3 ^er cent of the total borrowings of 
the agriculturists.^' Further, in actual practice, the inadequate 
loan that was granted v/as "ill-performed" by an "ill-suited agency". 
The chief defects in such loan operations were stated to be as *.
p
following;
" (i) inadequacies of amount, inequality of distribution and 
inappropriafeeness of basis of security;
(ii) inconvenience of timing, incidental delays and 
impositions of various kinds on the borrowers; and
(iii) inefficiency of supervision and incompleteness of 
co-ordination".
1 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S., Vol.11. P. 167. on cit.,
2 Ibid. P. 199.
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Tt ho- ever, be rointed. out that there were come regional
vru’iatio" r in credit gra 'ted by government. Thun, in 1951-1? 
government accounted for about 11.6 per cent of the total borrowings
of cultivators in Pu jab* whereas 3 ysore, such proportion was
"i 2
only 0.2.' Such uneveness was observed also A.n 1961-2.
In. ge> era1 , different denartr "ts of government finance had
very little co-ordination among themselves, nor had t1 ey much
contact wifh other agencies for rural finance.
Such absence o^ co-ordination had naturally little impact
towards oromotino integration aiong the organized and unorganized
agencies. We shall examine later the more recent efforts of the
government.
2.10'.?. Th o _Po_stal Savings Bank:
The Postal Savings Bank is one of the chief organized agencies 
whereby it •s feasible to mobilise rura1 savings into investment. 
Post-Off'ces are located in every corner of village India and they 
accept deposits from the neonle. However, not much attention is 
raid to the deposit - banking side of oost-offices. A ri.se in 
denosit business could be useful in mobilizing rural savings.
1 Ibid. P.200.
2 See, PP. I Bulletin, Sent ember, 1965* P. 1357.
3 RBI - A.I.R.C.S. Vol.ll. P.208, on■cit.,
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Indeed, in India, the post-offices have the natural advantage 
of be^'ng located in most of the villages and in having familiarity 
with the local demand and supply sides of agricultural credit.
Under these circumstances, the following recommendations have been 
made for the development of Post-Office Savings Banks.~
(a) Greater interest should be taken by the officers in 
developing the deposit side of post-offices.
(b) When new post-offices are to be opened, due attention should 
be raid to the Problem of mobilising rural savings.
(c) To make the scheme for deposit mobilisation more attractive 
to the people, regional language should be used as far as possible 
in printing rules, notices, etc.
(d) There is a genuine need to produce vigorous propaganda on 
the role and utility of such post-office savings banks.
(e) Whether the rules regarding opening of accounts, withdrawals 
etc, could be made more elastic or not should be examined in detail.
Post-Offices are generally well organized and en.joy the 
confidence of people. They have a net-work of branches throughout 
the country and could be developed without much operational cost.
At present, interest rates offered by post-offices on savings are not 
high and as such rural savings may be mobilized by post-offices by 
the offer of higher deposit rates. It seems, therefore, that 
post-office savings banks, if properly developed, may play an 
important role for the promotion of integrated agricultural finance 
in India.
1 Government of India - Report of the Rural Banking Enquity 
Committee (1950), PP. 68 -~69, op~clt.,
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2. 11 Contact between the Organized and Unorganized Rural
Money Markets and ttie_problem of Integration:
From the present study of the nature and operations of the 
organized and unorganized money markets in the Indian rural economy, 
it emerges that one of the ma.jor problems of the Indian rural money 
market is the lack of integration between two different types of 
market. It is difficult to quantify precisely the degree to which 
the unorganized sector is dependent upon the organized sector.
But it is believed that there is little nexus between dual 
money markets."
Some estimates of the degree of contact between the two markets 
could be made by measuring the extent to which commercial banks have 
financed directly and indirectly the agricultural sector. In 1967,
only about 2 per cent of total loans given by commercial banks v/as
diverted to agriculture and as such the bank may be regarded as weak.
Another criterion to estimate such links would be to measure 
commercial banks1 lending to money-lenders. In 1951-1 only
if per cent of the total village money-lenders obtained credit from
2
the commercial banks."' Here again, the link between tv/o sectors 
appeared to be weak. More recent information about the dependence 
of money-lenders on commercial banks or other types of organized 
financial agencies are not available.
1 U Tun Wai - op cit., I.M.F. Staff Parers, November,1957,PP. 80-142
2 P.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S., vol. l,"Pt.2, PP. 672 - 675, o p .cit.,
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It may be argued that an estimate of the oroportion of total 
institutional credit in total agricultural credit may indicate the 
links between two money markets. Such proportion v/as about 7 in 
1951-2," 18 in 1961-2,"' and perhaps about 30 in 1967-8.^ This,
perhaps, suggests a slowly growing link but this also implies that 
unorganized agencies have still a firm grip over the supply side of 
agricultural credit. There are, however, other ways of measuring 
the degree of contact between the organized and unorganized sectors 
and we shall examine these links and. try to suggest some measures 
in our later discussion.^
1 R.B.I. - A.I .R ♦C .S . vol.11, P.167, on ,cit.,
2 R.B.I.Bulletin, September, 1965, P. 1309.
3 See R.B.I. - Organizational Framework....(1969). P.5 78, op cit., 
h. See Chapter V.
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2.' 12. Conclusions:
The following conclusions may be drawn from the preliminary 
analysis of the sunply side of agricultural credit:
(a) The Indian rural money market has a distinctly dual 
character as it is divided between the organized and unorganized 
sectors.
(b) The nature, composition and workings of the organized and 
unorganized financial agencies in the supply side demonstrate a 
good deal of contrast and complexity.
(c) The unorganized financial agencies - oarticularly the 
money-lenders - were fairly strong in the suuply side and despite 
some advances of the organized agencies between 1951 and 1968, 
they still supply about 70 per cent of total rural credit. This 
clearly underlines the magnitude of the problem to be faced in any 
attempt to reduce their importance.
(d) There are some links between the organized and unorganized 
sections but these are quite weak. Here the main problem is one 
of strengthening the links between the two sectors to promote 
further integration. This we examine in detail below.
This description of the suoply side will be followed by an 
analysis of the demand side of agricultural credit, and that leads 
naturally to the discussion of interest rates. In chanter 111, the 
demand side of rural credit is examined and this is followed by an 
analysis of interest rate in rural areas in chapter IV.
6 6
CHAPTER III
BORROWING AND INDEBTEDNESS OF INDIAN CULTIVATORS:
THE DEMAND SIDE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
It is generally believed that one of the basic features of Indian 
agriculture is the deficit nature of the family budgets of a large number 
of cultivators. In 1962, it was revealed that 62.6 per cent of 
reporting households with income less than Rs. 1200.00 had no savings 
(see table A 3.1). A very wmodest!: saving income ratio of 2.7 per cent
was observed for the income class Rs. 1201.00 - Rs. 1800.00 which 
accounted for about 19 per cent of total number of households.^
This reflects the very low level of income of the peasants. The fact 
that about two-thirds of rural households had no savings manifested 
clearly excess of expenditure over income.
The deficit nature of agricultural family budgets may be explained 
by a variety of factors. They include low income per capita derived 
from small and scattered holdings, uneconomic use of land, absence of 
the availability of basic inputs, vagaries of weather and lack of education.
As a result, Indian cultivators have to borrow whenever expenditure exceeds
income. Evidence of such borrowing and indebtedness is abundant in periods
2
both before and after independence. In 1931, total rural indebtedness in
3
India was about Rs. 900 crores in one estimate. But this was not very reliable
1 National Council of Applied Economic Research -All-India Rural Household 
Survey: Saving, Income and Investment, vol.II, New Delhi, 1965, PF. 96 - 100
2 See, for example, Government of India - The Indian Central Banking ... 
...(1931). vol.I, pt.l, P.55, op.cit., Government of India - Report of 
Agricultural Finance....(1945), PP. 2 - 17, op- cit., Government of Madras - 
Report of the Economist...(1946), PP. 24 - 56, op.cit. , Government of India - 
Report of the Rural Banking...(1950), PP. 36 - 39, op cit., R.B.I. Bulletin,
Sept. 1965, PP. 1296 - 1393.
3 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking...(1931), vol.I, pt.l.
P.55, op. cit. ...........................
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In 1961-2, cash loans outstanding for all rural households in
India, stood at Rs. 278'"'. 93 crores. Of this, Rs. 2380.00 crores
(ie, 85.3 ner cent) was outstanding against cultivators who formed
roughly about 73 rer cent of rural households. The average amount
outstanding ^er household and per reporting household v/as estimated
2
as Rs. 1|06 and Rs. 6h7 respectively.^ During 1961-2, out of total
rural borrowings of Rs. 1238 crores, cultivators borrowed Rs. 1038
crores i e, 83.5 Rer cent and roughly 19 per cent of rural households
reported borrowings at an average rate of Rs. 370 oer reporting
3
hour ehold end Rs. 180 per household. The proportion of debt 
outstanding per household in average tangible asset per household, 
was about 6 per cent.
In this chapter, we shall try to analyse several factors 
influencing the borrowing and debt patterns of Indian cultivators.
At the beginning, a reference will be made to the existing 
literature. Secondly, a statistical analysis will be made of 
borrowing and indebtedness according to purpose, security, duration, 
Interest rate., sources, seasonality and asset-grou.ps for the years 
1951-2 and 1961-2. A further analysis for the year 1969-70 would 
have been desirable, but unfortunately, no systematic data are 
available after 1967-2. Finally, we shall try to test a few 
hypotheses to she some estimates of relative changes in the 
significance in some of the explanatory variab? es over two points of 
time.
1 1 etln, September, 1965, P. 1297.
2 Ibid." P. 1297.
3 IbldT P. 1306.
h R.R.T. hi?.], etin, June, 1965, P. 859* Average tangible asset per 
household is said to be Rs. 6609-00.
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3* 2. A Reference to the Literature:
Attempts have been made from time to time in India to analyse
the composition, pattern and causes of borrowing by Indian
cultivators.' It is obvious that the need to borrow is a reflection a
of the excess of expenditure over income. The causes of such excess
expenditure have been considered in different Committee reports,
In one report, such causes included illiteracy, low holdings,
defective system of accounts kent by debtors and lack of the saving
habit among the cultivators. It v/as also argued that the longer the
interval between successive receipts of the return for labour, the
2
greater would be the need to borrow. The explanation was as follows; 
" I f  wages were paid monthly instead of weekly, on">y a very small 
nroportion of the working class in the v/orld could exist without 
credit; but the cultivator has to wait for half a year before he 
receives the return of his labour, and in far too large an area, 
where the^e is only one crop a year, the interval between successive 
receipts may be full twelve months".'' However, in the absence of 
reliable and adequate data, such a hypothesis cannot be tested.
In another report, attention has been drawn to such factors 
as poverty arising from soil condition, climate and irregular income, ' 
extravagance, growth of population, opportunities to borrow because 
of money-lenders* influence and revenue system of a fixed demand/
1 Thi s ch. , fn. 2, P . 4>(p ,
2 Government of India - Royal Commission on Agriculture in India 
(1928) Abridged Renort, Bombay, 1928, PP. 1-31 - 444.
3 Ibid., P. 432.
4 See, Government of India - The Indian Central Banking. ...(1931) 
vol. 1, Pt. 1. PP. 97 - 67, op- cit. , ~ ~  ^
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It has been argued that in the past, the most important reasons for 
hi-h de^t were high interest rates and ancestral debt. The debt 
burden assumed greater prooortion, also because of lack of
1
distinction between short and long-term agricultural finance.
But, he^e again, little attempt was made to quantify the influence 
of the explanatory variables in both borrowing and debt patterns. 
Further, little information was available about the influence of 
explanatory variables in different regions to account for regional 
variations.
In 19^5, on the basis of evidence provided by several Provincial 
Banking Committees (1931), the Agricultural Finance Sub.Committee 
(19L'p) observed that debt repayment was everywhere an important 
reason for contracting new debts, Debt was incurred also because 
o* social expenditure, consumer needs, and distress circumstances
2
while debt for capital expenditure was stated to be "insignificant".
The Committee (19^ +5) was right in stating that debt burden de-nended
upon the time at which the survey was conducted. Such burden may
be very low at the end of a successful harvest. This element of
seasonality in the pattern of rural borrowing calls for closer 
3
examination.' Further, borrowing may be affected by the nature of 
the economy. In a subsistence economy, and where intensive 
agricultural operations are low, borrowing may also be low both in 
aggregate and per capita terms whereas in a commercialized economy 
and where agricultural operations are fairly intensive, borrowing may 
be relatively high. Again, the nattern of borrowing may be different 
among different classes of cultivators. The physical features of 
agricultural area may sometimes determine the level of economic 
activity and this may affect capital expenditure and the level of 
borrowing. ‘
 ^ ■ ibmd. P.. 60. ? . Government of India - Report of the Agricultural
Finance Sub-CommitteedpAg) , PP 2 - 17, on cit.
7 IMfL- P*12. !■ " Ibid. P. 13.
However, it must not be assumed that the absence of borrowing, 
in itself, is a healthy sign because, "freedom from debt might be 
as much a sign of lack of credit as of financial strength". ~ In
India, the main causes of borrowing are stated to be associated
2
with physical resources and social environment. Poverty was 
regarded at the result of fluctuations in agricultural prices, 
system of land tenure and pressure of population.^
Such points are no doubt relevant but it is very difficult to 
examine the seperate effects of each one of these factors in the 
absence of suitable data. The Finance Sub-Committee (19^5) 
reached the conclusion that to cater for all types of rural credit, 
Agricultural Credit Corporations (A.C.C.) should be set up in each 
province to deal with short and long-term loan apnlications of any 
individual agricultural producer. But it was not clear from the 
renort how if, the A.C.C. were established, the relationship between 
the A.C.C. and co-operatives would grow. Moreover, the A.C.C. may 
face the same difficulties which the co-operatives had to encounter 
for many years. However, of late, it has been decided by the 
Government that an A.C.C. will be set up in those states where the 
co-oneratives could not progress satisfactorily.ll We shall turn to 
a closer examination of their role later.
1 Ibid. P.13.
2 Ibid. P.15.
3 Ibid. PP.15-16.
k For details,see, P.B.I. - Peoort of the All-India Rural Credit
Review Committee. (P.A.I.P.C.R.), Bombay, 1969,PR 6Mf - 662.
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Some avnntitative estimates o " rural indebtedresr in '"adras
province in 1946, are however, available in Naidu* s renort.
Ca ~es of rura1 indebtedness were classified as (a) "basic" and
(b) "alterable”. Basic reasons include the nature of the economy
like weather, so:M conditions and size of 1 and-holdings; the
'alterable1 reasons include factors like low mice, very high rate
of interest, natural growth of population, litigation, etc. Tt was,
however, argued that war-time debt v/as influenced by easy money
conditions, high prices, enactment of debt relief legislations,
2
sc1 e of land and supplementary income due to war-time causes.
Naidu tried to estimate the effects of land sales on debt 
liquidation and then argued that the rest of the total amount of 
debt that was liquidated between 19*0 and 1944 v/as entirely due to 
a war-time rise in prices. The statistical estimates of correlation 
between m i c e  rise and debt fall and the standard errorAjbf such
(k yt o“h  ^  •
correlation, however, in fairness to Naidu, it may be said that in 
Naidu1 s time, very little use of statistical tools was ’ado to 
analyse Indian economic problems.
Naidu1 s study bed certain of er interesting aspects. For 
example, data on per family and ner capita debt showed that tenants 
and 1 m.dless labourers incurred a greater volume of debt and there 
won' a worsening of their economic status. But Naidu's conclusion 
about the fa? ling total rura1 indebtedness war valid for Madras 
state a1 one and could not be generalized for the whole of India.
1 See, Government of Madras - Renort of the Economist... (1976) 
?. Ibid. P. 51.
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On the basis of oer capita debt calculated by Naidu,
Rangnekar estimated that the volume of indebtedness of Indian 
cultivators was roughly equal to Rs. 1100 crores in 1945*
After examining other regiona-1 studi es, Rangnekar concluded that 
so far as indebtedness is concerned, the economic condition of 
the cultivator might have been improved in 1912—3, but since then, 
the situation had deteriorated at least for 90 per cent of the 
agricultural population consisting of uneconomic holders, 
landless tenants and labourers. It may be pointed out that 
Rangnekar's method of estimation of total all-India debt from 
Naidu1s calculation of per caoita debt in the province of Madras 
does not seem to be very auoropriate. Moreover, Rangnekar's study 
did not throw any new light on the nroblem as his conclusion was 
just the same as Naidu1s observation.
After independence in 1950, conclusions similar to those drawn 
by Naidu and Rangnekar were also observed in another report.- 
It ±s argued that as the terms of trade moved in favour of 
agriculture, there was a rise in money income and savings and fall 
in debtedness in the rural sector. It is, however, conceded that 
a 1arge majority of the rural population might not have gained at 
all.
1 See, D.K.Rangnekar - Agricultural Finance in India. 
Co-operators Book Depot, Bombay, 1952, PP. 74-5.
2 Government of India - Report of the Rural Banking...(1950) 
P.39, on cit.,
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What is interesting in this renort (,1950) is the ease with which 
the conclusion about "general improvement" of the condition of 
agriculturists has been reached. For one thing, it is not clear 
what sort of data were used for arriving at the conclusion about 
reduction in indebtedness. For another, it is never stated which 
class of cultivators stood to gain when the "terms of exchange" 
was favourable to agriculturists, in fact, the question of 
distribution of gains among the different classes of Indian 
cultivators has se1 dom. been discussed in Indian economic literature.
Most of the studies mentioned so far have been made at the 
all-India level. Studies at the micro level (,ie. village) have 
also been made. In one such study in a south India village,
Harper broadly confirmed that the more general and common causes 
of borrowing are also witnessed at the village level. such 
causes include low income and repayment emanating from small and 
uneconomic land holdings, mismanagement of family property, 
expenditure on capital investment, livestock and ceremorb es. such 
reasons a~e, no doubt, important in explaining borrow: ng b'r 
cultivators but in the absence of suitable data, little opportunity 
is given to test the relative importance of the different variables, 
mentioned by Harper.
1 See, E.B.Harper, "Moneylending in the Village Economy of 
Malnad", "The Economic Weekly" Annual Ho., February h. 1961 
HP. 169 - 177.
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3.3 Method, Scope and Sources of present Study:
The method that we propose to follow in our present study 
for analysing the borrowing and indebtedness of cultivators is to 
apply simple and multiple OLS^ regression equations to available 
data to quantify our results as far as possible. Here we shall 
try to note the econometric problems involved in our analysis.
It may, however, be mentioned that this type of quantitative study 
has not been made before in analysing Indian agricultural credit 
problems and in this respect, our study may be regarded as 
different from others. The scope of the present enquiry will, 
however, be limited to only two periods ie. 1951-2 and 1961-2.
The choice of these two periods is dictated by the nature and
availability of data. However, we shall try to note the changes 
in relative significance of the explanatory variables that we shall 
introduce in our system of equations between 1951 and 1962.
The sources of data used in our analysis are mainly the 
following:
(a) R.B.I.- All-India Rural Credit Survey,vols. 1,11,111,(1951-2)
ie, A.I.R.C.S.
(b) R.B.I.- Rural Credit Follow-up Surveys: 1956-60.
(c) R.B.I.- "All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey",1961-21
published in R.B.I. Bulletin, September, 1965.
All these surveys were conducted by the R.B.I. and in data 
available in these surveys, borrowing and indebtedness of cultivators 
were classified according to sources, purposes, security, rate of 
interest, duration etc. and therefore, such data are amenable to 
statistical analysis.
1 OLS means ordinary least square.
It may, however, he mentioned that the Follow-up Surveys from 1956 
to I960 were generally made only for a certain limited number of 
districts and thus, strictly, comparisons with original surveys 
with data taken from Follow-up surveys have their limitations. 
Nevertheless, data available in the Follow-up Surveys will only be 
used when adequate data in the comparable year are not available 
from other sources. it is unfortunate that no recent information 
about borrowing and indebtedness is available because comparisons 
with data available for recent times would have made our analysis 
more interesting. This gap in empirical field requires careful 
consideration, it is also important to remember that the statistical 
estimates have to be interpreted with due caution.
3. 4. 1 Factors affecting borrowing and indebtedness:
1951-2 and 1961-2:
m  this section, an attempt will be made to analyse changes in -
the significance of different variables affecting borrowing and
indebtedness in both 1951-2 and 1961-2. The results obtained for
the year 1951-2 are summarised in the next section.
3. 4. 2 Estimates for 1951-2:
The estimates of the co-efficients of different purposes 
affecting borrowing in 1951-2 are set out in the following equation: 
(bee table a 3.2;
B = 26.3429 + .8015 F A + 1.2190 C A + .9089 cv + 1.0126 N ...(1) 
(.1229) (.1328) (.2130) (.2506)
Estimates of the equation for .debt for the same year is set 
out in equation (2) (See table A3.3)*
D 1.2534 + 1.5710 FA + .8781 CA +*9702 cv +*8655 N ...(2) 
(.157*0 (. 2254) (.3659) (1.0773)
Wh e r e
R?= *928
D. W. =-2.51 D.F = 23
B = Total borrowing.
D = Total loans outstanding.
FA = Family Expenditure.
CA = Capital Expenditure.
CV = Current Expenditure.
N = Non-farm business Expenditure.
Figures in parentheses show the standard errors.
Here we obtain a fairly good fit for both equations (1) and (2). 
However, in equation (2) estimate of the co-efficient of N seem to 
be insignificant.
When variables were introduced according to their significance 
it appeared, that CA was the most significant variable affecting 
borrowing and this is shown in equation (1.1) :
Capital expenditure, here, appears to explain about 60% of 
total variation and the result obtained seems to be very important 
because it refutes the widely believed hypothesis that family 
expenditure is the most significant variable that affects borrowing.
B = 91.2493 + 1.9480 CA 
(.1796)
D.W. = 1.95
...(1.1) R = *689 
D.F. = 53
F. = 117.60
1 For data, See, R.B.I.- A. I.R.C.S. . vol.lll. PP. 622-3, op .cit. ,
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However, in the case of indebtedness, family expenditure became 
the most significant variable as it alone explained 77% of the 
variation of total loans outstanding. This is shown in equation(2.1):
D = 33.0970 + 2.0963 FA ...(2.1) H2 = .766 
(.2273) D.F. = 26
F. = 85.03
In equation (1.2), it is revealed that FA coupled with CA 
explained about 80% of the borrowing and FA was relatively 
the second most significant variable affecting borrowing:
B = 37.3342 + .8714 FA + 1.4778 CA ...(1.2)
(.1657) (.1716)
R =*797 
D.F. = 52
Just the opposite happens in the case of indebtedness as CA comes 
after FA as the relatively second most significant variable to 
affect indebtedness. This is evinced in equation (2.2) :
D = 6.5920 + 1.6517 FA + 1.2210 CA ... (2.2) R ? -'900 
(.1719) (.2116) D.F. = 25
It appears that together with CA, FA explained about 90% of total
variation in indebtedness. The introduction of cv, which came
next in the order of significance, yielded (2.3):
D = 3.5130 + 1.5488 FA + .9412 CA + 1.0285 cv.... (2.3)
(.1538) (.2097) (.3559) p2 = 6
D.F. = 24.
Little multicollinearity was observed between the major explanatory
variables like FA and CA and hence our estimates appear to be
unbiased.
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3. *4 * 3 Estimates for 196?-2: 
The estimates obtained in section 3.4 • 2 may be compared now
1
wi th estimates made for the year 1961-2' . We have,
B = -0.2976 + 1.1713 FA + .8598 CA + .9695 cv + 2.3876R...(3)
(.3308) (.1493) (.1120) (.7886)
R ? = .993
D.W. = 2.If 3 D.F = 10
D = -0.6718 + 1.0856 FA + 1.131*1 CA + 0.9999 cv + 1.3757R... (if)
(.0399) (.1160) (.1452) (.4419)
Where D.W. =2.37 R? = .998
P = Debt repayment. D.F = 10
Equations (3) and (4) appear to be a good fit. It should be 
mentioned that for the year 1961-2, in the list of explanatory 
variables, rerayment of debt hasbeen included instead of 
non-farm business expenditure. Such replacement was due to the 
nature of data available.
Contrary to the existing belief, CA became the most significant 
variable affecting both borrowing and loans outstanding as evinced 
in equations (3*1) and (4*1):
B = 16.5581 + 3.4253 CA ...(3.1) P? =-907
(.3034) D.F = 13
D.W. = 2.15: F = 127.47
D = 45.3073 + 2.6475 CA ,..(4.1) R2 = .810
(.3555) D.F. = 13
D.W. = 2.07 F = 55.46
Thus, in 1961-2, the hypothesis that borrowing and debt were 
influenced most significantly by household expenditure cannot 
be accepted on the basis of Present study.
1 For data, see, R.B.I. Bulletin, September,1965* PP,1329-1331
and PP. 1363 - 1365.
See also tables A 3*4 and A 3«5
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Together with FA, CA accounted for about 96% of total 
variation of borrowing and 98% of indebtedness as shown in equation 
(3.2) and (4.2):
B = 5.0471 + 2.1308 CA + .9794 FA ...(3.2) RP ='964
(.3563) (.2249) D.F = 12
D = 5.6631 + 1.6920 CA + 1.0371 FA...(4.2) F2 =*987
(.1213) (.0804) D.F = 12
It should be mentioned that our estimates for the equation 
for borrowing are not wholly unbiased as multicollinearity was 
observed between CA and FA.
Therefore, our conclusion on borrowing should be accented with 
caution. On the other hand, little multicollinearity has been 
observed between CA and FA when loans outstandings were analysed 
and thus, in that case, our conclusion need not be substantially 
vitiated.
In the estimates of the equation for loans outstanding, 
current expenditure (ie. cv) came next in the order of significance 
and along with CA and FA, it explained 99% of total variation as 
shown in equation (4.3):
D = - 0.9680 + 1.4201 CA + 0.7994 cv + 1.1116 FA...(4.3)
(.0949) (.1741) (.0518)
F2 = .996 
D.F = 11
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3. 4• 4• Conclusions:
The following conclusions may be reached on the basis of the analysis 
made in previous sections:
(a) The main explanatory variables of borrowings and loans outstanding 
appeared to be capital and family expenditure for both 1951-2 and 1961-2.
(b) The widely believed hypothesis that cultivators borrow and remain 
indebted mainly for incurring large family expenditure has not been 
substantiated on the basis of our observation. Indeed, it appeared that in 
most cases it was capital and not family expenditure which was the most 
significant variable affecting the demand side.
(c) From (b) it follows that the hypothesis that there was some change 
from indebtedness for consumption to indebtedness for incurring capital 
expenditure between 1951-2 and 1961-2, and therefore, to some extent, to 
indebtedness for production has not been rejected in our findings. It may, 
however, be mentioned in support of our conclusion that using the R.B.I. 
Follow-up data for 1959-60, Dr. Tara Shukla also found "more intimate relation 
between investment and borrowings or debt than between family expenditure
and borrowings or debt". This may imply that districts or states borrowing
greater amount or having larger debts also invest more for productive purposes,
because of greater "technical potentiality for investment and hence less
2
uncertainty of repayment". This has also the important implication both at the 
district and the state level that at a higher level of borrowing, capital 
expenditure rather than family expenditure is more closely correlated with 
borrowing and/or debt and perhaps at a lower level of borrowing and/or debt 
family expenditure is more closely correlated with indebtedness.
1 See, Tara Shukla - Capital Formation in Indian Agriculture, Vora & Co. 
Publishers Private Ltd., Bombay, 1965* 167* 2 Ibid. P. 167*
3. 5• 1 Borrowing and Indebtedness according to Sources:
The study of borrowing and indebtedness according to sources 
may be important for many reasons. Firstly, it helps us to srecify 
different sources of credit. Secondly, a quantitative study 
enables us to evaluate the relative significance of different 
sources in the supoly side. Thirdly, the study may be useful in 
identifying the changes in the significance of organized and 
unorganized sectors in the supply side of rural credit.
3.5* 2 Estimates for 1951-2.
The stastitical estimates of the co-efficients of supply
agencies affecting borrowing and debt are stated in equations
(5.1) and (6.1):]vSee tables A 3.3 and A 3.6)
B = 47.2729 + 2.1866 CO + .8630 RL + .9708 AL + .8420 PL...(5.1) 
(1.4958) (.5218) (.1879) (.2055)
D.w.a 1.15 Ra = .822
D.F = 8
D = 22.3641 + 2.6383 CO + .8056 RL +1.0795 AL + 1.0105 PL...(6.1) 
(.5826) (.1984) (.0716) (.2122)
D.W.= 1.91 R2 = .945
Where CO = Co-operatives D.F. = 21
RL = Relatives
AL = Agricultural Money-lenders 
PL = Professional Money-lenders
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While equation (6.1) seems to be fairly good fit, in equation
(5.1), high standard errors of the co-efficients of CO and RL make 
their significance rather weak.
Agricultural money-lenders seemed to be the most significant 
variable affecting the supply side as it alone exolained about Ll% 
of total variation in borrowings and 75% of total debt as evinced 
in equations (5*1) and (6.1):
B = 182,6362 + .7266 AL ...(5.1) P2 = .*+16
(.2595) D.F. = 11
F = 7.8a
D = 103.603*4 + 1.1717 AL. . .(6.1) R2 = .796
(.1399) D.F = 2A
F = 7A.39
Together with orofessional money-lenders, agricultural 
money-lenders exolairied about 70% of total variation in borrowings. 
In case of indebtedness, co-ooeratives came next to agricultural 
money-lenders and together they exolained about 83% of total 
variation. These are shown in equations (5.2) and (6.2):
B = 109.8258 + .8717 AL + .6899 PL ...(5.2) R2 = .697
(.2018) (.2266) D.F. = 10
D = 76.7134 + 3.2010 CO + 1.11^1 AL...(6.2) R2 =.833 
(.9339) (.1141) D.F = 23
Relatives followed the professional money-lenders in the order of 
significance in the side of borrowings and professional, money-lenders 
followed the co-operatives in the side of debt as shown in equations
(5.3) and (6.3):
B = 60.2920 + 1.0022 AL + .8057 PL + .9631 RL...(5.3) R2 = .774 
(.1981) (.2165) (.5490) D.F, = 9
D = 44-3361 + 1.0464 AL + 3.1055 CO + 1.0406 PL.(6.3) R2 = .002 
(.0929) (.2499) (.2768) D.F = 22
The relatively high standard error for the co-efficient of RL in
(5.3) makes its estimate rather biased. However, our estimates have 
revealed the stronghold of money-lenders in the supply side.
8 3
3. 5• 3 Estimates for 7.961-2:
The relative significance of the agencies affecting the supply 
side in 1961-2 is shown in equations (?) and (8):.
B = 7.23B6 + .2492 CO + 3.2727 RL + 1.0953 AL + 1.3231 PL...(7)
(.2674) (.7037) (.1711) (.3617)
D.W. = 2.08. R2 = .962
D.F. = 10
D = 8.6922 + 1.4973 CO + 1.8342 PL + 1.0383 AL + 1.2948 PL..(8) 
(.2541) (.4918) (.0465) (.1315)
P.? = .991
D.W. = 2.93- D.F. = 10
Equations (7) and (8) seem to he good fit. However, in (7) the
significance of CO seems to be very low. O^ce again, agricultural
money-lenders appeared to be the most significant source in the
supply side explaining about 65% of the total variation of
borrowings and 79% of total debt as shown in equations (7.1) and
(8.1):
B = 33.0509 + 1.4865 AL ...(7.1) R° = .653
(.8007) D.F. = 13
F = 24.53
D = 63-4447 + 1.2594 AL ...(8.1) R 2 = .793
(.1782) D.F. = 13
F = 49.95
In the debt side, the professional money-lenders and in the
borrowing side, the relatives came next to agricultural money-lenders
in order of significance as shown in equations (7.2) and (8.2):
B = 7.0346 + 1.4491 AL + 4-4487 RL ...(7.2) R2 = .910 
(.1594) (.7593) D.F, = 12
D = 43.1402 + 1.0942 AL + 1.3988 PL...(8.2) R2 = .900 
(.1370) (.3910) D.F. = 12
1 For data, see, R.B.I.Bulletln. September,1965,PP.1323 - 4 and 
PP.1357 - 8, See, also, tables A.3.4 and A 3.5.
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Professional money-lenders car.e next to relatives in order of 
significance in the case of borrowing and co-oreratives cane next 
to professional money-lenders in the side of indebtedness. This is 
evinced in equations (P.7) and (8.3)*
B = 7.0628 + 1.1933 AL + 3.6293 RL + 1.2192 PL ...(7.3) 
(.1342) (.5871) (.3421)
R = .958 
D.F = 11
D = 18.8227 + .9982 AL + 1.3773 PL + 2.0241 CO ...(8.3) 
(.0667) (.1856) (.3113) P
R = .979 
D.F = 11
3.5. 4 Conclu^ ons;
The following conclusions may be reached on the basis of our 
present study.
(a) In both 1QB1-2 and 1961-2, agricultural money-lenders 
remained the most important source of credit to the cultivators in 
the supply side.
(b) The relative significance of the role of professional 
money-lenders went down considerably in 1961-2 in comparison with
1951-2 and this conclusion is in line with the findings of the 
R.B.I. survey.
(c) Relatives seem to have gained in importance in 1961-2 in 
comparison with 1951-2 in the side of borrowing.'1
(d) The importance of the co-oreratives did not appear to be 
great in the supply side in either 1951-2 or 1961-2.
(e) The supply side of rural credit was dominated by the 
unorganized sector in both 1951-2 and 1961-2 and little change, 
if any, was noted in this respect in the periods of our study.
1 ^Only interest-free loans given by relatives were treated as loans 
from relatives:Ioans bearing interest from a relative were classified 
as from one or the other of the appropriate agency such.as the. . . . 
agriculturist money-lender^,professional money-lender,etc.,according 
to the business of the relative".See,R.B.I . A. I .R.C._S. vol.l.Pt.2,
P .1. o p .cit.,
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3. 6. 1 Borrowing and Indebtedness according to security:
1931-2 and 1961 -2_:
In this section, v/e shall try to evaluate the significance 
of different tyres of securities against which loans were borrowed 
or outstanding. As we have done before, we shall confine our 
analysis to only two reriods, ie, 1951-2 and 1961-2;
3. 6. 2 Estimates for 1951-2:
The estimates made for the year 1951-2 have been stated in 
equations (9) and (10): (see tables A 3*7 and A 3.8):
B = 6.0185 + 1.0140 PS + .7713 BU + .9900 IP ...(9) R2 s .992
(.0196) (.3263) (.0643) D.F. = 34
D.W. = 2.25
D = -4.5979 + 1.0275 PS + 2.0397 BU + .9929 IP..(10)p
(.0212) (.2928) (.0351) R = .996
D.F. = 23
Where D.W. = 1.97
PS = personal security:"'
BU = Bullion and Ornaments:
IP = Immovable property:
D = Cash loan outstanding for more than one year.
Personal security alone explained 92% of the total variation in
borrowing and *84# of total debt as shown in (9.1) and (10.1):
B = 14.6159 + 1.1330 PS ...(9.1) R2 = .926
(.0533) D.F. = 36
F. = 452.06
D = 31.7685 + 1.2915 PS ...(10.1) R2 = .843
(.1115) D.F. = 25
F. = 134.19
1 For data, see, R.B.I.- A.I.R.C.S.,vol 111, pp. 595-6 and 
PP. 640-1, op cit.,
2 These are unsecured loans,generally given against nersonal 
guarantee.
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Irrnovahl e property ca .e next to personal security as the 
second most significant explanatory variable and together they 
explained 99% of total variations in borrowings and 93% of debt. 
This is shown in equations (9.2) and. 10.2):
E = 10.7817 + 1.0113 PS + 1.0281 IP ...(9.2) R2 = .991
(.0208) (.0662) D.F = 35
1.0395 PS + 0.9824 IP  (10.2) P2 = .987
(.0364) (.0606) D.F. = 24
The exrnlanatory variables here appeared to be free from 
multicollinearity and auto-correlation and the estimates anpear 
to be unbiased.
3. 6. 3 Estimates for 1961-2:
The results obtained for the year 1961-2 are summarised 
in equations (11) and (12): (see table A 3.9)
B = 12.0495 + .9277 PS + 1.1866 IP + .8774 SV - .3340 BU (11)
(.1394) (1.0242) (.8133) (3.9674)
D.W. =1.87. R2 = .932
D.F. = 7
D = 10.5043 + 1.0072 PS + 1.0110 IP +*5256 SU + .4985 BU (12)
(.0760) (.1434) (.7250) (2.2220)
Where D.W. = 1.98. R2 = .982
D.F. = 9
SU = Guarantee by third party on surety security.
In equations (11) and (12), estimates of both SV and BU appear to 
be biased and insignificant and this was also true to the estimate 
of IP in (11). Personal security explained alone 89% of total 
variation of borrowing and 88% of total debt as shown in equations 
(11.1) and(12.1):
B = 13.7421 + 1.1042 PS ...(11.1) R2 = .896
(.1187) D.F. = 10
F_ = 86.61
D = 33.6162 + 1.1507 PS ...(12.1) R = .881
(.1222) D.F. = 12
F = 88.72
1 For data, see, R.B.J .Bui.letin,. September. 1965.PP 1338-1^40 and 
PP. 1372-1374.
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Immovable property cane next to personal security in the order 
of significance and together they explained about 98% of total 
variation of debt as shown in (12.2):
D = 10.^576 + 1.0356 PS + 9998 IP ...(12.2) P? = .981 
(.0527) (.1318) D.F. = 11
3. 6. b Conclusions:
The following conclusions may be drawn on the basis of our 
study made in sections 3*6.1 to 3*6.3 '
(a) Personal security was by far the most important form of 
security against which loans were either borrowed or outstanding
in both 1951-2 and 1961-2.
(b) In both oeriods of our study, little change has taken ■niece 
in the forms of security offered by the cultivators to get loans. 
This underlines the problem of developing different types of 
securities against which loans may be granted. The existence of 
such a problem emphasizes simply the limitations faced by 
organized agencies in granting credit to the farmers. On the other 
hand, it strengthens the hand of unorganized agencies in Indian 
rural money market, particularly those of money-lenders, who did 
not hesitate to advance loans against oersonal security. Thus, 
the problem is one of developing suitable types of securities 
which would be acceptable by the organized agencies. If the 
process of developing securities takes a long time, then the 
organized agencies like co-operatives and commercial banks must 
devise such measures which would take into account the farmers' 
ability and skill to produce, earn and repay rather than their 
static income and assets.
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(c) "r + follows from (b) that attempts to ex'oand credit flows 
by ^ed agencies in rural areas may involve departure from
the traditional principles of institutional financing and perhaps 
such institutional agencies may have to formulate an "anticipated 
income theory of liquidity" instead of strictly adhering to the 
orthodox canons of banking like liquidity and profitability.
3.7. 1 Relationship between borrowing, indebtedness and asset-grouns:
After considering the classification of borrowing and 
indebtedness according to different types of security, it may be 
interesting to examine how loans were granted by the co-oneratives 
as well as at all-India level to different types of cultivators 
belonging to different asset-groups. It is generally argued that 
in India, distribution of credit is unfavourable to poor farmers.
In this section, we shall try to test the validity of this 
hypothesis. Unfortunately, data on credit distribution according 
to asset-groups are not adequate in 1951-2 to make a comparative 
estimate between 1951-2 avd "1961-2 possible and thus our estimate 
will be made for only one period, ie, 1961-2.
3. 7. 2 Borrowings from Co-operatives according to asset-groups:
The total a ount borrowed fvom cultivators from co-operatives 
in the Survey year (1961-2) stood at Rs. 160.5 crores and this was 
93.6% of total borrowings of all rural households from co-operatives.1 
The proportion of borrowings from co-operatives to total borrowing 
rose from 3.9% for the lowest asset-group to 20.5% for the highest 
asset-group. Thus, a relatively himher proportion of borrowing was 
observed among that section of cultivators who belonged to higher 
asset-groups. The average borrowing per reporting household rose 
from Rs. 103.0 to Rs. 899*0 for the highest asset-group.2
1 Cultivators form about 4/5ths of total rural households.
2 See, R.B.I.Bulletin, Sept ember,1965, PP. 1311-1312..................
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It is observed that the rural households in the asset-groups of
Rs.20,000 and above, who formed about 5% of all the rural households,
accounted for about l/3rd of the aggregate borrowings from co-operatives,
while the households in the two lowest asset-groups, forming 30%
of all rural households had a share of only 3.5% in the total
1
amount advanced by co-operatives in 1961-2. " We shall now note 
whether the same pattern of borrowing is observed at all-India 
level.
3. 7• 3 Borrowings according to asset-groups:All-India! 1961/2.
The share of each asset-group in total cash borrowings at the 
all-India level roughly shows the same pattern that we have 
considered in the earlier section. The lowest asset-group 
accounted for only 1 Jf/o of total borrowings whereas the highest 
asset-group accounted for 23%. The top two asset-groups together 
accounted for A3.2% of total borrowings. This implies that credit 
distribution both at the all-India level as well as from 
co-oneratives, was in favour of those cultivators who belonged 
to the higher asset-groups. In the following section, we shall try 
to make some statistical estimates of borrowings and debt in 
different asset-groups at all-India level.
1 I_bidv pp- 1311-1312
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3. 7. J-i Statistical Estimates of borrowing and debt according 
to asset-groups: _196l-2:
The application of simple linear regression to all-India
data yielded equations (13) and (11)' (see Table A 3.10)
B =: 116.7872 + .0110 A ...(13) P2 = .9961
(.0010) D.F. = 3
t = 10.82 D.W. = 2.0791
D = 182.1823 + .0818 A ...(14) H2 = .9889
(.0035) D.F. = 5
t = 23.13 D.W. = 2.2972
Where B = Average borrowing per reporting household
D = Average loans outstanding oer reporting household.
A = Asset-groups.
Equations (13) arid (lit) show clearly that the relationship between 
borrowing/debt and asset-groups is positive and highly significant 
given the t-values. The equations also appear to be free from 
auto-correlation given D.W. statistic.
The regression analysis for borrowings from and indebtedness
p
to co-operatives and asset groups yielded equations (15) and (16):
B = 119.1253 + .0409 A ...(15) 82 = .9961
(.0010) D.F = 5
t = 39.09 D.W = 1.9946
D = -27.8074 + 2.4480 ...(16) R 2 = .9966
(.0581) D.F = 5
t = 42.14 D.W = I.986O
Where Bc = Borrowings from co-ooeratives and 
Dc = Indebtedness to Co-ooeratives.
Equations(15) and (16) suggest that the relationship between 
asset-groups and borrowings and indebtedness to co-operatives is 
positive and statistically highly significant.
1 For data, see, R.B.I.Bulletin, September, 3Q65.P 1306 and 
PP. 1296 - 1297.
2 Ibid, P.1301 and P. 1311.
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3.7. 3• Conclusions:
It is possible to draw the following conclusions on the 
basis of our study on the relationship between borrowings/ 
indebtedness end asset-groups:
0 )  The correlation between borrowing, indebtedness and
asset-groups is oositive and statistically highly significant 
at the all-India level.
(?.) Such strong correlation also existed in the case of
credit distribution by the co-ooeratives.
(3) It follows that credit distribution, both at all-India
level and by the co-operatives remained unfavourable to the small 
and ooor farmers rWho constitute a great majority of Indian 
cultivators. This problem is given further attention in 
chapter V.
3*3. 1 . Borrowing a d Debt according to different Interest Rates: 
1931-1 and 1961-2:
It has been stated that in underdeveloped countries like India, 
cultivators are often charged high interest rates, particularly by 
the unorganized agencies which consist of money-lenders, traders 
and landlords. The causes of the prevalence of high rates are 
stated to be high risks and uncertainty in lending, administrative 
cost, the nature of agricultural economy, monopoly power of 
money-lenders and the scarcity of loanable funds in relation to 
demand for such loans. A rigorous discussion of all these points 
will be attcmnted in the nnxt chapter of our study. Here we shall 
briefly v''"Per to the different interest rates which were charged in 
195?-2 sad 1961-2 and try to draw some implications from such 
comparison.
cultivators: All-India: 1951-2*
From the available data, the proportions of borrowings said 
debt at different interest rates are summarised in table A 3.11.
■From the table A 3.11, it follows that the highest proportion 
of both borrowings and debt took place at rates varying between 
18/c and 25% followed by proportions of borrowing of about 21% 
and of indebtedness of about 23% at rates varying between 10% 
and 124%. One observes that no interest rate was charged either 
on borrowing or debt of significant proportion (ie, about 1/5th 
to 1/Ath of debt and borrowing). Such loans were given mainly 
by friends and relatives. The proportions of borrowings and debt 
at rates over 23% were not high and such Proportions over 33% 
appeared to be still less. Similarly, borrowings and debt at 
rates varying either between 7%° and 10% or between 34% and 7% 
appeared to be fairly similar and low, ie, around 6 to 7 pen cent.
Proportions of borrowings and debt appeared to be quite low at 
rates higher than 33°/° on lower than 34%. It seems that oxagggerated 
statements about interest rates need to be modified in view of 
these facts.
3.8. 3 • Borrowing by cultivato r s ac cor din g_ to diff erent _i n t erest 
^ates: 1961-2;
We may try to summarise the findings of the P.B.I. survey 
where borrowings in 1961-2 were classified according to interest 
rates paid by cultivators.
It is worth observing (see table A 3.12) that the highest 
proportion of borrowing ie, 25%, took place without any interest 
being paid on that, followed by 18.7% of total borrowings at rates 
varying between 94% and 124%.
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About 16.5% of total borrowing was contracted at rates ranging 
w / from 181% to 25%a W r l e  15.5% of total was accounted for by the 
rates varying between 61% to 9l%. Proportion of borrowings at 
rates higher than 371% seems to be very low, ie, 1.5% and that 
varying between 2^% and 57f% seems to be quite low, ie, A.9%.
As regards interest rates charged on debt*: it is, however, 
unfortunate that estimates are not available for the year 1961-2. 
Some data are available in the Rural Credit Follow-up Survey 
(1959-60).'" But this survey was made in only 9 districts. This 
makes the task of comparison and generalization quite difficult 
and hence no further attempt is made here to undertake such 
analysis of rates charged on debt,
3.8. If. A comparison of rates charged on borrowing in 1951-2 
with those charged in 1961-2:
It is apparent from tables A 3^11.aud A 3.12. that the 
classification of interest rates in 1961-2 is not the same as it 
was in 1951-2. Nonetheless, some rough comparisons could be made 
on the basis of given classifications. Firstly, it may be said 
that the proportion of interest-free borrowing remained quite 
substantial for both the reriods. In fact, such proportion went 
up slightly in 1961-2 in comparison with 1951-2. Secondly, the 
proportion of borrowing at rates roughly varying between 18 and 
25 ner cent went down in 1961-2 to 18.7% from 2L% in 1951-2.
Thirdly, the percentage of borrowing at rates ranging between 10% 
and 12J-% was 21% in 1951-2. In 1961-2, at rates varying between 
91% and 12l%, 18.7% of total loans was borrowed.
1 R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey: 1959-60, Bombay.1962 
PP. 33-5. ‘  "
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Fourthly, the proportion of borrowing at rates less than 3i% 
in 1951-2 and 1961-2 or at rates higher than 35% in 1951-2 and 
374% in 1961-2 appeared to be quite low. Fifthly, in 1951-2, 
■proportion of borrowing at rates varying between 7% and 10% 
accounted for 6.2% of total borrowing. In 1961-2, interest rates 
at the range of 6£% to 9i% accounted for 15.5% of total borrowings. 
This seems to be an appreciable change. In general, borrowing at 
rates ranging from 10% to 25% accounted for nearly half the total 
amount of borrowing by cultivators in 1951-2; in 1961-2, 
borrowings at rates ranging between 9i'% and 25% accounted for about 
Z|3% of total borrowing. Thus, it appears that rates varying between 
9l% and 25% remained the most important range as it accounted for 
the largest proportion of borrowing up to 1961-2.
3.9* 1. Seasonality in Borrowings:
In India, the main agricultural activities are concerned 
with the harvesting seasons of crops. The farmers generally raise 
two types of crops: (a) the Kharif crops, and (b) Pabi crops.
A clearer distinction would mean that Kharif is monsoon crop 
while Rabl is winter crop. The harvesting of Kharif crop takes 
nlace during and just before the monsoon months ie., May to August, 
while cultivation for and raising of Pabi crop takes -nlace between 
November and February. In some -carts of India, the Rabl crop is 
more important of the two, but the Kharif crop is the main crop 
that is harvested and raised in most parts of the country. It is 
said that Farmers’ demand for loans tend to be high during the 
monsoon season and we shall try to test this hypothesis on the 
basis of available information.
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3.Q. 2. Some Brnpirt cal Evidence; 1956-60!
It is nossible to examine the nature of seasonality in the 
pattern of rural borrowing on the basis of Rural Credit Follow-up 
Surveys from 1956 to I960. In, 1956-7, for examole, such elements 
of seasonality were palnable and it was observed that seasonality 
in borrowing depended to a large extent unon the tyoe of crop 
sown and harvested at different times of the year. It is further 
revealed that in districts like Broach, East Khandesh, Dharwar and 
Gaya, only one period of economic activity during the sowing season 
was observed. During May and August, 69% of total borrowings was 
contracted in Gaya, 60% in Dharwar and 35% in Broach in 1956-7.
In Ferozepur, a large proportion of borrowing was reported once 
during August-Sentember and again during November-February. The 
first period coincided with making oreparation for the cultivation 
of Rabi crons aid cotton, and the second season coincided with 
harvesting of cotton-crops and sowing and growth of Rabi cro^s.“
In 1957-8, once again, it was observed that between May and August, 
85% of total borrowing took nlace in Akola, 68% in Burdwan and more 
than 50% in districts like Monghyr, -Jullundar, Nizamabad, Bangalore 
and Chingleput. Similarly, in 1958-9, in all the five districts 
surveyed there was greater proportion of borrowing between May and 
August an.r1 it was particularly heavy in districts like Jalnaiguri 
and Ahmedabad. In Mirzapur and Hissar, where both Kharif and Rabi 
crops are cultivated, the proportion of borrowing was noted to be 
greater not only during May and August but also during February and 
March.
1 See, R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey:1956-7, General 
Review Report, Bo bay, I960, PP.114-119.
2 See, R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey:1957-8. Bombay 
1961, PP. 62-4. " ’ ~  "
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Further, in 1959-60, the se .e nattern was observed and it was 
revealed that more than 2/5ths of the borrowings in all districts 
and abour half or more in six of them was contracted between May 
and August. It was observed: "Generally speaking, agricultural 
onere^'ons during the Kharif season along with the consumption 
needs during these lean months seem to have given rise to the 
concentration of borrowing during these months".
3.° . 3• Conclusions:
The following conclusions may be drawn from our study on 
borrowing and seasonality.
(a) Borrowings tend to be related to the level of agricultural 
activities. Such association seems to be nositive.
(b) In India, presumably because of the preval ence of a 
monsoon-type economy, greater attention to agricultural activities 
is paid between May and August when the Khar?.f crop is sown and 
grown along with necessary preparations for sowing. The data 
available for 1956-60 help us to conclude that there is a greater 
concentration of borrowing between May and August in most of the 
districts surveyed in comparison to other quarters of the year, 
excepting, of course, those districts where Rabi crops were mainly 
cultivated.
(c) In the case of those districts where winter crop is mainly 
grown, the proportion of borrowing was high in winter in 
comparison with other times in the year.
(d) The data available showed the existence of seasonality in 
borrowing among the cultivators. However, greater investigations 
need to be carried out to identify the exact nature of seasonality
1 R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey: 1PS9-60. Bombay. 196?. 
PP. 59 - 60. ~
97
(e) The presence of seasonality may imply the necessity of
introducing a flexible and seasonal rural credit policy.
3.10. 1. Borrowings and R epayments:
It may be useful to know the role played by borrowings in
repayments by cultivators. Some information is available, which 
allows us to analyse repayments according to sources of finance, 
eg. owned funds, sale of assets and borrowings. Here v/e shall try 
to test the hypothesis that borrowing plays an insignificant role 
in repayments on the basis of data available in the Rural Credit 
Follow-up Surveys for 1956-60.
3.10. 2. Empirical Evidence:
In the case of all districts surveyed in 1956-7, owned funds
accounted for more than 80% of repayments in all districts. Only
in Bikaner did sale of assets have some importance as a source of
repayments as it accounted for 18.6% of total repayments."'
The Follow-up Surveys from 1957 to I960 also substantiate
the hypothesis that owned funds played the most important part in
2
financing repayments. Excepting the district of Hissar in 1958-9, 
where borrowing financed 21% of total repayments, in all other 
districts surveyed between 1956 and 1^60, borrowing accounted for 
less than 20% of total repayments and for quite a number of districts 
(ie. 2/ out of 37 districts surveyed), the figure was less than 10%.
1 R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 1956-7, P. 1^1, op .cit. x
2 See i), R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey. 1957-8, P.69.op cit., 
li), R.B.T . - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 195o-9, P. 59, o p -cit.,
iii), R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 1959-60, P .66, o p  cit~~|~
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3.10. 3* Conclusions:
The analysis of data for borrowings and repayments yields 
the following conclusions:
(a) The hypothesis that borrowings do not play an important 
role in repayment has not been rejected.
(b) The role of owned funds in financing repayments can be 
regarded as ruch more important in case of almost all the districts 
surveyed betv/een 1936 and I960.
3.11. 1. Borrowing and Debt according to duration:
Indian cultivators require loans for different lengths of
time. It is possible to divide the loan periods into the following 
heads: (a) short-term; (b) medium-term; (c) long-term; Short term 
borrowing and debt may take nlace for purchasing working capital 
like seeds, manures, for rent payment as well as for consumption 
and ceremonial purposes. Medium term borrowing may occur for 
levelling of land, bunding, fencing or for minor irrigation works 
and for purchasing livestock. Long term borrowing may be explained 
by factors like major Irrigation projects, land reclamation, 
purchase of tractors and other types of fixed capital, land 
improvement projects, land purchases and debt repayments. In the 
next section, we shall try to make some estimates of borrowing and 
debt according to different lengths of time for the year 1951-2.
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3.11. 2. Estimates for 1951-2:
In one set of data (all-India) on borrowing according to 
duration, it is difficult to form an idea of medium and long-term 
borrowings by cultivators. However, some notion of loans
according to duration in 1951-2 may be obtained from another
2
investigation. It is revealed there, that for a large proportion 
of loans ie, 62.2%, the duration was not specified. This implies 
the absence of any clear definition of different durations of 
borrowing. Data are available when loans outstanding were 
classified according to duration for the year 1951-2. The 
statistical estimate of such data is set out in equation (17) s
D = -1.2242 + .9925 ST + 1.0741 IT + .8328 MT ...(17)
(.0252) (.0657) (.1118)
+ 1.2683 LT R2 = .992
(.1138) D.W. = 2.45, D.F. = 25
Where D = total loans outstanding (cultivators).
ST = short-term, ie., up to two years.
IT = intermediate-term, ie, , 2 - 3  years.
MT = medium-term, ie., 5 - 1 0  years.
LT = long-term, ie. , above 10 years.
In this analysis, short-term has been defined as a period 
which does not exceed two years. This is because of the fact that 
cultivators' short-term borrowing is affected not only by their 
current years' needs, but also by thei^ expectations of natural 
calamities and the vagaries of weather in future. Hence to calculate 
short-term needs, it may not be unreasonable to take into account 
two instead of one year.
1 See, R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. vol.111. PP.577-8, o p .cit.,
2 See, R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. vol.l, pt.2, P.487, op cit.,
3 Data obtained from R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. vol. Ill, PP. 652-3, 
op.cit.,
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Short-term was the most significant variable affecting debt 
according to duration as it alone explained 57% of total variation 
and this is shown in (17.1):
D = 123.7121 + 1.0067 ST ...(17.1) R2 = .'771
(.1630) D. F. = 23
Short and Medium-term together explained about 89% of total 
variation as shown in equation (17.2):
D = bo.^%5 + 1 .0483 ST + 2.3193 MT ...(17.2)
(.0860) (.2631) p2 = >888
D.F. = 27
Intermediate-tern cai;:e next to medium-term as shown in equation
(17.3):
D = 32.7367 + .9333 ST + .8893 IT + 1.4939 MT ...(17.3)
(.0598) (.1524) (.2271)
R2 = .952
D.F. = 26
All the variables in (17.3) seem to be statistically significant.
3.11. 3. Estimates for 1961-2:
It is unfortunate that data are not available on borrowing 
according to duration in the R.B.I. survey for 1961-2.. This may 
be due to the fact that information for borrowing was collected only 
for the survey year. However, some idea about debt according to 
duration can be had from the Rural Credit Follow-up Survey." in the 
next section, we shall use the R.B.I. data for 1961-2 to analyse any
change in the relative significances of different periods in the
2
structure of debt.
1 See, R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey: 1959-60, P.288, 
op.cit.,
2 Data are obtained from R .3.I.Bulletln, September, 1965,PP.1347-9.
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The equation obtained for the year 1961-2 is set out in (18):
D = - 0.51-28 + 1.0Q78 ST + 0.5680 IT + I .9514 MT + 0.8273 LT
(.0265) (.0868) (.2015) (.2032)
D.W. = 1.72. R2 = .999 ...(18)
D.F. = 10
It is interesting to observe that when the variables were 
introduced according to their significance, intermediate-term 
was the most significant variab1 e which alone explained about 
89% of total variation as shown, in (18.1):
D = 27.0169 + ^.2935 IT ...(18.1) R2 = .894
(.3152) D.F. = 13
F. = 109.18
Short-term came next to intermediate-term to yield equation (18.2):
D = 6.7221 + .8103 ST + 1.8552 IT ...(18.2) R2 = .976
(.1306) (.2721) D.F. = 12
3.11. 1. An alternative estimate:
It may be argued that our definition of short-term may not 
be acceptable to those who are inclined to think that short-term is 
a neriod which runs up to one year or less. To make allowance for 
such argument, we have modified short and intermediate-term and tried 
to make estimates to see how far these results sustain our conclusions 
reached in section 3*11. 3. The estimates obtained for the year 
1951-2 are set out in equations (19. to 19.3):
D = 4.6431 + 1.0480 ST + .9003 IT + 1.5571 MT + .7007 LT ...(19)
(.0363) (.0436) (.1684) (.1071)
R2 =1.00
Where D.W. = 2.44. D.F. = 8
ST = 1 year or less.
IT = one to five years.
MT = five to ten years.
LT = more than ten years.
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Eouation (19) seems to be a good fit. But in view of the high
correlate on between ST and IT ( r = .8891), it is difficult to
accept that the estimates of co-efficients of ST and IT as 
independent of one another and unbiased. Thus the problem of 
multicollinearity is involved here. In the absence of fresh data, 
it became difficult to break the multicollinearity deadlock. High 
correlation was also observed between ST and MT ( r = .7872) and 
thus the estimates presented above must be accepted with caution.
When the variables were introduced according to their 
sign" ficance, it appeared that ST was the most significant variable 
which explained about 96% of total variation as shown in equation 
(19.1):
D = 28.8725 + 1.981-9 ST ...(19.1) R2 = .963
(.1175) D.F. = 11
F = 285.51-
In ter mediate and medium-term loans followed short-term as evinced
in equations (19.2) and 19.3):
I) =-12.3507 + 1.1-206 ST + .7711 IT ...(19.2) R2 = .981
(.1793) (.2178) D.F. = 10
D = 20.9895 + 1.1357 ST + .7397 IT + 2.2731 MT...(19.3)
(.0801) (.0857) (.3012)
R2 = .998
D.F. = 10.
These estimates with alternative definition of short and intermediate 
term may be compared with the results obtained for the year 1961-2. 
The estimates for the year 1961-2 are set out in equations (20) to
(20.3):
D = - 0.3225 + 1.0920 ST + .9303 IT + 1.1392 MT + .91.80 LT. ..(20) 
(.03MO (.0315) (.1176) (.1185)
R 2 = 1.00 
D.W. =1.82 D.F. = 10
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Although equation (70) appears to be a good fit, nonetheless, 
the oroblem of multicollinearity remained in view of the high 
correlation between ST and IT (r = .881-5) and again between 
MT a d LT ( r = .8672). If our equation is to be used for 
prediction ourooses, then such multicollinearity need not be 
regarded as a serious problem provided it will continue to exist.
However, when the variables were introduced according to 
their significance, we find that it was intermediate rather than 
short-term loans which came first. This is set out in equation 
(20.1):
D = 11.2978 + 1.9936 IT ...(20.1): R2 = .961
(.1117) D.F. = 13, F = 318.72
ST followed by !TT, came next to IT in order of significance as
shown in equations (20.2): and (20.3):
D = 1.3511 + .7872 ST + 1.1116 IT ...(20.2): R2 = .981
(.2191-) (.1730) D.F. = 12
D = .8955 + 1.10^2 ST + .9020 IT + 1.7194 MT ...(20.3):
(.0738) (.0734) (.1601)
R = .998
D.F. = 11
The difference between equations(19.1), (19.2) and (20.1) 
and (20.2) are now clear. Whereas in 1951-2, short-term loans were 
more important than other types of loans of different durations, in 
1961-2, intermediate rather than short-term 3oans became relatively 
more significant. This finding reinforces the conclusions reached 
in 3.11. 2. and 3.11. 3.
3.11* 5: Evaluation:
The urcsent analysis in the above sections (3.11. 1. to
3.11. 3.) has suggested that although in 1951-2, cultivators incurred 
debt ostly for the short period, nonetheless, in 1961-2, it was the 
nt ermediate loans that were most significant. This leads to the 
conclusion that the tendency of the cultivators to incur relatively
more intermediate rather than short-term loans in 19.61-2 in.........
comparison with 1951-2 cannot be wholly discarded.
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3.12: Conclusions:
The following conclusions may be drawn on the basis of the 
present analysis of the borrowing and debt of Indian cultivators 
in 1951-2 and 1961-2.
(a) In both the periods of analysis, the pattern of borrowing 
and debt remained broadly the same.
(b) On the supply side of agricultural credit, the influence 
of the unorganized sector, particularly of agricultural 
money-lenders, appeared strong in all periods of analysis of both 
borrowing and debt. On the other hand, the influence of the 
organized sector appeared small in all periods.
(c) On the demand side, one.of the -i 'nortant conclusions that 
may be deduced from our study is that the existing belief about 
the unproductive use of loans by Indian cultivators, particularly 
for family consumption, has not been substantiated. In fact, it 
appeared that capital rather than family expenditure was the most 
significant explanatory variable affecting both borrowing and debt 
in most periods.
(d) The evidence suggested the overwhelming importance of 
personal security against which loans were either outstanding or 
borrowed in all periods.
(e) No definite conclusions could be drawn about changes in the 
duration of borrowing because of the paucity of data. Nonetheless, 
the tendency of cultivators to borrow relatively more intermediate 
rather than short-term loans in 7.961-2. in comparison with 1951-2 
may not be wholly discarded when debt was classified according to 
duration.
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(f) The presence of the element of seasonality in the 
borrowings of cultivators has not been disproved In our study.
This right imply the necessity of introducing a flexible credit 
policy.
(g) Tattle change has been observed in the pattern of borrowing 
and debt when these were analysed according to interest rates.
It is possible that the rural money market had some imperfections 
and normal equilibrium price might not have been observed.
This is a topic which requires closer examination and it will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV 10 6
r u r a l  i n t e r e s t r a t e s i n the In d i a n  e c o n o m y:
b.. 1: INTRODUCTION:
The dual nature of the Indian raoneymarket accounts for the
existence of different rates of interest. Within the unorganized
money market itself, it is possible to identify different interest
rates charged by different types of indigenous financial agencies.
In this chapter, firstly we shall attempt to describe such rates
and this will be followed by an analysis of the causes of ’’high"
interest rates in the unorganized sector of the Indian money market.
A theoretical model will then be constructed and an attempt will
be made to test some of its nroperties empirically. Further, we
shall try to explore the relationship between the rates nrevailing
in organized and unorganized sectors. As regards the structure of
Indian rural interest rates, it is difficult to argue that there is
a clear division between short and long-run interest rates because
Indian cultivators seldom make a clear distinction between short
and long-terr credit. Moreover, little information is available
on short and 1 ong term rural interest rates and hence, no attempt
is made here to analyse such rates. Throughout our discussion here,
we shall be mainly concerned with money rates though we shall try to
refer briefly to ’kind1 rates. The conclusions derived from our
discussion may be useful in examining the real nature of ’usurious1
interest rates in Indian rural areas and in detecting some of their
actual causes. This may reveal interesting policy implications.
1 See,for example, L.C.Jain,on cit., P.110. See also, Henry W.Wolff 
Co-operation in India, W.Thacker & Co.,London,1919,P.3,particularly
the following comment:
"It is usury - the rankest, most extortionate, most merciless usury - 
which eats the marrow out of the bones of raiyat* and condemns him 
to a like of penury and slavery in which not only is economic 
eroduct:' on hopeless, but in which also energy and will become 
paralysed and man sinks down beaten into a state of resigned fatalism 
from which hope is shut out and in which life drags on wearily and
• un pro-fit ably • as if- with no object in-view".
* Italics mine; raiyat means peasant.
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L. 2. 1. Some Past Estimates of Rural Interest Rates in India:
The I an Ce trail Banking Enquiry Committee. (1951)'
It is nos sib?, e to form some idea about the nature of the 
interest rates that rrevailed in Indian rural areas from some 
of the estimates in the past. Some of these rates were described 
by the Central Ba king Committee(193?)• Bates charged by the 
money-lenders showed wide variations in different Indian provinces. 
They appeared to be low for secured and high for unsecured loans
and they varied between 6 and 560 ner cent. Rates varying between
6 and 8 per cent may be regarded as low and rates higher than
18 - 20 per cent may be regarded as high for the purpose of our
analysis. The Banking Committee regarded interest rates prevalent 
throughout India as high."*"
Analysing the causes of such high rates, the Committee 
emphasized the r 'sk element in the cost of credit given by 
money-lenders, To quote: ” The money-lenders who lend money in these 
circumstances are taking a risk which other organized credit agencies 
do not take and they have, therefore, to protect themselves against 
loss by charging high rates of interest. The fact that the high 
rates of interest are of the nature of an insurance against risk is 
forcibly brought out in some of the Provincial Committees1 reports 
where the money-lenders’ stipulated rates of interest have been 
compared with what they actually receive by way of net profit’.’
v.
1 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking....(1931) 
PP. 81-2, op.cit., "  ~ "
2 Ibid. P.82.
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The Banking Committee (1931) rightly drew attention to the 
risk premium as one of the major factors accounting for a ’high’ 
rate of interest. Unfortunately, no attempt was made to assess 
and measure the extent to which the risk factor accounted for 
hirh interest rates.
4.2. 2 Estimates of the A.I.B.C.S. t 1951-2;
In the All-India. Rural Credit Survey (1951-2), a fairly 
comprehensive picture of the different interest rates that 
prevailed in the rural economy in 1951-2 may be obtained. It 
was revealed that different rates were charged by the urban, 
village and agricultural money-lenders and such rates broadly 
followed the sa:.e pattern and varied between a very lev/ level 
to as high as 50 per cent or more. The highest proportion of 
borrowing from all types of money-lenders generally took place 
at rates varying between 9i8% and 25% though in some cases rates 
fluctuating between 25% end 378% accounted for a fairly large 
proportion of total borrowings.^' It was also noted that 63.1% 
of total loans b o ’rowed ^r^n the village money-lenders 
(ie., money-lenders who stayed mainly in the villages) took place 
at rates varying between 98'% and 25%, ?2.2% of total l oans 
borrowed from agriculturist money-1enders(ie., money-lenders whose 
major source of income was agriculture and secondary source was 
money-lending) varied between 10% and 25% rates - a range which 
accounted for 63*5% of total borrowings from professional 
money-lenders (ie., money-lenders whose main source of income 
was money-1 ending).
1 R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S., vol.l. Pt.2, PP.490-1, P.562, PP. 592-5,
P. 597 for tables, op. cit. ,
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Nevertheless, it was generally observed that there was a lower 
nronortion of borrowing at rates which v/ere either very low or 
very high in comparison with more the usual level, which in 
U Tun Wai's calculation varied between 2X\ and 36 per cent in most 
of the underdeveloped countries."
t. 3• Estimates of the Rural Credit Follow-up Surveys:!936-60:
In several Rural Credit Follow-up Surveys, some indications 
of the pattern of interest rates charged on rural credit can be 
obtained. These surveys, though useful in providing information 
on the nature of interest rates in some Indian rural areas, are 
not comprehensive.
The pattern of interest rates observed in the Follow-up 
Surveys does not seem to be very different from that in the survey 
in 1951-2. Between 1956 and I960, no interest was paid on 
about 13% - 16% of tota1 loans borrowed by cultivators. The 
largest proportion of borrowings took place at rates varying 
between 9Wo and 25%. ^
1 U Tun Wai, on.cit., I.M.F. Staff Papers, November,1957, P.102 
on- clt. , S^e also, Sir Malcolm Darling - The Punjab Peasant in 
Prosperity and Debt, Fourth ed. Oxford University Press,London, 
19^7, P.184., where the average interest rate in Punjab was 
calculated as 11% in 1931.
2 i) R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey,1956-57,PP. 110-1 
or - clt., ii) R.B.I. - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey,1957-58,
P .61, on cit., iii) R.B.I. - Rural Credit" Follow-up Survey,1958-59, 
PP. 51-2, op. cit. , iv) R.B.I. - Rural Credit- Follow-up Survey,
PP.57-8, on-cit.,
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The nronortion of rates varying between 25% and 50% rose from 
about 3.88% in 1956 to 13.11% in I960. Borrowings at rates 
varying between 5% and 9A% accounted for roughly l/5th of total 
borrowings between 1956 and 1959, but it accounted for only about 
l/10th of total borrowings in 1959-60. It follows, therefore, that 
subject to the United range of observations during 1956-60, 
interest rates varying between 9Ao/ and 25% accounted for the 
highest proportion of total borrowings and such proportion 
generally tended to be low either at a very low or at a very high 
interest rate. It would have been interesting to analyse interest 
rates according to size of holdings and different classes. 
Unfortunately, little data are available to carry out such analysis 
at the moment. Another interesting field of enquiry would have 
been regional variations in interest rates but since we are mainly 
concerned here with al1 -India analysis, no attempt ;s made to 
carry out a regional or state-wise enquiry.
if • 2. if* Estimates of Rural Debt and Investment Survey; 1961-2:
The Rural Debt and Investment Survey conducted by the R.B.I. 
in 1961-2 gives us some further idea of interest rates in rural 
areas. But there was no breakdown of the different rates charged 
by different types of financial agencies. However, data collected 
by the R.B.I. are useful in revealing that range of interest rates 
which accounted for the highest pronortion of borrowing by the 
cultivators.
11 1
Thus, it may be stated that the largest proportion of borrowing took place 
at rates varying between 9il% a-nd 1 2 followed by rates varying between 18|% 
and 25i%. The average interest rate in 1961-2 stood at 14*76% while it was 
16*84% in 1951-2, ^he following table (4*1) illustrates the average interest 
rate in different years where we have calculated such average by the formula
Ztx/Tf = x . 1
Table 4*1 : AVERAGE INTEREST RATES BETWEEN 1951-2 and 1961-2.
YEARS Average Interest Rates paid on borrowing 
by the cultivators (Per cent).
1951-2
1956-7
1957-8
1958-9
1959-60 
1961-2
16.8368
15*0883
14*8516
17.3088
18.0567
14.7589
Sources: i) R.B.I. A .I.R.C.S., vol.Ill, PP 583-4? op.cit.,
ii) R.B.I. - Rural Credit Pollow-up Surveys, 195^-60. loc.cit 
iii) R.B.I. Bulletin, September, 1965? PP 1381-3*
1 Here the numerator stands for the sum of the product of the midpoints 
of the class intervals and the number of frequencies and the 
denominator stands for their total frequency.
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4.3. 1 • Interest Rates charged by the Organized Agencies:
°§£ea of Pr~i nary Co-on e^a.tive Credit Sourcesj_
In the field of agricultural credit, the lending rate of the 
organized agencies like co-operatives, government and banks are 
different from those charged by unorganized agencies. The rates 
charged by the primary agricultural credit co-operative societies 
are stated here. Our choice of lending rates of the rrimary 
societies is deliberate in view of the fact that these primaries 
and not the District or State Co-operative B°r:ks lend directly to 
the cultivators.
The rates charged by the primary credit societies largely 
varied between 3# and 124# p. a. betv/een 1951-2 and 1953-1- though 
rates as high as 19# p. a.  ^n Vindhya Pradesh (now rants o** Madhya 
Pradesh) and 21# p. a. in Manipur were observed in the sane reriod. 
Between 1954-5 and 1966-7, rates varied mostly between 4# and 4-4# 
p. a. to 124/- p. a. though in isolated cases, rates went up to 24# 
p. a. Between 1957-8 and 1966-7, the usual rates varied between 
64# and 124# p.a.
It is evident from the above analysis that, the usual rates 
chafed by rrimary credit societies remained fairly stable over 
time. We shall now examine the rates charged on government loans.
4*3. 2. Rates charged by the Governmer.ti
Although the government finances agriculture indirectly through 
the Reserve Bank and the State Bank of India as also through the 
.Agricultural Credit and Agricultural Refinance Corporations, direct 
lending by the government to the farmers is not high. However, from 
time to time, government lends to farmers to provide relief from 
distress arising out of famine or flood.
 ^ Por details, see, R.B.I. — Statistical Statements relating to the 
Co-orerative Movements in India, 1954-5 'to 1967-8.
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Government loans which are directly siven to the agriculturists
are usually regarded as Mtaccavj1f loans and generally interest rates
on these loans are quite low. From the available data, it may be
stated that the rates generally go up to 64% p. a. In some cases,
rates are more than 64%, though in quite a number of cases, no
1
interest is charged at all.
if.3. 3. Interest Rates on Loans by Commercial Banks:
It has been pointed out that the commercial banks provided
2
only 0.9% of the total borrowings of cultivators in 1951-2.
In 1961-2, banks accounted for only 0.6% of such total borrowings 
and advances of all scheduled commercial banks for agriculture 
(excluding plantations) was only 1.1% of their total advances by 
the end of June, 1968. Generally, the commercial banks lend to 
the agricultural sector indirectly though of late some direct 
financing has taken place. The rates charged by the commercial 
banks wore generally little below 10% in case of direct lending.^ 
Commercial banks generally refrained from direct lending to 
agriculture in a large scale because of the nature of agricultural 
economic activity, fluctuation in prices, long gestation periods, 
absence of sound collateral in the rural economy and difficulties 
in realizing the values of the collateral that is usually offered 
in less developed countries including India (ie.,land) because of 
'■any legal complications and lack of prouer title rights.
1 See, R.B.I. A.I.B.C.S. vol.l. Pt.2, PP. 152-5, o p  cit.,
2 Ibid. P.3.
3 R.B.I. - Financing of Agriculture by Co^'erclal Banks: Report
of a Seminar held on December, 6 to 8, 1968, Bombay, 1969, P. 51,
and P.55.
b R.B.I. - Ibid. P.lifZf.
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However, the rates charged by commercial banks could be 
fairly important if they undertake the task of lending to 
agriculture indirectly through financial intermediaries like 
co-oneratives. Here the commercial banks may have to consider 
the opportunity cost of lending which involves careful considerations 
of alternative returns from industry through bank lending. If the 
commercial banks find surplus funds during the slack season, then 
such funds may be diverted through agricultural financing agencies 
at whatever returns they may fetch to the banks. To cover 
opportunity cost, ie, the returns from holding government securities, 
such lending may take place at rates higher than government bond 
rates.
J+.3. b* Interest Rate charged by the State Bank of India:
Direct financing of farmers by the State Bank of India was not 
envisaged until very recently. The total assistance rendered by 
the State Bank and its subsidiaries was Rs. 335.00 crores in the 
aggregate by the end of June, 1968, in terms of limits sanctioned 
and Rs. 211.00 crores in terms of outstanding.^ Very recently, 
the State Bank ^as started fending directly to the agriculturists - 
in one case to a firm in Araraoti in Maharashtra and in another case
p
to fishermen of Ratnckgiri district in the same state. ~ The rate 
of ineterest charged varied between 84% and 94% p.a.^ Such rates 
compare favourably with the rates charged by co-operatives.
1 See, 2.3.1. - Financing of Agriculture by Commercial Banks(1969) 
P. 129, o p .cit.,
2 Ifrld. PP. 130 - 131.
3 Ibid.. P. 133.
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4.3. 5. Conclusion on Interest Rate charged by Organized Agencies:
The discussion of the different interest rates charged by 
organized agencies leads to the conclusion that, on the whole, the 
usual rate in the organized sector is lower than the usual rate in 
the unorganized sector. Roughly, the rate charged in the organized 
sector varied between 8% and 9.38% and that in the unorganized 
sector varied between 15% and 17%.^ Further, the range of 
fluctuations in the rates prevailing in the organized sector is 
less than those prevailing in unorganized sector. However, the 
discussion of the relationship between the Bank Rate and the Bazaar 
rate ie, the rate at which the bills of the small traders are 
discounted by the shroffs will be made at a later stage of our 
analysis.
1 See table 4.1
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1+.4•1• Theory of Interest Rate Determination in Underdeveloped Rural
Money Market:
The problem of interest rate determination in underdeveloped rural money
1
market has not gone unnoticed among economists. It is contended that the
2typical village money-lender is either a monopolist or an imperfect competitor. 
It is said that frequently these money-lenders charge high interest rates 
because they can take advantage of their monopoly position and the exploitation 
of such monopoly power helps the money-lender to reap some monopoly profit in 
the rate of interest that he charges.
1 See, for example, a) Anthony Bottomley, "The Premium for Risk as a 
Determinant of Interest Rates in Underdeveloped Rural Areas" in The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. LXXVII, Nov., 1963, PP* 637-47* 
bj Anthony Bottomley, "The Cost of Administering Private Loans in 
Underdeveloped Rural Areas" in Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 15, No. 2, 
July, 1963, PP. 154-63*
c) Anthony Bottomley, "The Structure of Interest Rates in Underdeveloped 
Rural Areas" in Journal of Farm Economics, vol. 46, No. 2, May 1964,
PP. 313-22.
d) Anthony Bottomley, "The Determination of Pure Rate of Interest in 
Underdeveloped Rural Areas" in The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
vol. XLVI, No. 3, Aug. 1964, PP* 301-304*
e) Anthony Bottomley, "Monopoly Profit as a Determinant of Interest 
Rates in Underdeveloped Rural Areas" in Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 16, 
No. 3, Nov. 1964, PP. 431-37*
f) Anthony Bottomley and Donald Nudds, "A Widow's Cruse Theory of 
Capital Supply in Underdeveloped Rural Areas" in The Manchester School 
of Economic and Social Studies, No. 2, June, 1969, PP* 131-40.
g) Anthony Bottomley - Factor Pricing and Economic Growth in 
Underdeveloped Siral Areas, Crosby Lockwood & Son Ltd., London, 1971*
h) Millard Long, "Interest Rates and the Structure of Agricultural 
Credit Markets" in Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 20, No. 2, July, 1968,
PP. 275-88.
i) George Rosen, "Capital Market and the Industrialization of 
Underdeveloped Economies", in The Indian Economic Journal, vol. VI, No. 2, 
Oct. 1938, PP. 172-94*
j) S. Thirumalai, "Role of Interest in Reorganisation of Rural Credit" 
in Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. XI, No. 2, April-June, 
1956, PP. 103-12.
k) U Tun Wai, op.cit.. I.M.F. Staff Papers, Nov. 1957, PP* 80-142.
2 a) A.G. Chandavarkar, "The Premium for Risk as a Determinant of Interest 
Rates in Underdeveloped Rural Areas" in The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. LXXIX, No. 2, May, 1965, PP* 322-25* For a critique of 
Chandavarkar’s thesis, see Anthony Bottomley, "Reply", Ibid., PP. 325-27*
b) Charles Nisbet, "Interest Rates and Imperfect Competition in the 
Informal Credit Market of Rural Chile" in Economic Development and 
Cultural Change. Vol. 16, Oct. 1967, PP* 73-90.
c) Anand G. Chandavarkar, "Some Aspects of Interest Rate Policies in 
Less Developed Economies : The Experience of Selected Asian Countries" 
in I.M.F. Staff Papers, vol. XVIII, No. 1, March, 1971, PP* 48-112.
1 1 7
In the context of the Indian rural economy, Chandavarkar argued
that since the density of money-lenders as a professional class was
very low, therefore such a state was favourable to the growth of
monopoly in the business. It was argued that the socio-economic
structure of Indian rural society prevented the growth of
competition independent of the number of money-lenders. Further,
since the money-lender is sometimes both a merchant or middleman
and a landlord, therefore he could not only overnrice the credit
to be given to the cultivators but also underprice the produce of
the borrower-cultivators when he buys the farmers’ products.
Thus in both ways, the money-lender can appropriate monopoly
gains. ~ Similar appropriation of monopoly profit has also been
2
mentioned in other underdeveloped countries like Malaya and 
Chile.'’ The exploitative gains or profits of a mononolist - 
cum - monopsonist money-lender who is interested in maximising 
profit may easily be seen by using any text-book diagram.l'
L . /;.. 2. Evaluation of Chandavarkar - hypothesis;
It is difficult to accent the hypothesis advanced by 
Chandavarkar about the monopolistic exploitation of money-lenders.
For one thing, there is lack of adequate data to evaluate the cost 
and revenue sides of the money-lender who is both a monopolist 
and a monopsonist. In the absence of such data, one wonders how 
Chandavarkar could state that ’’...the wide gap between risk and 
actual interest charged is largely explained by the mononoly profits
of money-lending, which attracts the social odium of usury in these
5
countri es’.’-'
1 A.G.Chandavarkar,on. cit.,in The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
May, 1965, P.322.
2 See, Charles Gamba,"Poverty and Some Socio-Economic Aspects of 
Hoarding, Saving and Borrowing in Malaya" in The Malayan Economic 
Review, vol.Ill, No.2. October, 1958, PP.33 - 62.
3 See,Char1es Nisbet, on. cit. , P. 81.
4 See,for example,H.H.Liebhafsky - The Nature of Price Theory, 
Revised Ed. ,-Thc- Dorsey • Press,Homeland,Illinois,U. S.A." 1968,PP. 377-81.
5 See, A.G.Chandavarkar, on. cit. , The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
May, 1965, P. 321. ~ .
For another, Chandavarkar made no attempt to distinguish between 
• the risk-element and monopoly profit in the interest rate charged 
by money-lenders a’-d hewce one cannot tell from his writing how 
much of the rural interest rate charged was due to the risk-element 
and how much could be regarded as monopoly profit. Further, 
Chandavarkar1s way of measuring competition^ in terms of the 
number of money-lenders in a village may be misleading. As Long
observes; "In 64% of all villages in the sample cited by
Chandavarkar, there was not a single reported lender. If one
lender in a village implies monopoly (which according to
ChandaVarker^ s_ data exists only in 11.5% of Inddan vil1 ages),1 
f^eiat does the absence of lenders imply/". Long suggested that it 
does not imply that there was no borrowing. Some farmers might 
have failed to respond or farmers in the absence of money-lenders 
in a village might have borrowed from outside the village. Again, 
the figures for total lenders in an area understates the degree 
of coneentration since in very few cases, the borrowing cultivator 
may have access to all lenders. Long pointed out that within the 
credit structure of a developed economy, loans made by consumer 
finance companies (who charge 24% p.a. on the average) would appear 
to be very similar to farm loans in poor countries since both tyres 
of loans are sw^'H in size, of short duration, usually unsecured 
and expensive to administer. Yet the combination of administrative 
costs and losses through default in the agricultural credit markets 
of underdeveloped countries are probably higher than those of 
consumer finance firm in the U.S.A. and thus money-lenders may 
charge interest rates as high or higher than the latter.^
1 Italics mine.
2 Millard Long, oa>. clt. , P. 277
3 Ibid. P.281.
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It is observed shove that Chandavarkar did not try to quantify 
the different elements in the cost side of the rural interest rate.
In the absence of such quantification, it is difficult to subscribe 
to the theory of exploitative monopoly ~ains of money-lenders. In 
other underdeveloped countries, the theory of such exploitative 
"•sin0 has not been wholly substantiated. After analysing the 
Malayan case, Wharton argued: 1. "Multiole-threat dealers 
(1 e, markn t er, erchant or ^ o^ey-1 er.de^)^ are rare and ore likely 
to be found exactly in those situations which are accompanied by 
conditions inhibiting sizeable exploitative gains. 2. Double-threat 
dealers, (ie, marketer-cum-noney-1ender), ' are more common, but 
the prevailing situation is closer to the oligopsony or imperfect 
competitive model than the monopsony model and hence exploitative 
gains are likely to be reduced".
In the next few sections, we shall examine some of the studies 
which have been made to quantify t’^e different elements in Indian 
rural interest rate.
4.4• 3• Long's study in Indian Rural Interest Rate:
Or the basis of data available in the A. I.B.C. S. for the year 
(1951-2). Long constructed a table where he described the likely
annual interest rate in the Indian rural economy by duration and
• i 4 n  sk.
1 Italics mine.
2 Italics mine.
3 See, C.R.Wharton,Jr.,"Marketing,Merchandising, and Money-lending:
A note on Middleman Monopsony in Malayanin The Malayan Economic Review, 
vol. Vll. No.2. October,*1962. P. 43.
4 Millard Long, on.clt., P. 284*
Taking the expected net return on portfolio of agricultural loans 
as 5.4%, ie, 2% above the bond rate, 3.3% as average risk-premium 
and 3% as average administrative cost, Long showed how the interest
rate per annum of a loan with no risk of default would be 8.4%,
with 1% risk of default is 9.5%, with 10% risk of default is
20.5% and with 20% risk of default is 33.5%. Distribution of rates
according to risk and duration was constructed by using the 
time-marginals and, with the assumption that all short-term loans 
would fall in the cells with low-risk of default because of greater
accuracy with which the lender can predict the prospects for
repayments and because there could be less demand for credit at 
high rates.
4.4. 4. Evaluation of Long's Measurement:
Long's attempt to quantify the different elements of rural
interest rate in India merits attention. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to criticise his method of measurement on the following 
grounds:
(a) Long's assumption about the average risk of default ie,
3.3% p.a. seems to be quite low. The rate seems, as it will be 
shown subsequently, to be higher in many cases.
(b) The assumption about administrative cost ie, 3% p.a. again 
seems to be fairly low since loans are small in size, scattered 
and short in duration. Moreover, a small number of borrowers per 
money-lender as well as the possibility of keeping funds idle in 
off-season adds to the opportunity cost."*"
1 See Anthony Bottomley, op- cit., Oxford Economic Papers, 
July 1963, pp. 154 - 163.
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(c) While calculating interest rates according to risk of default 
and duration, Long did not make it very clear how the time-marginals have 
been actually applied to derive the interest rates,
(d) It is difficult to accept Long's assumption that all short-term 
loans had low risk of default.
Notwithstanding these critisms, it should be mentioned that Long's 
analysis of interest rates in underdeveloped countries, particularly in 
India, provides useful insight into the quantitative aspects of the problem,
4-4 5* Bottomley's Estimation of Rural Interest Rates 
in Underdeveloped Countries:
In a series of interesting articles, Anthony Bottomley tried to
explain and determine rural interest rates in underdeveloped countries
including India, Here we shall briefly examine the salient features of
Bottomley's theory,
Bottomley argued that a money-lender in an underdeveloped country
generally faces a demand curve for loans which slopes downward if we measure
interest rate in the vertical axis and the demand for loans in the horizontal
axis. This is so because the lower the interest rate, greater is assumed
to be the demand for loans. Similarly, the supply curve slopes upwards
because it is assumed that the higher the interest rate, greater will be the
supply of credit. The supply curve is based on mainly three types of costs
2
which may be written as follows:
L = C + P + Am
Where L = total loan charges.
C = the opportunity cost of the principal. ,
P = risk-premium because of unwillingness to repay.
A = administrative cost of lending by money-lenders.
1 See, this chapter, p. 116
2 See, Anthony Bottomley and Donald Nudds, op.cit., The Manchester School ... 
June, 1969> PP* 131-40.
^ Bqttomley has distinguished willingness to pay and ability to pay.
\
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Bottomley argued that the opportunity cost of lending by village 
money-? e .ders (ie, the pure rate of interest which may rrevai1 for 
government bonds) should be about twice the rate charged by the 
urban banker since the fund of village money-lenders remains 
unemployed for nearly six months every year and as such the 
money-lender may ask for compensation for what he lends. The 
risk-premium is assumed to be less for the village money-lenders 
in comparison with an urban banker since economic and social 
co-ercion ^ act in such a way as to help the village money-lender 
to get back the loans miven in a relatively easier way in 
comparison with an urban bank. This is so because village ties 
are not simply economic but also social and institutional. The 
administrative costs of the 1 ender depends upon a variety of 
conditions and such administrative costs for the village 
money-lenders should not be very low chiefly because of small 
size and short duration of such loans, less number of borrower 
per lender and greater number of individual loans.'1" Bottomley 
and Nudctethen assumed that the higher the principal(P), the 
higher the income from it, but subject to the law of diminishing 
returns beyond a certain level of investment as shown in 
Bottomley and Nuddihs diagram which we have reproduced here..
1 .See, Anthony Bottomley, on-cit., Oxford Economic Papers. 
July, 1963, PP 134-63. '----------------- -----
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Returnable income at the end of loan period is estimated net of
family subsistence allowances a d this gave net returnable income
I + P. Its expected value is regarded as I + P which assumes a
functional relationship to P as shown in fig.IV.I. and subject to
the ] aw of dimi.ni. shing returns and I curve is made convex to the
horizontal axis. Lines L ( = C + P + A) as also L ( =L + monopoly
profit) are also drawn. Interest asked by money-lenders is shown b y
R curve. When a cultivator’s I + P)R + P, money-3 snder Is - acl
in full. If t^is ' s no' tve case, culti vator repays whatever he can.
V/ith the lines (1), (2) and (3) showing the series of average interest
rates received by money-lenders in fig.IV.2. borrower’s net
returnable income (ie, tot a-1, income net of principal rent and
subsistence expenses) v/ith primitive technique is shown by Ix.
With improved technology, this curve becomes ly as capital borrowed
and are transferred to more Productive uses. In fig.IV.‘2. interest
costs of a village money-lender is L , and that of urban bank ism ’
I n as it 's assumed that the lending cost of urban bank is -renter 
than that of a village money-lender. This difference is assumed to 
be diminishing with the rise in the size of principal. The slopes 
of lines (1) and (2) in fig.IV. 2. show the average interest rate 
o b t '.ned by monopolistic money-lender where productivity changes from 
Ix to fy reflecting that average interest rate obtained nay fall from 
the slope of (1) to that of (2) as borrower's productivity went u p .
It is concluded that lowest average rates are received where 
borrower's productivity is the highest."
1 See, Anthony Bottomley and Donald Nudds, o p, cit., The Manchester 
School. . . , June, ‘in69. P. 139*
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Productivity of the borrower and his returnable income may be raised 
through innovation in rural areas. The policy implication derived from 
the study was as follows:
"A successful credit policy will not consist in blanket attempts to finance 
the status quo at a lower rate of interest. Rather must a government 
attempt to ally rural innovation with an increasing contact with the urban 
money market".
To illustrate the validity of the arguments stated above, Bottomley 
and Nudds quoted some examples. Thus, in Mexico, the rate of interest
is about 8^ and repayment is always about 100$. Low rates of interest
_ . . 1 1 - ? 
and high rates of recovery was also observed in India.
In the above analysis, the monopoly element in rural interest rate
has not been considered and this is examined in the next section.
4*4* 6. Monopoly element in Interest Rate charged by Money-lenders:
The different components of the rural interest rate have been summed 
up as follows:^ (a) unit opportunity cost of lending money; (b) unit 
administration charges; (c) unit risk-premium and (d) unit monopoly profit. 
The first three components are supposed to provide the average and marginal 
cost of lending.
1 Ibid. P. 139.
2 See, F.A.O. - New Approach to Agricultural Credit, ^ome, 1964 P. 30,
P. 55* and. PP 73-9 cited by Anthony Bottomley and ^ onald Nudds, 
op.cit., in f-Phe Manchester School ... June, 1969* P. 140., fn. 3*
3 Anthony Bottomley, op.cit., Oxford Economic Papers, November, 1964*
PP 431-7* See, also Anthony Bottomley, op.cit., The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, May, 1965* PP. 325-7*
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The money-lender has also a demand schedule for his loans.
Maximum profit is obtained at that point where marginal cost
intersects the marginal revenue from below. The theory of
discriminating monopoly would apply where the money-lender is
charging different rates from different customers.^
The existence of different interest rates in unorganized
money markets of underdeveloped countries including India is
certainly not questioned here. But what may be precisely
questioned is the necessary link between the existence of such
rates and the practice of discriminating monopoly. The interest
rate may be different in different rural areas simply because the
risk-premium may be different.
The existence of monopoly profit in the rural rate, as stated
2
by Chandavarkar and others has been questioned by Bottomley.
1 For a theoretical discussion of bank's discrimination in farm 
loans, see, for example, Reynold P.Dahl, Some Price Discrimination 
Aspects in Bank Farm Loan Interest Rates" in Journal of Farm Economics, 
vol.XLIV, No.l. February, 1962. PP.126 - 140. Such discrimination
is said to be rare in practice. In Indian case, such price 
discrimination is not known to be existing in practice.
2 See, for example, i) U.Tun Wai, op cit., IMF Staff Papers,
November, 1957, P.124. ii) R.B.I. - A.I.R.C.S. vol.11. P.102,P 172, 
op cit., iii) S.G. Panandikar op cit., PP.58-9 and PP, 62-3.
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While Chandavarkar believed that the unit nonopoly orofit nay be 
greater than the sum of other three components in rural interest 
rate, Bottomley argued that this may not be the case for the 
fol1owlng reasons:^
(a) Money-1 enders onoortunity cost is equivalent to the return
cpT
that he can pet on alternative riskless investment * as the reward 
for sacrificing liquidity. But since the village money-lender1s 
onnortunity cost also derends upon the duration of loans and since 
for about six-months in a year, the fund of the money-lenders 
remains idle, therefore, if the interest rate or riskless alternative 
investment is 8% p.a. the village money-lender will be justified 
in charging 16% for six months to cover the onnortunity cost of 
seasonally idle funds.
(b) The unit administration cost of a typical small and short-term 
loan advanced by money-lender is regarded as big' .
(c) T^e risk-premium for village money-lender is treated as high 
since the farmers frequently fails to provide suitable collateral 
for getting credit.
(d) Even if monopoly orofit is reaped by the village money-lender 
in certain villages, it will be difficult to sustain such monopoly 
profits in the face of increasing inter-village mobility of 
money-lenders which will eventually reduce the rural rate of interest.
1 Anthony Bottomley, op.cit.. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
May, 1965, PP. 3 2 6 - 7 .  —  -
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The arguments advanced by Bottomley are interesting but it 
needs to be pointed out that both sides seem to be operating in 
an emoirical vaccum (or clone to it). What is important here is 
to try to define as clearly as possible the meaning of
' iononoly situation' and to contrast it to the situations of a
typical Indian village or villages. This obviously requires furt’ er 
research and investigation at the village level.*1 However, ^ in the 
next section, we shall try to show how in the nreser.ce of 
risk-premium alone, high interest rate charged by the money-lenders 
nay be obtained.
1.5. 1 . An Alternative way of determining Interest Hate in
Underdeveloped Rural Econon'T es in Presence of risks:
In this section, we shall examine briefly the hypothetical
rura1 interest in underdeveloped countries in the presence of risks.
T^en, with Indian data, we shall try to show their emnirical
relevance. To begin with, we divide risks under the following
hoads: (a) natural, (due to, say, disease or bad weather);
(b) technical, eg, failure of farming and storage, processing, and
transport; (c) commercial, ie, risks arising from orice fluctuations;
(d) financial, ie, failure of repayment. Risk of tyoe (d) is more a
2
problem of illiquidity rather than insolvency.
1 A recent micro-study of a few Punjab villages in India revealed 
that "monopoly profits accounted for not more than 6% of the interest" 
(P.475), See, Karan Singh,"Structural Analysis of Interest Rates on 
Consumption Loans in an Indian Village" in The Asian Economic Review. 
vol.X, No.A. August, 1968, PP, 471-5*
2 See, F.A.O. of the United Nations, Dr.Horace Belshaw - Agricultural 
Credit in Economically Underdeveloped. Countries, Rone, 1959,1115 °3-101 .
\ See nldo, John W.'Tello/f - The Economics of Agricultural Development, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York,'’ 1966, PP. 315-7.
K.S.Suryanarayana, "Reorganisation of Rural Credit in India" in 
Th-e- In.r’lan Journal, of Agricultural Economics, vol XI, No. 2.
April - June,' 1956, P.43.
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■ At the beginning, we assume away any element of monopoly 
nrofit and administrative cost in rural interest rate in 
underdeveloped countries. The rural interest rate (=r) is 
assumed to be the sur of opportunity cost (- , administrative
cost (=£), risk premium (- 71) a :.d monopoly profit (pu).
Therefore, we have,
r = « C + P  + 7» + ax 
We have already assumed that $ = o ar.d A - o. We further
assume that the risk-premium is related to the ability of recovery
(=p) in such a way that the higher the probability of recovery (=r), 
the lower is the risk-premium and where p = 100 per cent, 
risk-premium is nothing. We then use the foil owing formula to 
derive the rural rate (=r):
r = 1 - l
P
Thus when oC = .05 and p = 1.00
r = i,+, - 1 = 0.5 = %
1.00
When «c = .05 and p = .90
— —  - 1 = .166 = 16.6$
r = .90
It is now possible to construct a schedule (see table . 2.) on the 
basis of different assumptions about the probability of recovery, 
assuming that oC = .05 or 5% in all cases. The value of
approximates to the Bank Pate which may be considered as 'pure rate1
or opportunity cost. The different values of p are taken from the
probaV1 ity of default as viewed by the money-le ders.
1 See, for example, R.B.I.- A.I.B.C.S. vol.l.Pt.2, P.A76, P.501.
op.cit.,
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tioi d that, the a  tion about is based n the
•possibility of alternative use of funds "by Indian villa 
•one; -1 r idcrs ■'"id either the deposit rates of the co-operative 
he-.hr: or the oort-office-savings banh rate a; be treated as a 
closer approximation to tb e rate we have assumed here.
Froa table 1.2, it is easy to find out that as the probability 
of default rises ( = 1- p), r risos. It also fol1 ows fro-’ the 
table that with a 70^  chance of recovery, the money-lenders oay 
be justified to char re 501' interest rate. If the money-lender1 s 
administrative cost is added to this, the rate could be h'y.er 
than 5QC/, and even such rates ray not contain elements of monopoly 
■profit.
1 See, J ohii r W . M ell or, on. .cit. , P. Ill, "....opportunities for 
productive investment are few relative to saving capacitjcs 
rural areas and hence pure interest, in the sense of return on 
money itself, is relatively low in the rural sector of low-incorne 
countries".
2 Ibid. PP. 316-7. Mellor tried to explain rural interest rates 
mainly in terms of high risk and administrative cost. He argued! 
"The evil arises not so much for conscious collusion among 
money-lenders or in an unusual degree of immorality among 
money-lenders but rather from the nature of credit a d  the 
borrowers and the resultant credit system". See also,
Martin.W.Wilmington, "Aspects of Money-1 ending in northern Sudan" 
in The Middle East Journal, Spring, 1959* PP* 139-110. The writer 
thought that monopoly element in •high1 interest rate in Sudan may 
not be much. To quote! "No thou :ht is given to the debtor ethics 
which names collection a strenuous and costly affair. Nothing is 
said about "bad debts" and the annual losses they cause the 
money-lenders...No consideration is given as to where the 
money-lenders themselves obtain funds for business; the", in turn 
may have borrowed at the exorbitant rates..." PP. 139-110.
* 1 3 2
TABLE 4.2. : The probability of recovery and Rural Rate of Interest:
P a r
1.00 .05 .0500
0.95 .05 .1025
0.90 .05 .1666
0.85 .05 .2353
0.80 .05 .3125
0.75 .05 .4000
0.70 .05 .5000
Here
P = probability of recovery 
a = opportunity cost 
r = rural interest rate
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A rate higher than 50/o charged by money-lenders is found in few cases 
in rural India, and as such, monopoly profit may exist only in such cases, 
possibly in the rates charged by say, Pathanmoney-lenders. It should, 
however, be remembered that in our discussion of opportunity cost, we did 
not pay any attention to the idle funds that money-lenders may have during 
the off-season. The inclusion of any such possibility raises . It may, 
perhaps, be argued that if funds are really idle, then six-months bills may 
be issued to increase short-term investments and this may be a useful device 
to finance current agricultural operations.
The risk-premium may be higher also because of the anticipation of a 
price rise and such risk is discussed in the next section.
4«5. 2. Premium for Risk in anticipation of Inflation:
Inflation generally leads to a fall in the value of money and as such
during inflation, creditors stand to lose in real terms when they get
repayment. The loss of creditors largely depends upon the rate of price
rise and the time-lag between loans advanced and repaid. The greater the
rate of price rise and larger the lag between loans received and loans
repaid, the greater will be the loss of the creditor (or the gains of debtors)
The probability of charging higher interest rate to safeguard against the
1
loss of repayment has been observed in South Korea. In the Indian economy,
the rise in prices between 1951 and 1967, particularly between 1962 and 1967,
2
substantial. In the following section, we shall try to explain the money­
lender's interest rate when he anticipates inflation.
1 See, Colin D. Campbell and Chang Shick Ahn, "Ryes and Mujins - Financial 
Intermediaries in South Korea" in Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
vol. XI, No. 1. October, 1962, PP. 55-68.
2 See, Santikumar Chakrabarti - The Behaviour of Prices in India, 1952-1966: 
An Empirical Study: Unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University 
of London, 1970*
was
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b . 5. 3• Estimation of Interest Rate in periods of Inflation:
Let us assume that R is the expected monetary returns over 
monetary costs of money-lenders(le, net monetary income). Let R 
be the decreasing function of time ( =t ).~ Implicit is the 
assu^otion that as the money-lender will be advancing more money, 
the rate of return will fall. This will be the case even when there 
is no inflation. The net return curve is thus:
R = f (t) (see, Fig.IV.3)
Now if we assume that money-lenders are anticinating inflation,
then R will shift downwards to R f (fig.IV.3). Such a shift takes
place mainly because of the state of imperfect knowledge and greater
uncertainty in the face of the anticipated nrice rise. Assume now
that oC is the cost of capital in the absence of inflation. With no
inflation, when a future payment is being converted to its present
2
value eauivalent, it is discounted at ^ . The present value of 
sum P in n years is given by P/ (1 + d )n . if money values are not 
stab!1 e, then discounting P at rate ^ may not show the present value 
equivalent of P received in n years. Lot prices rise at the rate 
of g each year. Then the nresent value of a given sum of money, P, 
due in n years, when the cost of capital is < is given by
P P     or ------------
0+«<) (l+g)" [(1+0(l+g) ] n
1 See, for example, W.B.BWck and V.G.Hurt, ’’Decision Processes for 
Understanding Capital Use and Investment on Farms"in E.L.Baum,
H.G.Diesslin and E.O.Heady(eds.) - Canital and Credit Needs in a 
Changing Agriculturc, The Iowa University Press,Ames, 1961,PP.352-3.
2. See, A. J.Merr ett & All en Sykes - The Finance and Analysis of Capital 
Pro.i ects. Longmans,London, 1963,PP. 2.1k -5« For a simple illustration of 
present value and cost of capital,see,A.J.Merrett and Allen Sykes - 
CoPital Budgeting and Company Finance. Longnans,London,1966,
PP. 5 - 7, chs. 3 and A.
FlfcVRE IV. h
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The cost of capital in money terms, °6i, under inflation at rate g is
oC i = (H-0 (1+g) - 1
j e, the cost of capital is to be multiplied by the rate of inflation 
aid their product used to discount future payments, 
l et g = 3% and < = b%» Then the appropriate discount factor is:
(1.01 x 1.03) - 1.0 = 7.12%
xf both g and oC are low, then nearly the same result v/ould be 
obtained by adding r to g and thus L% + 3% = 7%.
In the Indian context, the assumptions that g = 3% and **?
= If' may not be very unreasonabl e as the Bark Rate remained at L% 
a: d nrices went up by nearly 30% between 1931 and. 1961. If we 
combine the risk of rrice rise with the risk of default in 
repaying loans, then for measuring rural interest rate, we can 
devt.se a different ^ormula and by using it to the Indian data, we 
may try to show Indian rural interest rate where different types of 
risks are involved.
Thus, we have,
1 + <  . ri = — p----- 1 + [(1 + <) ( 1 + g) - l]
"(l.oZf) ( 1.03) - l
or ri = 1__ +_ .01 ,
.90
= .1555 + .0712 = .2267 or 22.67%
Where p - .90 (ie, proportion of loan repayment) 
g = .03 (ie, rate of inflation) 
oc = .01* (ie, Bank Rate)
It follows, therefore, that the provision for risk-T>remi urn
for both inflation and default in loan repayment makes the rural
Interest rate higher the what it would ha _e be^ with risk of
default but without inflation. In the next section, we shall try to
discuss other factors which may be responsible for raising interest
rates.
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2.5- • 'Rurp'1 Interest Rate in case of Capital Rationing, Risk
and Uncertainty:
The term 'capital rationing' generally implies that the
borrower is unable to pet all the Capital funds which he wishes
1
to obtain at going on possible interest rates. Such a case 
arises because the lending agency is sensitive to risk.
2Capital rationing in agriculture can be both internal and external.
When the risk aversion on the part of the cultivator himself 
puts a limit to the use of credit funds, capital rationing is 
internal. This may occur because of technical or weather conditions. 
Capital rationing may be external when the lending agency, rather 
than the borrower, because of technical, technological and Trice 
uncertainties restrict the use of funds. The lending agency may 
have to face other tyres of uncertainties like the managerial 
ability and honesty of the farmer. It follows that under 
uncertainty and capital-rationing, the lender may ureter to 1 end 
according to the value of security rather than on the basis of 
marginal productivity of capital and in case of risk-aversion, 
ie.,internal capital rationing, the use of capital may be less than 
the point at which marginal value productivity of credit is equal 
to marginal cost.
1 See, lari 0. Heady - Economics of Agricultural Production and 
Resource Use, Prentice H a l l , Inc.,New York, 1952, P.BSO and
PP. 550-60.
2 T.W.Schultz - The Economic Organization of Agriculture, McGraw- 
Hill Book Co., Inc. New York,' 1953, P.306. See also, L.F.Hesser, 
"Conceptual Models of Capital Rationing among Farmers" in Journal 
of Farm Economics, vol. XL11, No.2. May I960. PP. 325-3A.
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For many farms in Indian agriculture, capital rationing can 
be external, though in seme cases, it was observed that risk-aversion 
may be high because of two reasons!' (a) the belief among cultivators 
that once a person becomes indebted to a private money-lender, 
his chances of getting rid of debt are very slim; (b) there are 
strong social and moral stigmas attached to debt which may prevent 
the cultivator from borrowing an far as possible. If the farmer's
2
uncertainty is reduced, the rural lehders may lend at a lower rate.
This, of course, assumes that the lenders are risk-averters.
Porter argued that rural lenders should be risk-averters because 
they are "one-way" shareholders in the farmer's enterprise - 
ie, lenders lose if the farmers fail to repay, but gain no greater 
amount than the agreed interest if the innovation succeeds.
However, these lenders may turn into "risk-lovers" if the real 
profit from lending emanates from compounding interest on previously 
defaulted borrowings.
The point of optimum lending' by a rural money-lender may be 
shown in fig. IV. A. Let us measure the amount of possible returns 
in the vertical axis and the range of outcomes ie, uncertainty or 
possible magnitudes of loss in the horizontal axis. AP indicates 
the opportunity possibility curve. Where the money-lender lends 
nothing, the prospective return is nil and the chance of loss is 
also nil.
1 See, S.Thirumalai, op c ’ t . , P.106. See also, B.P.Dutia, 
"Uncertainty, Capital Use and Firm Household Relationship" in 
nv.^  T-^ ian Economic Journal, Vol.Vlll, Uo./j, April, 1961,
PP. 338-9• Also Gopal Karkal, o p ,cit., P.85.
2 See, Richard C.Porter,"Risk, Incentive and Technique of Lev/ 
Income Farmer" in The Indian Economic Journal, vol.Vll, No.l. 
July, 1959, PP. 1-27.
3 Ibid. P. 13. See also fn. 21.
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c,e o f  o u t c o m e s  ( i t n c e a t a i n t y )
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Such a. state implies absence of uncertainty. Let I be the 
indifference curve of the money-'' ender and it sloues upwards, 
showing that the money-lender is willing to assume greater 
uncertainty only if the income prospects are sufficiently large.
AP could start from the point of origin if there is no alternative 
use of funds. But it originates at some point like A in the 
positive scale of the vertical axis since it is assumed here that 
the money-lender may have alternative use of funds as they can 
deposit money either in Post-Offices or in co-operative banks.
AP slopes upward as it is assumed that most probable returns are 
greater than certain alternatives. If the reverse is true, the 
curve will slope downwards. The ioney-1ender must choose between 
greater and smaller investments involving more or less uncertainty.
The theoretical equilibrium is attained at a point like E where 
the indifference curve is tangent to the opportunity line as the 
lender maximises exnected utility. Lending beyond E is ruled out 
because (a) increasingly higher amounts of prospective incomes are 
required on I curve to make the lender willing to undertake greater 
risk while the most probable expected income(on the AP line) does 
not rise at a rate large enough to cornuensate for greater 
uncertainty.
Theoretically, the effect of uncertainty on the interest rate, 
cay be stated in the following way. Let MVP be the ’most probable 
expected' marginal rate of urofit curve out of money investment 
by the lender, (fig IV. 5)* Let interest rate by r„ and let the 
money-lender add a discount (at a constant rate) in the face of 
uncertainty to interest" rate.
C0 £?
JUTU/CN ftF 
CA riTAL
/ \ /
\ ' 
\
/ T,"
MVP
T,
r,
/
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The discounted marginal cost of capital then becomes r,y .
Equilibrium may not be obtained if the MVP of capital is greater than
the ciscounted marginal cost of capital throughout. But if the
money-lender considers greater lending with greater risk then a
rising discount rate may be added to r, and the discounted cost of
capital becomes rj'. The amount of discount and the increasing
rate of discount are shown by the distance between r/ and r'J
respectively. The MVP is subject to diminishing returns and r':
is subject to increasing rate of discount. Under certainty, use
of capital = 0CQ. With a constant rate of discount, it is OC^ and
with an increasing rate of discount under uncertainty, it is
equal to OC^.^ Hence the expectation of rising risk connected
with larger investment may restrict the use of capital by the
lender and such a situation may also occur when the borrower
2
invests the loaned funds. A restriction of lending with same
demand raises interest rates. Here external capital rationing
is not matched by internal capital rationing. Where both external
and internal capital rationing operate, the extent to which interest
rate will rise depends upon the relative shifts of the demand for
and supply of loanable funds curves. Failure of the interest rate
to clear the market of all willing borrowers, ie, credit rationing
or fringe of unsatisfied borrowers, stems from the difference in
the viewpoints from which lenders and borrowers assess any
investment project. Generally, the lender views any project with
3
less enthusiasm than the borrower for the following reasons:
1 See, for example, Earl.0.Heady, op cit., P.345. There is, however, a 
distinction between risk and uncertainty. While risk is insurable, 
uncertainty is not.
2 See, Hira Singh - 'Role of Agricultural Credit in Economic Development 
of Indian Agriculture', Unpublished Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy(Agricultural 
Economics)at the University of Winsconsin,U.S.A. 1964, PP.204 - 211.
3 See, A.J.L.Catt, " 'Credit Rationing' and the Keynesian Model' in 
The Economic Journal. vol.LXXV, June, 1965, PP. 358-9.
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(a) Since the lender knows less about the project than the 
borrower, therefore, the lender will be inclined to subtract a 
greater risk-premium from the yield.
(b) The lender generally charges additional risk-premium because 
of the possible dishonesty or incompetence of the borrower.
(c) While the borrower has a personal interest in the project
apart from the profit motive, the lender views the transaction as
a cold comparison of expected return on his money against the risk
involved and other alternative returns. However, an individual
lender may be a greater risk-averter than an institution simply
because such a lender may find it more expensive and troublesome
than an institution to get the repayment and also because a given
loan generally represents a greater proportion of an individual’s
assets in comparison with the assets of an institution.^
Nonetheless, neither an institution, nor an individual money-lender
could charge the highest possible interest rates continuously after
assessing and allowing for risks and uncertainties because of the
fear of government intervention or of public opinion. Such
intervention in the Indian case has been demonstrated several times
in the enactment of money-lending legislations which sought to
control money-lenders' interest rates though without much success.
Credit rationing may also be associated with a whole range of
interest rates. ''As a result, for each borrowing operation there is
one particular rate of interest, which is the Relevant Rate of 
2
Interest... . However, the main purpose of our exercise in this 
section is to underline the possibility of credit-rationing by 
Indian money-lenders, which might raise interest rate by reducing 
the supply of credit.
1 Ibid. PP. 360-1. 2 See, J.S.G. Wilson, 'Credit Rationing and
the Relevant Rate of Interest in Economic#.,vol.>1X1, No.81. Feb. 1954. P.21.
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. 6. 1. A S ^ m l e Model for determining Interest Hate in the Indian 
Rural Economy:
In this section, we shall try to build up a model for 
determining an equilibrium rural interest rate in the Ind'an 
economy. Specifically, we postulate the following functional 
relationships:
R = f (Y) ..... (1)
Y = F  _ ..... (2)
t = g (y) ..... (3)
r = \fr (R) ...... (L)
Where R = Repayment by the cultivators.
Y = Farmers income, 
y = Out'out of the cultivators,
r = Rural rate of interest.
Actually, equation (2) is an identity which is valid when 
price is constant. Hence we are left with 3 equations and 
3 unknowns and the system is determinate.
Geometrically, the model may be nresented in a simple way 
(see fig.IV.6). In the 1st auadrant, (ie, North-east), we have 
R = f (Y). The curve slopes upwards because it is assumed that
the greater the amount of income the greater is the repayment by
the farmer. In quadrant 11 (ie, South-east), the identity between 
income and output is shown by the A5°line. In the third quadrant
(ie, South-west), the rate of interest is shown as a negative
function of output and in quadrant IV (ie, North-west) the interest 
rate is shown as an inverse function of repayment. In the next 
section, we shall try to make an empirical test of the assumptions 
behind the assumed functional relationships.
In figure IV.6. it is shown how, when income rises, output 
rises, repayment rises and interest falls. Equilibrium interest 
( rate is achieved at fd interest rate with income at Y o , output at yo 
and repayment at Ro.
1 45
____
FI W A S
1 4 6
4.6. 2. An Empirical Test of the Theoretical Model:
In this section, we shall empirically test the assumptions 
which were made in formulating the functional relationships in 
the previous section. We carried out a few regression analyses 
with the relevant variables that we introduced in our model. We 
have stated the results of our empirical investigations in the 
adjacent table. We have applied the following simple linear 
equation to test the validity of our assumptions:
y -  Bl +  e2x2 1
From the table (4.3.) it is clear that our assumptions 
about the type of relationships between the different dependent 
and explanatory variables are broadly confirmed by the empirical 
tests. Repayment is significantly correlated with income in a 
positive way in all the cases we have considered. Interest rate 
is inversely related to repayment and in one of the two cases we 
have considered, the relationship is fairly significant. In the
other case, ie, (4) in the table, the relationship is significant
2
at 5% level, but R = .36. The weak part of our empirical test 
is the relationship between interest rates charged by professional 
money-lenders and cash-income. In equation (6) such a relationship 
is not significant statistically, though the negative sign of the 
co-efficient broadly justifies our assumption about the inverse 
relationship between interest rate and cash-inpome. However, in 
equation (7), where the same data are tested with the exclusion of 
Bihar - Bengal and Western Uttar Pradesh, the result becomes highly 
significant.
1 For an explanation of these symbols, see table 4.3, p.147.
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The reason for excluding Bihar - Bengal and Western Uttar 
Dv,adesh is that in those provinces, a fairly h4 gh rroportion of 
borrowing took place from relatives who did not charge any -'.nterest 
at all. Such empirical tests are by no means enough; but they may 
res^nably be regarded as some partial indicators of the direction 
of the relationships of the different variables considered in our 
model. It is sometimes argued that high interest rates in 
underdeveloped countries including India may be caused by excess 
demand for credit. This may be true but in the absence of fairly 
authentic data, it is extremely difficult to measure precisely 
the de and for and supply of credit. There are also considerable 
d.:‘ fficulties in measuring the supnly of credit by unorganized 
agencies to cultivators.
i-.7. 1. Monetiza+1 3 Pate of Interest:
The nature of the peasant economy may sometimes influence the 
interest rate. It is possible to indentify different rates in 
different parts of a country like India and such dr f f er mces may 
nartly be due to the different degrees of monetization and 
commercialization of the economy. Monetization ( = K) is defined 
here as the ratio of ’monetary transactions’ ( = M) to total 
transactions ( = T) ie,
However, monetization may also be measured from the input side 
as the ratio of total monetary expenditure to total expenditure 
on all inputs. From the side of output, it is the ratio of cash 
income to total income. In the following section, we shall era: ine 
whether such monetization in the Indian rural economy, defined as 
in (a) above, might have any relationship with the rate of interest.
1 5 0
P. Monetisation in Indian Rural Economy and Interest Hates:
7r tie A.I.B.C.S. seventy five districts surveyed were 
c1 pssified according to the type of economy and three major 
classifications were made: (a) subsistence; (b) nonetized (but not 
commercialized); (c) commercialized and monetized;1 The oth er 
classification is related to the range of interest rates charged by 
rrivate credit agencies. The index for this purpose was, for each 
district, the proportion which the volume of borrowings at 18% or 
more bears to the total volume of borrowings. The 75 districts were 
arranged in descending order of magnitude of these pronortions and 
then divided into five equal groups of fifteen each, as shown in 
the table. Using Spearman’s rank correlation co-efficients
= P
Where  ^ 6 Hdi~_
' N(N2-1)
rank correlation between the interest rate and the number of 
subsistence districts is ^ = + 1.0.
Between monetized areas and the rate of interest,
p = - .¥>,
and between commercialized areas and interest rate, p = -.902.
2
Our results are broadly similar to those obtained by Sengupta.
The results of our study lead to the conclusion that in highly
monetized and commercialized districts surveyed, the rate of interest
was significantly low and in highly subsistence districts, interest
rates tended to be high. However, the degree of monetization may not
■5
depend upon the level of interest rat.es.
1 See, R.B.I. - vol.ll. PP. 190-1°6, on clt. ,
2 See, J.K.Senguptay”Role of Monetisation in Agriculture” in India n 
urnal of 'cultural Economics. Vol.Xll, No.A.Oct-Dee,1957.PP.28-9
3 ”Whil e ei pirically ie n.tive association exists In inter count 
compare son between monetization ratio and interest rate level, one 
could not claim monetization depends on the level of interest rates. 
The causal relationship, if any, rather runs in the opposite direction 
t .e process of onetization tending to decrease the level of interest 
.T o.oes as a c m  * tal market devel o p s ”.Raymond. WdGo"J dsmith — pa• ^ ci al
• Structure and Development^ YeO e Univ'ersi'ty Press," 1969, P .937
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4*8. 1 • Relationship between Bazaar bill rates and Co-operative Rates:
The study of interest rates in the Indian rural economy is not fully 
comprehensive if we do not examine the relationship between rates 
prevailing in the organized sector, and the rates prevailing in the Bazaar 
section of the Indian money market. The Bazaar rate is "the rate at which
•i
the bills of small traders are discounted by the shroffs". Firstly, we
shall try to test statistically the relationship between the Bazaar bill
rate and rates charged by primary agricultural co-operative credit societies.
2
The result is shown in the following equation.
Baz = 9.8711 + 0.1516 CR R2 = .037
(.2136) DW=.32: D.F.= 13
F = .50
Where Baz = Bazaar bill rate.
CR = rates charged by primary agricultural co-operative credit 
societies.
The result shows poor correlation and unreliability of the estimate of 
the co-efficient of CR in view of its high S.E. The low D.W. statistic 
also signifies the presence of auto-correlation. This need not be 
surprising in view of the fact that the Bazaar section of Indian money 
market is not very dependent upon primary agricultural credit co-operatives 
for funds.
1 L.C. Jain, op.cit., P. 97* Shroff means indigenous banker.
2 Data for the years 1953 we have taken from R.B.I. Reports on Currency
and Finance, 1952-3 to 1967-8, Bombay, and R.B.I. - Statistical Statements 
relating to the Co-operative Movement in India, 1952-3 to 1967-8.
1 53
4.8. 2. Bazaar b'll rate and Hundi rate:
It would be interesting also to know the relationship between 
Bazaar bill rates and hundi rates, ie.,the rate at which the State 
Bank or other commercial banks discount hundls for giving
1
accommodation to the indigenous banks up to a certain limit.
2
By using the relevant data, we obtain the following equation:
Baz = 6.6264 + .7899 HR R?‘ = .90
(.0724) D.F. = 13
D.W. = 1.54. F. = 119.0
Where HR = Hundi rate.
Thus 90% of the total variation in Bazaar bill rate is explained 
by hundi rate and the correlation between then appears to be highly 
significaut.
4.8. 3• Bazaar rate and " ark Bate: an anal:r ds_ of the relative
discrepancy of the two rates:
It is useful to examine the nature and change in the 
discrepancies between Bank Rate and Bazaar Rate on a time-series 
basis. In 1949-50, when the Bank Rate was 3% p.a. Bazaar bill rate 
in Bombay was roughly equal to 8% p.a. and in Calcutta, it was about 
12% p. a. In 1966-7, when Bank Rate was 6%, Bazaar bill rate in 
both Calcutta and Bombay v/as equal to 15% p. a. It follows that 
while Bank Rate v/ent up by 100% between 1919 and ''.967, Bazaar rate 
in Bombay v/ent up by 87. and in Calcutta, it went up by only 25%.
1 See, Gopal Karkal, op cit. , PP. 67 - 8.
2 See, R.B.I. - Report on Currency and Finance: 1952-3 to 1967-8 
and R.B.I. - Statistical Statements relating to the Co-operative 
Movement in r 1952-3 to 1967-8.
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This implied that t1'e .relative difference between Calcutta 
Bazaar rate and Bank Bate decreased substantially though such 
decrease in difference was small so far as Bank Bate and Bombay 
Bazaar rates are concerned. However, the difference between the 
hundi rate and Bank Bate increased considerably during the sare 
period since the hundi rate went up by 178% whereas Bank Bate went 
up by 100%. Such estimates also suggest that the difference 
between the hundi rate and Bazaar rate is gradually narrowing.
The interesting fact to observe is that during 19i-8-50, Bombay 
Bazaar rates were lower than those in Calcutta which perhaps 
implies inter alia, the absence of the flow of funds between these 
tv/o important money markets as also the presence of a weak 
communication channel in India, Such difference may also be 
explained by the high cost of transfer and variations in risk.'1'
However, in 1966-7, rates in both the markets were the same and
indeed, in 1067-9, the rate in Calcutta was actually lower than 
2
that in Bombay. This may imnly an improvement in the channels 
of communication and a greater flow of funds between the two 
markets. It may also imply a chanre in conditions in Calcutta or 
in Bombay without an improvement in the channels of communication.
1 See, J.S.G.Wi 1 son - Monetary Policy and the Development of. . . .-IP 
PP. 266-69, op cit.,
2 See table If. 5.
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4.8. 4* A Statistical Estimate of the relationship between the 
Bank Rate and the Bazaar rate:
The statistical estimate of the various factors exuected to 
affect the Bazaar rate in India has yielded the following equation 
with Koyck transformation when applied to data available for 
period 1945 - 1968. Data of Bazaar rates are average of Calcutta 
and Bombay rates- (see table 4*5):
BAZt = 2.288f + .0484 BANt + 1.4239 BANt-1 + .2115 BANt-2 +*2087 BAZt-1 
(1.1659) (.7020) (.7325) (.3136) (.2383)
t = [l.96l [.07] [1.94-"] [.67] [.88]
R 2 = .8314 
D.W. = 1.84
BAZt = Current Bazaar rate.
BAZt-1 = Lagged Bazaar rate of one period.
BANt = Current Bank Rate. '
BAl\Tt-l = Lagged(one period)Bank Rate. J
BANt-2 = Lagged(two period)Bank Rate.
In the above equation, we find that given the t-values, only 
BANt-1 has significance at 10% level whereas the other variables are 
insignificant.
The OLS regression consisting only of BANt-1 and BAZt-1 as the 
explanatory variables yielded the following equation:
BAZt = 1.8154 + 1.4806 BANt-1 + .3206 BAZt-1
(.8395) (.3768) (.1545) §2 = .8450
| - [2.04] [3.93] [2.08] D.W. = 1.9693
The above equation shows not only higher R^ but also higher
D.W. statistic which reduces the chance of existence of auto-correlatic 
From the t-values, it appeared that BANt-1 is more significant than 
BAZt-1. The equation also shows that the effect of one period 
lagged Bank Rate on Bazaar rate is quite significant.
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With Eank Rate as the dependent variable, v/e obtained the 
following equation:
BANt = .0075 - .0001 BAZt + .OAR6 BAZt-1 + .0102 BAZt-2 + .8927 BANt-1 
(.3922) (.0849) (.0777) (.0333) (.1891)
t = [.02] [-.11] [.64] [.31] [4.72]
r ?- = .895**: D.W. = 1.1679
The above equation shows that only BANt-1 has a significant 
effect upon the Bank Rate while Bazaar rates of different reriods 
did not have any significant effect. However, low value of D.W. 
statistic signifies that auto-correlation might exist in the 
estimates.
As a cross-check, we used monthly data from 196** to 1965 
\» / ( see, fig.IV. 7) and obtained the following equation* fllhich is
similar to the ^receding equation but with improved D.W.statistic. 
However, in this equation only the relationship between Calcutta 
Bazaar rate and Bank Rate is considered:
/ BANt = -OA89 + .211A BAZt - .0952 BAZt-1 +.0081 BAZt-2 + .6973 BANt-1 
(.0585) (.1222) (.11*91) (.0058) (.1285)
t = [-  .84] [1.73] [- .64] [1 .39] [5.43]
R 2 = .9975 D.W. = 1.4736
The equation shows once again that only BANt-1 had significant
effect on BANt and Bazaar rates in different periods did not have
any significant effect upon current Bank Rate.
From these equations, it may perhaps be inferred that although
the Bazaar rate was affected by a lagged Bank Rate, Bank Rate was
not significantly affected by Bazaar rates in different periods
during the span of our study. The inference may be regarded as
important as it indicates to a certain extent that it is core likely
that the unorganized market was influenced by the organized market
and not the other way round. However, it 5s probable that the effect
was not'instantaneous.
1 Data are shown in table I*.'6.Since there was no variation in 
Bombay Bazaar •'-ate, therefore only the Calcutta Baz.rate is considered
/ .
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I
TABLE 4,6* BANK RATE AND CALCUTTA AND BOMBAY BAZAAR RATE:
MAY 196A - 1965 NOVEMBER 
PER CENT.
MONTH
AND
YEAR
BANK RATE CALCUTTA
BAZAAR
RATE
BOMBAY
BAZAAR
RATE
1964
MAY 4.5 13.0 12.0
JUNE 4.5 13.0 12.0
JULY 4.5 13.0 12.0
AUGUST 4.5 13.0 12.0
SEPTEMBER 4.5-5.0 13.0 12.0
OCTOBER 5.0 13.5 12.0
NOVEMBER 5.0 13.5 12.0
DECEMBER 5.0 13.5 12.0
1965
JANUARY 5.0 14.0 12.0
FEBRUARY 5.0-6.0 15.0 12.0
MARCH 6.0 15.0 12.0
APRIL 6.0 15.0 12.0
MAY 6.0 15.0 12.0
JUNE 6.0 15.0 12.0
JULY 6.0 15.0 12.0
AUGUST 6.0 15.0 12.0
SEPTEMBER 6.0 15.0 12.0
OCTOBER 6.0 15.0 12.0
NOVEMBER 6.0 15.0 12.0
Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, 1961' June to January,1966.
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l±. 9. Inst i tutional Aspect of Interest Pate in Indian Rural Economy:
Economic and monetary transactions in a subsistence economy 
are sometimes mingled with social or institutional relationships. 
Joan Robinson once observed: "The most important influences upon 
interest rates which account for, say, the difference between 
^0 per cert in an Indian village and 3 ner cent in London - are 
social, legal and institutional". It has been argued that an 
explanation of the causes and of the price of borrowing in a rural 
economy requires anthropological investigations. To quote:
"For ultimately the reasons for borrowing, the efficacy of the 
communication process, the ro1e of valuation, the objectives of 
productive activity and the associated relationships in the village 
are outcomes of the village culture. Only ° better understanding 
of village culture and, more particularly, of the role of production 
and its related processes within the village culture can provide the
insights by which a closer meaning of data collected in an economic
2
survey can be evaluated*/
1 See, Joan Robinson - The Rate of Interest and Other Essays* 
McMillan & Co.,Ltd. London, 1952, P.3*
n See, Bert.F.Hoselitz, "Capital Formation,Saving & Credit in 
Indian Agricultural Society" in Raymond Firth and B.S.Yamey.(ed). 
Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies. Studies from 
Asia, Oceania, The Caribbean and Middle America, George Allen and 
Unwin, Ltd., London, 196L, P.373.
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To auote another writer: "Interest may not be native to the village
community. There ere many cases of time transactions that involve
no Interest, such as reciprocal holm, advances of seed or seedlings
to fellow-villagers, temporary loans of cattle and holdings, 1 of
which ust be regarded as credit without intones':. It is probable,
however, that beside these transactions, there are also spontaneous
occurrences of interest in kind, while undoubtedly capitalistic
western influences have strongly encouraged the levy of interest in
the village society".1 These studies reflect that the problem
of interest rate determination of rural areas in a country like
India cannot be tackled from the economic standpoint and hence
2
sociological and anthropological surveys are also necessary.
Vithout denying the necessity of such investigations, it must be 
pointed out that in such studies due emphasis should be given on 
the quantification of ideas expressed in the surveys as far as 
possible. Otherwise, serious difficulty may occur in the 
measurement of various causal factors and also in testing the 
hypotheses.
1 See, J.K.Boeke - Economics and. Economic Policy of Duel Societies. 
H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon N.V., Haarlem, 1953, PP 47-51.
2 See, F.'6.Bailey - Caste & the Economic Frontier: a village in 
highland Orissa, Manchester University Press, 1957, PP.155-6.
Bailey observed: "The r?te of Interest from time to time...-;s
50 per cent,. If seed paddy is borrowed, the rate is 100 per cent. 
These high rates are the means by which those who have no land or 
little land are able to build up a paddy-lending business".
( PP. 155-6).
163
/; .10. Conclusions:
The following conclusions may be reached on the basis of our 
study of Indian rural interest rates:
(a) The idea that interest rates are always very high and 
usurious in the Indian rural economy is not found to be generally 
valid on the basis of our study. It may be regarded as significant 
if taken along with a whole range of other factors in the rural 
sector( e.g. high rent, malpractices of traders etc.) The average 
rate of borrowing varied betv/een 17%( approx.) in 1951-2 and 15% 
(approx-) in 1961-2. This may not be regarded as very high in the 
rural sector. Nevertheless, the possibility of charging high 
interest rate in some cases is not denied in our study. In view 
of the fact that price level went up by 30 per cent between 
1951-2 and 1961-2, the fall in the real rate during the same 
period was higher.
(b) The examination of the cost side of rural rate revealed 
that such rates may mostly be explained with the help of high risk 
and uncertainty, High r:sks prevail in rural lending mostly because 
of the inability of cultivators to provide suitab? e collateral.
It is also suggested here that monopoly profit may exist only in 
some cases.
(c) The hypotheses that the farmers' repay lent of borrowing is 
related positively to farmers' income and that interest rate is 
inversely related to income are empirically vindicated within the 
limits of the availability of data. However, there is scone for
further enquiry in this line.
(d) The level of interest rates seemed to have been negatively 
correlated with the degree of monetization in the Indian rural 
economy.
1 64
( c) The relative difference between Bank Bate and Bazaar rate 
in Calcutta seems to have declined over-time though this decline 
does not seem to be significant so far as the relative difference 
between Bank Bate and Bombay Bazaar rate is concerned. The 
relative difference between the hnnrk rate and the Bazaar rate in 
both Bombay and Calcutta appeared to have declined significantly.
(f) The difference between Calcutta and Bombay Bazaar rates had 
completely vanished by 1966-7 though in 19^8-50, rates in Calcutta 
were higher in comparison* with those in Bombay. This may suggest, 
inter alia, greater flow of funds between the two markets. It may 
a? so imrly a change in the economic condition in Calcutta or 
Bombay.
(g) The econometric study of the relationship between the 
Bazaar rate and the Bank B-'te indicated that it was more probable 
that Bazaar rate was influenced by the Bank Bate of one period lag 
while the Bank Bate was more significantly influenced by its past 
values rather than by Bazaar rates (current or lagged). Thus, there 
seems to be some ground to argue that rates in the organized sector 
influences rates in the unorganized soct^^ and it is more likely 
that t1 e Bank Bate is the 1 eader rather than the follower.
(h) It appeared that although the average rural interest rate in 
India is not excessively high, there is no reason why it could not 
be lowered more particularly in those regions where rates are 
exorbitant. The basic problem here is to enable the peasant to 
raise his farm output by providing him with more imputs and if 
necessary, by providing credit in kind.1
1 It is well observed that low interest rate was not enough to 
eliminate the unorganized agencies by making the organized agencies 
more attractive to the farmers and the cultivators may require 
services even nore than money. See, FAO of the United Nations:
FAO Agricultural Studies No:68-Agricultural Credit Through 
Co-operatives and Other Institutions, ~B0x677.965."Pi 17~~ard~~P.?6.
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Increase in farmer’s income will help him to accumulate assets which may
be used as collateral for taking further loans. This would reduce the risk-
premium and the monopoly element wherever it exists, which in its turn may reduce
the rural interest rate. A diversification of the nature of farmer’s security
may also reduce the risk-premium and thus, the rural interest rate. A
number of measures for safeguarding against risk, e.g. diversification of
crops, a multiple cropping system, crop insurance, proper grading and
storing facilities for crops, provision of warehousing facilities and
certainly providing better irrigation facilities, seeds, manures, and
fertilizers, could be adopted and some of them are adopted especially in the
Intensive Area District Programmes and Intensive Agricultural Area projects.
There may remain a case for raising interest rates in the organized sector
as "the maintenance of nominal interest rates in the organized sector below
their true economic level results in a steady attrition of organized finance",
because "only the rates in the organized sector are controlled, the rise in
real rates of interest will be confined to the unorganized sectors, resulting
in a steady diversion of savings to that sector in search of higher rates of 
2
return". It is believed that raising interest rates in the organized market 
will "promote financial intermediation and the integration of money and 
capital market".^ However, it seems fair to conclude that unless the income 
and asset position of farmers improve appreciably, not only will the high 
risk-premium and monopoly profit element continue to make the rural rate 
higher, but also the farmers' capacity to turn to alternative organized 
agencies will remain limited and the task of integration between organized 
and unorganized money markets in India may continue to remain difficult.
1 See, for details, An and. G. Chandavarkar, op.cit., IMF Staff Paper, 
March 1971> P« 72.
2 P- 72.
3 Ibid. P. 72.
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PROGRESS OF1 AGRICULTURAL CREDIT CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES IN
THE INDIAN RURAL ECONOMY:
5.1. T INTRODUCTION;
The aim of this chapter is to examine the nature and growth of 
the co-operative credit societies in the Indian rural economy. The 
cho"‘ ce of the analysis of co-operative credit societies is deliberate 
because a) they are the most important organized agencies in the 
rural sector, and b) they have been recognised as the main agencies 
to act as substitutes for the money-lenders and to promote gradually 
the integration of the dual money market in the agricultural sector.
In India, the development of agricultural credit co-operative 
societies is marked by uneveness and it is important to establish 
how far these societies have made progress in extending i) coverage 
of rural population, ii) loans to cultivators, iii) the scale of 
their activities, and iv) the link between credit and marketing.
It is important also, to examine the financial viability of these 
credit societn* es.
In this chanter, we shall firstly discuss the nature of the 
growth of co-onerative credit societies in India and the factors 
which helped or hindered their nrogress. Secondly, the analysis 
will be mainly concentrated on the liabilities and assets of these 
urinary credit societies in order to examine their viability. Some 
relevant criteria to test the efficiency or *viability1 of credit 
societies will then be annlied. The study will be carried out at 
the macro (ie, all-India) level at the beginning though some attempt 
will be made to extend the analysis to the state level, to consider 
regional variations.
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Thirdly, the workings of State and Central, co-orerative hanks - 
the first tv/o layers of the existing three-tier system of granting 
credit to the cultivators through the co-oreratives - will he 
discussed briefly. Such a study may be useful in bringing out 
certain factors which stard in the way of the efficient working 
of the co-oneratives and this may suggest certain policy 
i iplications: with regard to rendering the credit societies more 
viable, increasing competition with money-lenders, and promoting 
greater integration in a dual money market. This in its turn is 
expected to make the operation of monetary policy more effective 
in the Indi an rural economy.
5.2. 1. Growth of the Co-operative Credit Movement in India: 
a brief_ survey:
The origin of the co-operative credit movement in India 
dates back to 190/ when the Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 
was passed (though there is evidence to suggest that some form of 
co-operative societies existed in India even before 190' , 
uarticularly in the state of Madras - now Tamil Nadu - in the 
form of *Nidhls* or mutual loan societies and in Punjab in 1891 
where ~ co-operative society started working for controlling the
p
common land of the village for the benefit of co-sharers). From 
the very beginning of the co-operative movement, "the agricultural 
credit societies far exceeding, both in number of societies and in 
membership, though not ir working capital all other tyres of 
co-operative organizations*1.'
1 See, for eva-.ple, S.N.Sen - Central Banking in Underdeveloped 
Money Markets, Fourth ed., Booklands Private Limited,Calcutta, 1967, 
PT'h 25 - 9* See also, Alak Ghosh - Financial Intermediaries and. 
Monetary Policy in a Developing Economy, The V/orld Press Private Ltd, 
Calcutta, 1961, P.109.
2 For details, see, E.M.Hough, or cit., ch.111.
3 Ibid. P.53; see also, P.B.I. A.I.P.C.S. vol.11, ch.18, op cit.,
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It is useful to clarify here the sources and uses of funds of 
co-orerative credit societies and this is illustrated in diagram.V.1. 
It is revealed that generally the Provincial or State Co-operative 
banks defend upon the Reserve Bonk of India and the State 
governments for their funds which they loan out to the Central 
co-orerative banks at the district level. The Central co-operative 
banks may try to raise deposits or owned funds. But they largely 
depend upon State co-operative banks for 1 ending to primary credit 
societies. These nrimary credit societies are real competitors of 
money-lenders. Apart from getting loans from Central Co-operative 
banks, primary credit societies may also raise owned funds to lend 
directly to ember-cultivators. Thus the primary credit societies 
are the ultimate links in the flow of organized funds to 
cud ■Hvators.
-5.2. 2. Causes of Slow growth of Co-onerotive_Credit Societies in 
India:
The performance of the co-orerative credit movement in India 
is considered as noor and several, reasons are advanced to explain 
its 1 failure*. “ These reasons may be summarised under a few major 
heads for the sake of a rigorous analysis. In sum, these are,
(a) financial, (b) administrative, (c) organizational, (d) factors 
related to the scale of activities and coverage and (e)institutional. 
Each one of these causes will be examined carefully in the next fev; 
sections.
1 See, R.B.I. - A. I .R. C . S . , vol. 11, P. ?J\ 5, or cit. , See also, 
Government of India - Report of the Co-operative Planning Committee, 
Bombay, 19/'6, PP. 11-12.
1(a) Financial; The existence of co-orerative credit societies
in the midst of peasants with low income and low credit-worthiness
itself accounts for the financial weakness of the society. This
is so because farmers due to their low income, have low savings
and a low volume of assets. Generally, among the richer farmers,
thebest asset is 1 and whereas among poorer cultivators either there
is no asset or whatever the assets they have, those mainly consist
of rrimitive agricultural implements and/or livestock which are
insufficient as securities against which credit may be granted.
Further, low income and low saving also accounts for the low level
of deposits a-d hi ah level o^ overdues in the workings of primary
societies. In fact, large numbers of societies became ’dormant’
ie, societies which do not advance or collect loans, for quite a 
1
few years. It is not surmising that the financial weakness of
many co-operative credit societies led to their poor absorptive
capacity and in some cases, much of the financial assistance from
central financing agencies could not have been disbursed by primary
2
credit societies. Some quantitative evidence of decline in the 
financial strength of co-operatives^ is also available. Darling 
reported that owned funds as a percentage of tota1 working capital 
of primary agricultural credit societies declined from l\3 in 
1929-50 to 37 in 1955-6. Deposits as a percentage of working 
canital fell from 11.6 to 8.9 during the same period, whereas 
overdues as a percentage of loans outstanding went up from 22 to 25 
between 1^50-1 and 1955-6.
1 See, Government of India: Ministry of Food,Agriculture,Community 
Development and Co-operation - Report of the Committee on Co-operation, 
New Delhi, 1966, P.13. See also,i)Government of India-Report of the 
Committee on Co-operative Credit,New Delhi,I960,P. 200.13) R?B. I.‘ 
A.T.R.C.S. v6l.ll, P. 232, on cit.,
2 See, V. Tirupati Naidu - Far . Credit and Co-oneratives in India,
Vora ?< Co. ,Publishers Private Ltd, ’Bombay, Allakabad, 1963.¥.17.
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Further, in 1954-5, in five out of nine major districts, over 25?' 
of agricultural credit societies worked at a loss and ir. six states 
in 1955-6, increase in recoveries did not keep pace with increase in 
advances. There were great regional variations in the membership 
ne^ society as well as in loans advanced per : ember and the audit 
c1 assif? cation in 1955— 6 showed that in Blthar, Hyderabad, Madhya 
Pradesh, Utirt>' Pradesh and West Bengal, less than 8°' of societies were 
classified as TtA ” (Model) or "B" (Good.) whereas Bombay had about 
fcy>/0 »»A,f and "Bu group. Such financial weakness also limited
2
the score for augmenting share capital and reserves of the society.
(b) Ad inistr-'tjve: The administrative problem was one of the
major obstacles that stood in the way of effective functioning of
co-operatives. The problem is felt not on^y with regard, to the
3
genera1 management of co-operatives," but also with their loan 
administration. While the lack of sense of business management 
led to insolvency of many primary credit societies it also 
accounted for their roor recovery performance, particularly after 
1951. Very few primary societies tried to harness the loans to 
really productive purposes and link fresh borrowing to the 
repayments which might h^ve implied fina: cing out of internal savings. 
Sometimes, dates of repayment as fixed by credit societies created
5
inconvenience for the cultivators. Cases of book adjustments of 
old loans through renewals which overstated the amount of repayments 
were not rare. ^
1 See,Government of India,Planning Commission:Sir Malcolm Darling - 
' -:Qrt Certain Aspects on Co-operative Movement in India,New Delhi
1957", PP. 4 - 7- ' ' ' '
2 See, Government of India,Ministry of Food and Agriculture,Cb ester,
C .Davis - Report of Rural Credit in India,New Delhi, 1954 ,PP. 10-15.
3 See,Daniel Thorner -Agricultural Co-operatives in India: A H e l d  
Report,Asia Publishing House,Bombay, 196k- P.l.
4 See, Anwar Iqbal Qureshj. - The Future of Co-oneratlve Movement in
Oxford University Press,Madras, 1947,P.160. See also V~Tiruoati 
N*idu> cit., PP.17-18 and PP.65-66.
.5. R.B.I.- - A.I.P.C.S.vol .n , PP.217-T8 ' op cit
6 Ibid P. 218. ’ — r-:— ^
1
A large proportion of noor cultivators failed to get co-orerative
1
cred't r id loans were generally given to "big cultivators. This
war not in line with the principles of co-operatives of helring
small and poor farmers. It may, however, be added that from the
standpoint of increasing production, granting of more credit to
big cultivators may not be necessarily undesirable. In many cases,
overdues might have been the result of inadequate supervision due
2to administrative innefficiency. Sometimes, loans were given on
3
the basis of caste or community. It is said that in many cases, 
the non-credit co-operative societies did not get their required 
finance from the district central co-operative Banks. Poor 
ouality of admin:’ strati on resulted in delays in obtaining loans from
5
co-oreratives.' The Problem of administration was acute even
g
between 1951 and. 1968 as evinced recently.'" It Is also believed
that inefficiency in administration was the result of undue reliance
on the honorary services of the secretary. This point is stressed
in both 1946 and 1964 and it was argued that the appointment of a
full-time paid secretary would have rendered the administration 
7
more efficient.
1 Ibj d. PD. 234-35. See alsOjB.N.Choulbey - Principles and Practice
2- Co-opero'lve Baiking in India,Asia Publishing House,London,1968 
P.49 and Ch.11.
2 R.B.I. - Report of the A11-Indla Rural Credit... (1969)PP. l?6-7o~" cit.
3 Indian Society of Agricultural Economics -Co-operation in Kodinar 
Bombay, 1951, PP. IX - Xll.
4 C.B.Indule -Co-operative Banking in India,Continental Prakashan 
Poona, India, 1968, P.53.
5 Government of India-Agricultural Finance Sub-Committee(1945)»
P. 45, op cit., see also, FAO Development Paper No.7?-New .Approach to 
Agricultural Credit, Rome, 1964, P.l.
6 R.B.I. - Report of the All-India Rural Credit...(1969).PP.176-7. 
o p  cit. ,
7 Government of India - Report of the Co-operative Planning Committee 
(191-6)... ,PP. 11-12 o p  cit. , See also,R.B.I - Report of All-India. . (1969)
P * 146, o p  cit. L
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It ay bo pointed out that the employment of a paid, secretary 
might have raised the cost as well. Nevertheless, it appears, 
that the rrob-1 em of loan administration and management of the 
co-oreratives has still remained very important and is yet to be 
solved - thanks, inter alia, also to the lack of training in 
bar.king methods.~
(c) Organizational: The problem of organization of credit
co-operatives on sound lines and their co-ordination w' th other
types of (non-credit) co-operatives may be regarded as quite
important. Without proper organization, even an efficient credit
mechanism r ay not yield desirable results unless its effects are
buttressed by improving the supplies and services which an
2
organized credit system produces. Lack of organization in the 
co-operative credit structure was also responsible for a fragmented 
approach of the co-operatives towards the solution of rural problems 
wifhout trying to meet all the wants of cultivators. It was 
observed that in many cases co-ordination between centra], co-operative 
banks and primary societies as also between credit and non-credit 
societies v/as lacking. The necessity for re-organization of large
5numbers of societies has not ’ eon denied in the government reports."
1 RBI - Statutory Report(1937). P.24. op cit.,See also,RBI - 
Report of the All-India. ..(1969), Ch . 32. o p  cit. JL
2 S e e, S. TT. Ph o #al - A ~r 1 c ul t ur al Financing in India - with special 
reference to Land Mortgage Banks,Asia Publishing House,London, 1966. 
P.XI. See olso,B.K.kadan-Aspects of Economic Development and Policy. 
Allied Publishers Private Ltd., Bombay, 1964, P. 95.
3 RBI - Report of the Banking Union at Kodlnar.Bombay,1937. P. 16. 
^orort of the Agricultural _Credit 0r ganization Co.mittee_( 1947) ,
PP.16-7, cited in RBI - A.I.R.C.S. vol.11. P.249.op cit., See also,
E.M.Hough, o p  cit., P.334*
5 Government of India - Report of the Committee...(I960) P.200. 
on cit. ,
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(d) Factors related, to the Scale of Activities and Coverage:
It is possible to trace one o^ t’ e major causes of the ^allure of
co-oner stive credit movement in the limited scale of activities of
credit societies. In fact, the small size of credit societies
accounted for the low volume of their loan transactions and this
is sunnosed to have endangered, the viability of credit societies.
Further, the coverage of credit societies is not regarded as
satisfactory and it is reported that a relatively small nronortion
2
of total cultivators borrowed from the co-operatives.' Among those
cultivators who obtained loans, the big farmers obtained relatively
more than poor and small cultivators." To quote: "In general, the
credit co-operatives have concentrated on lending to the more
prosperous farmers who are least pressed for funds and who are
willing to take substantial loans. Those farmers are least
penalized by the operating rules of the co-operatives, which are
rigid in comparison with those of the money-lenders, and they can
benefit by using the loans in profitable investment or even by
re-lending to the lower income members of the community".^ It may
be arsued that the small coverage and low turnover might have
5
r n -  -ed the cost of credit for cultivators.
1 RBI - Report of the All-India Rura1 Credit...(1969),P.417.QP cit.
2 RBI - A.I.R.C.S., vol.11, P.215, op cit.,
3 Ibid. P.230, See also,H.B.Sivanaggi, "Provision of Credit for 
Small Cultivators:Reconsideration of the Problem" in A.K.Khusro(ed) 
Readings in Agricultural Ec>ho 'cs^ Allied Publishers Private Ltd.,
Calcutta, 1968,' PP. 2L\0 - 61....
4 See, John W.Mellor,Thomas V.Weaver, Uma J.Lele, Sheldon R.Simon - 
Developing Rural India, Cornell University Press, Ithaca,New York, 
1968, PP.65-6?. S ee also, Michael Linton - Sunnly Problems Matter 
Most in the Economy, Institute of Development Studies,Brighton,1 9 6 9 *  
P. 2.
5 United Nations: Department of Economic Affairs - Rural Progress 
Through Co-operatives,New York, 1954, PP.6-7. See also, FAO
@3op lent Paper No.16. Sn* r Bernard O.Binns - Agricultural Credit 
For Smal1 Far-ers, FAO of the United Nations, Rome, Italy,1952.P.3.
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(e) Institutional: The institutional factors may be regarded
ar very ~ ■•'’■port-at in accountin'"' for tie failure of co-operatives. 
Fro-' the very beginning of the co-operative credit noveme.-t, it 
had to face tremendous opposition from landlords and private 
traders. In the workings of co-operatives, the influe: ce of caste 
and village politics, of big traders and landlords was clear.~ In
states like Madras, co-operatives suffered very much from
2
govern" tent intervention. Such cases of government interference
a^d government assistance at the cost of the rest of the economy
has been called into question b" some write-s. > The other
institutional factors arc: t) the absence of leadership because of
the super-imposed way of organizing the ori-nry societies from
above, ii) lack of education and the feudal backrround of Indian
v? liases, iii) a defective system of land tenure and the
subsistence nature of agricultural economy,iv) political factors,
v) lack of right co-operative conduct.
In view of the complexity of the nature of institutional
factors, It is not difficult to underst^ d why the Indian
socio-economic environment has promoted a form of institutional
q
credit which is urban-biased and. which neglected -agriculture.
1 "RBI - vol. 11. PP. 265-67, op cit. ,
2 Daniel Thorner, op cit., P.l. Soe also, Sheila Gorst - 
Co-operative Credit for Producers and Consumers, Basil Blackwell 
Oxford, 1962, P.10/:.
3 Sec, for example, P.T.Bauer - Indian Economic Policy and 
Develonment, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1961, P.76.
A RBI - Report of the All-India Rural Credit...(1n£9),PP.186-200, 
on cit.,
5 RBI - A.I.R.C.S. vol.11, PP.265-7, op cit.,
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It is well observed:"The failure of co-orerative credit is
explicabl e In terms of the total impracticability of any attei pt
to combine the very weak in competition with the very strong and
expect them by themselves to create cord.itions firstly for their
emancipation from the interests which oppose them, and secondly
for their soc- a? and economic development in the context of
severe di sadvantages historically imposed on them by a structure
of the type described. The problem is not so much one of
reorganization of co-operative credit as of the creation of new
conditions in which it car operate effectively and for the benefit 
w 1
of the weaker.
The persistence of large-scale illiteracy, lack of local 
leadership, the existence of a defective system of land-tenure, 
influence of politics in the day-to-day administration of the 
co-operatives and the impact of a feudal structure in the villages 
still dominated by landlords and traders are still now the 
important institutional factors which must be reckoned to explain 
the failure of co-operelive credit movement in India. Between 
1951 and 196(3, many of these institutional orob*1 e s were not 
solved. Further analysis of these problems is beyond the score of 
this study.
1 Ibid., P. 279.
1 7 7
5.2. 3• Summary of the causes of failure and th 1 r evaluations:
Among the reasons for the lack of success of c o-op or stives 
discussed previously the most basic seem to be related to the low 
scale of activity of co-oneratives, their financial weaknesses and 
their problems emanating from loan administration.' The 
institutional, factors are important, but an enquiry into their 
solutions takes us beyond the scope of our present analysis. The 
■important m o b -1 em is the low income of the agricultural population 
and this largely accounts for the financial weaknesses of credit 
societies. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the credit 
co-operatives could not successfully mobilize internal resources, 
they had to depend on external funds. This need not be treated as 
a serious probl em. as long as the co-operatives become successful in 
/giving Loans (and in this respect, it will be shown later that they 
were, to some extent, successful) and obtain ^unds from those 
commercial banks which were successful in mobilizing deposits. Here 
is an important linkage which may be developed further.
It seems, that the most important problem that the co-operatives 
■are now facing is the problem of loan administration and sound 
management. Indeed, it was one of the major problems that the 
co-operative credit societies have faced between 1951 and 1968 in 
their way to obtain viability.
1 See a) RBI - Rural Credit Foil o w - u p  Survey,1956-7,P.A59,o p  cit.
b) PBI - Rural Credit Follow-up Survey,1957-8, PP.195-96» o p  cit.,
c) RBI - Rural Credit Foil "urvey,1958-?, PP.2A1-/j2, op cit.,
d) RBI -  Rural Credj 11ow-up Survey,1959-60.  P.158, o p  cit. 7
See also, V. Tirupati Naidu, op cit., P.76.
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The reported or ogress of co-oneratives in the mhere of loan 
advanced, ' nay be stultified if the recovery per for nance which is 
related to the -oroblem of loan administration does not improve.
It is argued that "in any credit s,rste: , the conce pt of needs and 
resources becomes meaningful only when they are looked uron as 
factors to be reckoned with in a continuing operation. An essential, 
condition for maintaining this continuity is the ability of the
P
system to recover the amount lent by it". This is an irroortant 
observation wotth pointing out. As the co-operatives are largely 
subsidized by the Reserve Bank (because the Bank gives loans to the
co-operatives at 2$ below the Bank Pate) and as the Bank had to be
guided by both liquidity a d profitability considerations, therefore, 
despite trvAnr" a liberal apnroach towards the grant of rural credit 
in the sixties, the ~a .k can hardly afford to ignore the recovery 
performance of co-operatives. "In fact, it will be failing in its 
duty if it were not to draw a f-’rm line between promoting 
development of credit institutions and itself assuming the role of 
such institutions". ' It .ay not, he- co, be wrong to su^ ;est that 
the problem of loan administration is one of the key-problems that 
has got to be solved for placing co-operative credit societies on 
a sound footing in view of the above analysis of the actual 
onerations of co-operative credit societyes in India in recent times.
1 See,!) G.M.Laud-Co-omcrative Backing in India, The Ob-operative 
Book Depot, Bombay, 1956, PP- 662-70k.
ii) Gilbert Etienne - Studies in Indian Agriculture: The Art of the
Possible, University of California P *©s , Berkeley, California,1968 
P. 81.
ill) Michael Linton, "Strategy for fi ^ * lturejTJrl an bias and Pural 
Planning" in Paul Streeten and Michael Linton(eds) - The Crisis of 
gj g - nln I c— > Lc 0-1 an in j i : I960* s Royal Institute of 
Int. ••matronal Affairs, Oxford University Press,1968, PPJ26-27.
2 RBI-Standing Advisory Co :t’ ee on Pural a ' Co-operative Credit
Bombay, 1 n 67, PP. 6h-86.
3 RBI-Role of Reserve Bank of India in Rural Credit,Bombay, 1961,
PP. 1/.J.-15.
I SBI-Sty^din g A.d v?*. scry C or mi 11 e e. . . (19 6n), P1"*. 6°-9. 0^ cit. ,
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5.3* 1. An ' alysis of Workings of the Primary Agri cult turural Credit 
Societiest Some testable hypotheses:
Some of the major tests to easure the financial strength of 
the co-operative credit mechanism may involve considering the 
proportion of deposits to working capital, borrowings to working 
capital and overdues to loans outstanding. Specifically, to 
conclude that the financial strength of a credit society has 
improved, we should expect that,
a) the proportion of owned funds to working capital should m  se,
b) the r^0p0rtion of overdues to loans outstanding should fall,
and c) the proportion of deposits to working capital should rise.
It is possible to suggest that as an improvement of the
financial strength, it may be exrected that the -nronortion of 
borrowing to working capital should decrease. But this point may 
be debated on the ground that if the central bank considers lending 
to co-oncratives as a reasonable way to expand the reserve base of 
the monetary system, then a rising proportion of borrowing, by 
itself, need not be treated as an index of weakness of the financial 
structure of co-oneratives. Further, instead of buying central 
government securities, if the central bank starts buying co-operative 
paper, then a direct linkage may be developed. Similarly, the 
co-operatives may also sell co-operative paper to the commercial 
banks and this may open up a new source of funds.
If the co mercial banks can mobilize deposits, the linkage is 
promoted between commercial banks and co-operatives, and if 
co-operatives grant loans to a larger proportion of cultivators, the 
necessity of a rarid rise in the deposit-credit ratio need not be 
over-emphasi zed.
1 8 0
Wh' t k  to be precisely e^rhasized is the use of loans in a
time. This is, again,
a nrobie-• of loan administration and supervision which we have
stressed before. Alternatively, to attract rural funds, the 
deposit rate has to be raised. But this may push up the ultimate 
1 ending rate to cultivators and the relative shift in demand for 
loans from co-operatives may fall.
Other surrleme: tary criteria to judge the success of credit
societies may also be applied. Such tests include:
(a) the change in the proportion of villages covered by 
co-orerative credit societ?' es; and
(b) the change in the proportion of borrowing members from 
co-operative.credit societies.
In the following sections, after considering the general 
picture, these tests will be applied first at the macro 
(ie, all-India) level and then at the State-level to take into 
account state-wise variations.
5.3. 2. Growth of Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Societies: 
1950-51 to 1968-9: All-India:
The general pattern of development of primary agricultural 
credit co-orerative societies is shown in table 5.1. These figures 
are mostly in terms of all-India averages. It is shown that the 
average membership of primary societies went up by more than .Refold 
between 1950-51 and 1968-9 ie, from A5 to 174* The rise in average 
share capital per member between the same period was roughly the 
same, though the rise in average share capital rer society was 
quite impressive.
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Average deposits ner society rose substantially, but the rise in 
average denosits ner e her was hardly sati sfactory as it rose 
from Rs. 9 in 1950 - 51 to Rs. 19 in 1968-9. Average working 
caoital per society rose substantially and so did loans per member.
The v»ise in denosits per member was much less than the rise in 
loans advanced per member. This implies that a great urorortion 
of loans advanced by credit societies was financed not by deposits 
but by external sources like borrowing, These points nay be more 
clearly understood through closer examination of the composition 
of the working capital of primary credit societies and this is 
attempted in the next section.
5*3. 3. 0 omr o sit ion o f v;rk i ng Capital of the Primary Agricultural 
Credit Co-operatives: 194-8-9 to 1968-9:
The financial structure of credit societies may be examined 
first with reference to the change in the proportion of deposits 
to total working capital. In table 5-2* it is shown that the 
urorortion of denosits to total working capital decreased from 
12.A in 1948-9 to 6.9 in 1968-9. In the same neriod, the proportion 
of owned funds to working capital declined continuously from 44.6 
to 96.5 while the proportion of borrowing to working carital rose 
from A3 to about 62.
This clearly innlies that the primary credit societies are now 
don ending more heavily than, before upon borrowing rather than uron 
either owned funds or deposits for their working capital. This also 
reflects the inability of primary credit societies to mobilize more 
deposits from the rural economy." Greater amount of funds may be 
borrowed if loans advanced also increases. Here inability to mobilise 
need not be a matter of serious concern if the repayment rerfor ance 
is sound. This was, unfortunately, not the case as will be revealed 
in the next section.
1 See,?. C. 3hattacharya, ,fThe Changing landscape of Banking" in RBI 
ulletin Karel , "'(>r-n . .
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5.3• 4* Overdues, recoveries and loans outstanding; 1948-9 to 1968-9*
An important indication of the financial viability of credit societies 
is the change in the proportion of overdues to total loans outstanding.
This proportion was 22.1 in 1948-9, 20.3 in 1960-1 and 34*6 in 1968-9 at the 
all-India level (see table 5*2). Thus, although there was slight improvement 
in 1960-61 over 1948-9, the situation has clearly worsened by 1968-9*
The proportion of recoveries to loans outstanding rose from 54*5 in 
1948-9 to 74*6 in 1960-1 but declined to 68.0 in 1968-9* In comparison 
with 1960-61, the recent fall in this proportion is disturbing. However, 
this fall may be due to adverse weather and crop conditions during 1965-7* 
Nevertheless, it may be stated that the recovery performance during the 
sixties should have been better and no effort should be spared in future to 
improve upon loan administration to ensure quick recovery and reduce the 
burden of overdues.
5*3* 5• Profit and Loss: 1948-9 to 1968-9•
The profit and loss account of the credit societies is another 
indication of the financial condition of credit societies. It is reflected 
that in 1949-50, net profit of all primary credit societies was Es. 0.74 
crores(approx.) In 1960-61, it went up to Rs. 4*43 crores and in 1968-9, 
it stood at Rs. 10.88 crores(table 5*2). However, profit as a percentage of 
working capital fell from 2.1 to 1.2 between 1948-9 and 1968-9* This may not 
appear to be very unsatisfactory at the macro-level though the picture may 
look different once the analysis is disaggregated. However, we shall now 
turn to a composite indicator used in the aduit classification of 
credit societies, to assess the financial strength of societies.
1 Given the rate of default, the reason that profit could be made is that 
there are book adjustments and loans are renegotiated.
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5. x. f. Audit Classificatl or_:
The primary credit societies are generally classified into 
five groups in the audit classification. Group ’A* includes the 
mode1 societies, rour f3' inc1 udes those which a e in a sound 
condition and capable of managing their own affairs, group fC' 
includes the mediocre societies, having their defects but 
"muddling on", group 'D' includes those whose financial condition 
is in very bad shape and in group ' E ’ those societies are included 
which are in hopeless condition.
In the audit classification of the credit societies in 1956-7 
and 1967-8 (see table 5*3), it is shown that in 1956-7, the 
proportion of 'A1 type societies to the total number of societies 
was only 2.7. While fB' type societies formed a little more than 
15 uer cent of the total. However, ' C' type societies formed about 
65 uer cert of the total and the‘:.r uroportion was highest. The 
*E’ type societies formed little above 2 per cent of the total.
In 1967-8, the proportion of the 'A1 type societies remained 
almost the same while that of 1P 1 type societies fell by about 
2 ner cent. Similarly, the decline of the proportion of ' D 1 type 
societies was also marginal while that of *C ' type societies 
moved up by about l\ per ce^t. The proportion of *D * type societies 
declined from 2.11 to 0.76.
The audit classification stated here displays the somewhat 
stagnant nature of the performance of agricultural credit 
co-crerative societies in India between 1956-7 and 1967-8. In this 
period, the proportion of 'A1, ’B 1 and •D 1 type societies did not 
change appreciably, while that of »C» type societies rose by about 
A per cent.
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T  e onl: healthy sign exhibited in the report was the slow fall 
in the proportion of ’ E ’ tyre societies. Such a fall might have 
been caused by the rethods adopted to liquidate those primary 
societies whose financial condition was hopeless. However, some 
other explanatory tests wiln be used to Judge the progress of 
credit societyes.
5*3. 7 . Number and Membership of Primary Agricultural Credit 
Societies: 1930-71 to 1968-9*
The growth of membership of primary agricultural credit 
societi es nay be regarded as a useful criterion to indicate the 
performance of credit societies. At the all-India level, it has 
been noted (see table 5.1) that the total number of primary 
societies rose from 1,15,''62 in 1950-51 to 2,12,129 in 1960-61 
and in 1968-9, the number was 167,760. This fall in the number 
of credit societies between 1960-61 and 1968-9 was mainly due to 
the steps win ch were taken to re-organize the primary credit 
societies on a sound basis. The average membership per society 
was 45 in 1950-51, 80 in 1960-61 and 174 in 1968~9(see table 5*1) 
The total member ship in the sa e period rose appreciably from 
about 47,77 thousands to 2,91,73 thousands in 1968-9 (see table 5.1) 
Hovrever, the proportion of active societies to total societies rose 
from 81 in 1960-6! to 87 in 1968-9* This trend reflects the 
activization of a greater proportion of societies under the scho e 
of re-organization.
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5.3. Cov a e of ' ■' ural Credit Societi
m- 0 p-ooortion of rural population covered by agricultural 
credit societies is a meaningful index by which to judge the 
progress of co-operative credi t societies. It is revealed in 
table 5.1 that in 1960-61 about 66?4 of the total villages in 
India were covered by ~ct'’ve credit societies. In 1968-9, it 
went u p  to 86°'. When, the percentage of rural population covered 
by active societies is considered, it was observed that it was 
only 24 in 1960-61 and 33 in 1968-9* Thus only one-third of 
total agricultural population is now actually covered by credit 
societies. When the proportion of borrowing members to total 
members is considered, it was 53 in 1960-61 and 38 in 1968-9*
It appears that on both counts, the progress of the primary 
agricultural credit co-oreratives was not very satisfactory. 
However, a more comprehensive view of the workings of agricultural 
credit societies may be obtained by extending the analysis to 
the state-level and such an attempt has been made in the next 
section.
5*4* 1 • Coy-' )sition of Worki n C a pital of Primary Credit Societies 
In the different Indian States: 1957-8 to 1967-8:
The growth of co-operative cred't societies in different 
Indian states is characterized by uneveness. In some of the Indian 
states, the credit societies have developed fairly well while in 
some o'her states, particularly in Eastern India, the progress was 
poor.
1 It was recently observed:" The main short comings of the co-operative 
system, which vary from State to State, are the problems of overdues,
indifferent management, domination of co-operatives by vested 
interests, shortage of resources, lack of effort to mobilise 
deposits, untrained staff, certain policies and procedures followed
w i h a not suitabl to n a a3 iv3ror.  ^ 4-.  ^ -1 ^ w e a k  ---- • - *• <-■
for linking credit to sarketin See, RBt - Organizational Framework... 
(1-969,- E M 3* on- c-11. ....................   • “ * ................ 1 • ' ’ ' 1
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With this broad Picture in mind, it may bo useful to examine the 
nature of change in the composition of working capital in different 
Indian states between l°r'7-p and 1967-8 to understand the relative 
difference in the financial strength of credit societies in 
different parts of India. 1957-8 is chosen because in periods before 
that, the available data are not strictly comparable because of 
changes in the boundaries of different states after 1955-6. It 
should be mentioned that for states like Maharashtra and Gujarat, 
the years of comparison are 1959-60 and 1967-8 simply because 
the former Bombay province was divided into Maharashtra and 
Gujarat in 1959 and data for the two separate states are available 
from l°5°-60.
In tab1e 5*4, change in the composition of working capital 
for different states is clearly shown. It is revea1 ed that in 
1957-8, the proportion of deposits to working capital was highest 
in Punjab (18.5), followed by Kerala (17) and Jammu and Kashmir(13.5) 
In other states, the proportion was below 10 and it was lowest in 
Assam (1.1). In 1967-8, Punjab once again recorded the highest 
proportion (25.2), followed again by Kerala (21.7). The proportion 
fell alarmingly in Jammu and Kashmir in 1967-8 (1.1) and this was 
the lowest proportion among all the Indian states. In Assam, the 
proportion moved u p  to ( 6 . 8 ) .  In the case of other states, no 
significant change was observed. Thus, except in the case of Punjab 
and Kerala, the record of deposit mobilisation on the part of other 
states does not seem to bo encouraging.
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As regards the proportion of borrowing in working capital (see 
table 5»4)> borrowing was by far the most important element of working 
capital in nearly all the states. In eleven out of fifteen states, the 
proportion was greater than 60. In 1957-8, it was lowest in Kerala(23), 
followed by Punjab(43«4) and Uttar Pradesh(54«3)• In 1967-8, it was 
highest in Jammu and Kashmir(9l), followed by Bihar(76.5)> Madhya Pradesh 
(75«7) and West Bengal(73*6). The increasing ratio was really disquieting 
for Jammu and Kashmir, Bihar, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. In the case 
of Assam, the proportion decreased slightly. Once again, Kerala depended 
least upon borrowing (5O.5), followed by Punjab (54)* No significant 
change was witnessed in the case of Gujarat, Maharashtra-; Madhya Pradesh, 
Mysore, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu. The heavy dependence upon borrowing of 
almost all the states indicates clearly the inability of most of these 
states to mobilize internal resources for financing credit under co-operative 
requirements.
The largest proportion of paid-up capital in working capital in 1957-8 
was observed in Uttar Pradesh (31«1)» followed by Kerala (29.1) and 
Gujarat (24*3)• It was lowest in Assam (10.5)« For a large majority of 
the states, the proportion varied between 15 and 25• In 1967-8,
Maharashtra occupied the top position (24*9) and in the case of Kerala, the 
proportion fell to 21.1. Some improvement was noticed in the case of Assam 
(i.e. 15*6) while Jammu and Kashmir registered the lowest proportion (6.6). 
When the proportion of reserves in working capital is considered, in 1957-8, 
Kerala topped the list (29«7)> followed by West Bengal (16.1), Punjab (14«8) 
and Tamil Nadu (12).
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por r y stater the proportion was below 10. Sharp decline was 
observed in el" states in 1967-8* The propoertion was highest in 
Tamil Nadu (9.9) and lowest in Jar. iu and Kashmir (1.5) • The 
-orooortlor f e1 i -pviow to 6.7 in Kerala and caused concern in
TVest Benge1 and Bihar.
The i .’portant implication that follows fro -1 +v>° above analysis 
f that the co.roositor of working capital differed between the 
states and in some cases, the difference was a rit'e significant. 
Further, most of the states depended substantially unon borrowing 
as a source of working capital and the degree of dependence did 
not decrease between 1957-8 aid 1967-8. Excluding Punjab and 
Kerala, the record of deposit mobildsation was unsatisfactory in 
most states. While the structures of working capital of Punjab,
Ko-.’J  a, Maharashtra a d Tr .79 Nadu looked better than many other
states, such structures appeared to be weak in states like Jammu
and Kashmir, Assam, West Bengal, Bihar and Rajasthan.
5»4* 2. Audit Classificstlon of Primary Societies ‘^n_ different 
Tghi_an_ States: 1956-7 and 1967-8:
The audit classification of nrimary societies is a useful way 
of judging financial strength. Table 5.5, reveal s that in 1956-7, 
the proportion of ’A' type societies was less than 1 in most of 
the states. Tr u and Kashmir had the highest proportion of 'A* 
type societies (16.96), fol1 owed by Maharashtra (l/.0i5),
Gujarat (9.18), Mysore (6.86) and Punjab (A.46). Gujarat had the 
largest oroportion of 1B 1 type societies (58.19 ), followed by 
Assam (55*37), Maharashtra (53.08), Mysore (44.51), Rajasthan (35*63) 
and Punjab (30.41)*
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It must be -aid that a large proportion of 'A' type societies 
in Jan-u and Kashmir is, indeed, very surprising. In 1967-8, 
Gujarat accounted for the highest proportion of both ’A' and 'B* 
type societies (11.13 and 12.93) respectively and Maharashtra came 
second with 7.38 per cent of 'A1 and 34*55 par cent of 'B* type 
societies. The Position of Assam and Rajasthan worsened 
substantially as the Proportions of »B’ type societies fell from 
55*37 to 27.64 in Assam and from 35*63 to 4*72 in Rajasthan. In 
both these states, percentage of 'A1 type societies was neglible.
As regards ’A 1 and 'B' type societies, the record of West Bengal, 
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa appeared to be very bad. The 
proportion of 'C1 type societies was very large in almost all the 
states in .1956-7 and the percentage of • E 1 type societies was 
largest in West Be-gal (18.68) - a dismal record indeed. Jammu and 
Kashmir had the highest proportion of 'Df type societies (70), 
followed by Uttar Pradesh (23*16) and Assam (22.70) in 1956-7* In
1967-8, Rajasthan had the largest proportion of fD * type societies 
(47.42), followed by Kerala (41-41) a:id Bihar (29*46). In Jammu 
and. Kashmir, this proportion fell rapidly from 70.02 to 12.24 and 
in Uttar Pradesh it fell from 23*46 to 12.60. There was also a 
drop by about 7 per cent in the case of Assam. In Andhra, this 
proportion went u p  substantially from 4.73 to 21.65* West Bengal, 
however, managed to reduce the proportions of both 'D1 and ' E 1 type 
societies in 1967-8 though it had the largest proportion of ?E' type 
societies (6.98).
,19 5
On the whole, it appears from the audit classification that in West 
Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Orissa, the viability 
of credit societies has been endangered while better performance has been 
observed in the case of Gujarat and Maharashtra in recent times. For a 
large majority of the states, the picture was nearly stagnant. Nevertheless, 
the present analysis highlights the uneven nature of progress of the 
co-operatives and such a situation clearly calls for more purposive action 
in the backward regions.
5.4. 3* Loans advanced, Overdues and Loans Outstanding: 1960-61 and
1968-9:
Some other important indicators of financial strength may include 
the change in average loans advanced and the change in the proportion of 
overdues to loans outstanding. Thus, if the average loans advanced per 
borrowing member is considered (see table 5«5), then in 1960-61, Gujarat 
topped the list (Rs.426), followed by Maharashtra (Rs. 330), Madhya Pradesh 
(Rs.274), Andhra Pradesh (Rs. 267) and Madras (Rs.249)« Assam (Rs»45) and 
Jammu and Kashmir (Rs.47) registered the lowest amount of average loan 
advanced. In 1968-9, Gujarat still headed the list (Rs.1,004), followed 
by Maharashtra (Rs.690), Punjab (Rs.578) and Tamil Nadu (Rs.518). Bihar 
advanced least (Rs.163), followed by Jammu and Kashmir (Rs.214), though 
Assam recorded some improvement (Rs.295)» Thus, in terms of loans given 
per borrowing member, the performance of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Punjab and 
Tamil Nadu was much better than that of Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Assam,
West Bengal and Rajasthan.
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As regards the proportion of overdues to loans outstanding, it 
is revealed that in 1960-61, Uttar Pradesh had the lowest proportion 
(9), followed by Madras (12) and Kerala (17). The record appeared 
to he worst in Assam (7k) i followed by Bihar (A5), Mysore (3k) and 
West Bengal (33). In 196°-°, the prooortion was lowest in 
Gujarat and Haryana (20, followed by Punjab and Kerala (26).
Assam once again staged the worst nerformance as the proportion 
stood at (75)i followed by West Bengal (57). The major disturbing 
feature here was that in most of the states, overdues constituted 
more than one-third of total loans outstanding. Further, in states 
like Assam, Jam u and Kashmir and Rajasthan, overdues of the last 
three years as a proportion of total overdues were significantly 
>r ph.1 The problem has become serious in state like Maharashtra 
where co-operative credit societies are comparatively well-developed.
The above analysis, once again, highlights the uneven nature
of Progress of co-operatives. It also points out sharply the
problem of loan administration in different states which we have
emphasised earlier. Loan administration apart, the low scale of
activi ty of many credit soci eties might have stood in the way of
2
promoting viability.
5.A. k. Profit and Loss Account: 1956-7 and 1967-8:
The test of profitability may partly indicate the financial 
condition of credit societies. Using this test in 1956-7, Uttar 
Pradesh showed highest net profit (Rs.58,27 thousands), followed 
by Maharashtra (Rs.49,16 thousands) and Punjab (Rs.25,05 thousands) 
(See t able 5*3).
1 See, RBI - Report of the All-India Credit...p ° 6 9 ) . P.523 o p  cit.,
2 Ibid* P.kk7~ T® quote; "It was only in two states,viz. ,Gujarat 
and Kerala, that the average loan business per society exceeded
RS. 50,00C’.r The figure was regarded as the minimum transaction
necessary to attain viability. .......................................
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Kerala showed a small loss and net profit was small in Ja ,iu and 
Kashmir (Rs.39 thousands) and Assam (Rs.72 thousands). In 1967-3, 
Madhya Pradesh recorded the largest amount of net profit, followed 
by Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. Assam war in the red with a loss 
of aban.t Rs.110 tbous" ds : ts performance was poorest. Other 
states managed to earn positive net profit though there is no 
reason to think that the exi sting profit i evels should, not be 
improved. This can easily be understood once net profit is 
considered as a percentage of total working capital. It was less 
than 3% in case of all states in 1956-7 and less than 6% in all 
states in 1967-8. In many states, it was less 1% in both 1956-7 
and 1967-8. The ratio is surprisingly high in Bihar and this may 
be due to bad data.
5.k. 5. Coverage: Strte-Wise data: 1957-8 and 1968-°:
The nature of progress of co-operative credit societies may 
also be evaluated by looking at indicators like coverage, average 
membership etc. Thus, the average membership per society was 
highest in Kerala (345) in 1960-61, followed by Tamil Nadu (191) 
and Jammu and Kashmir (175). It was lowest in Madhya Pradesh (14), 
followed by West Bengal (50), Assam (51), Bihar (56), Uttar 
Pradesh (61) and Orissa and Rajasthan (62) - (.see table 5.5).
In 1968-9, the position of the different states in this respect 
did not alter significantly, Kerala, once again, had the highest 
number of members per society (705), followed by Tamil Nadu (440). 
In Orissa, there was an appreciable rise from 62 to 355 whereas in 
the case of West Bengal, it rose from 50 to 78 only.
2 0 0
As regards the nronort'5 on of the villages covered by the 
societies, in 1957-8, in Bihar and Rajasthan, only 32. d r>er cent 
of the total villages was covered by the societies against 
90 ner cent covered in both Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1059-60.
In 1967-8, in Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh ard 
Ta il Nadu, credit societies covered 100 per cent of all villages 
whereas in Assan only 67 per cent of total villages was covered 
(see table 5«h). This may suggest that credit societies are now 
covering a greater prooortion of villages in most of the states.
This conclusion must be accepted with caution because the 
percentage of villages covered by the active societies was 5^.8 
in Tamil Nadu, 32.8 in Assam and 56.9 in West Bengal. However, 
in states like Maharashtra and Gujarat, actual coverage was much 
greater than in states like Assam and West Bengal.
5. L't. 6. Results of the State-wise Study:
The state-wise analysis of the progress of co-operative 
credit societies has some interesting implications. Firstly, it 
clearly shows the uneven nature of orogress of credit societies 
in different Indian states. Secondly, the nature of working 
capital was such as to irdicate that most of the states depended 
largely upon borrowing and only Punjab and Kerala were successful 
in mobilising deposits to relatively greater extent than the ot’;er 
states. The structure of working capital in Gujarat, Punjab, Kerala, 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu looked better than many other states 
like Ja mu and Kashmir, Assam, West Bengal, Bihar and Rajasthan.
2 C
The audit classification also shows the weak fin an ci a] strength 
o'" the 1 -st named states in comparison with states like Gujarat and 
Me.' arashtra-states wlich a1 so st-ged good perfor .ance in loans 
advanced in comparison with Assam, West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir, 
Rajasthan, Bihar ar.d Orissa. The problem of loan administration 
appeared to be most acute in Assam where the highest percentage of 
overdues was recorded and least in Punjab, Gujarat and Kerala in 
recent times. Coverage was good in states like Kerala and 
Maharashtra and ooor in states like Assam, West Bengal, Bihar,
Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and Rrj as than. The last-named states rlus 
Jammu and Kashmir may thus be regarded as relatively backward in 
comparison with states like Gujarat, Maharashtra and Punjab.
It is unrealistic to seek a single explanation for all. the 
differences ar.d several reasons may be advanced. Sore of them are 
a priori and given the existing state of data, there is little 
alternative to making some a priori judgements. First, it may be 
argued that the growth of the co-operatives had been more in those 
states where the system of land-tenure was characterized by the 
owner-cultivator relationship than in those states where the 
landlord-cultivator relationship predominated.' This is borne 
out to some extent by the relative success of co-operatives in 
We st and South Indian states in comparison with East Indian states. 
Second, the scale of transaction of credit societies may partly
explain the inability of many societies to attain viability in
2
different stages. The difference in progress may also be due to 
differences in the efficiencv of loan administration as well as in
the management of credit societies.^
1 131 - Organizational Framework...(1969),rr.30-1, o p  cit.,
2 Ibid. P. 30."
3 Ibid. P.P. 29-32.
2 C 2
F‘'"'r'4'.’:, a. greater i • riv- ~e betwo-n cre^l t and mrketing, coupl ed
v/i th tr- o ?. ntroduction of tho crop-!.asm system might have enabled
sone states to stage belter perfor lances. Fifth, the differntial
growth nates in a 'ri culture night explain partly the difference in
the progress of co-operatives. This was borne out by the examples
2
of states like Maharashtra and West Bengal, or Madras and Assam. 
Further, the rate of growth of oer capita income may also explain, 
to some extent, the divergent mature of progress of the credit 
societies. For example, in Maharashtra ar.d Madras(where the progress 
of co-operatives was much better than in states like Assam and 
West Bengal), oer capita income changed by 23. A and AO. 5 ner cent 
re'-nectively, between 1951 and.  ^961 when such changes were negative 
for West Bengal (-2# per annum) and Assam (-1.8$^ per annum) in the 
same period.' Finally the nature of the area (ie, dry or wet), 
night have led to differences in the level of loans given by the 
co-operatives.
c. 5. 1. Conn o_si tion of Wo rki n g Capital of t h e C entral Co -oner ative 
Banks: all- T n dla:
In the three-tier system of granting credit to nrimary credit
societies, the central co-operative banks occupy the middle as they
link the arex or State co-operative banks to primary credit societies
to ensure the flow of funds from the highest to the lowest level.
In this section, we shall mainly analyse the composition of v/orking
capital of the central co-operative banks and try to observe the
nature of its change over-time.
1 Ibid. P.16 and P.29.
2 National Council of Applied Economic Research - Estimates o_f State
Income, New Delhi, 1967, PP.58-9.
3 Ibid. P.58.
A Sec, N .S.J oh da aid I .L .Bh at, "Institutional Financ e:Pr obiem s 
and Prospects in arid Agriculture" in Indian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, vol. XXI. 11, No. A, October-December , IpTNT. PP. 30-7. ’
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This will allow us to understand the extent to which central 
co-o^err. ';ive banks have sa'Asfied the criterion of deposit 
■mobilisation. The nresent analysis is carried out at the all-India 
level and therefore leaves room for state-wise differences.
It may be observed (see table 5*6) that between 1950-51 and 
1060-61, the proportion of paid-up capital to total working capital 
rose from 7.?. to 15.1, but that of reserves fell from 8.5 to 5.9. 
Deposits as a proportion of working capital fell from 67.0 to 36.8 
whereas the proportion of borrowing rose from 17.3 to 1-6.1 in the 
sare neriod. Thus, although the proportion of owned funds to 
working capital remained almost the same, the fall in the proportion 
of deposits and rise in the proportion of borrowings indicates 
greater dependence of the central co-operative banks upon external 
rather than upon internal funds. The r'.se in the proportion of 
paid-up capital was mainly brought about by a greater state 
contribution to share capital. If these tendencies persist even 
in the long-run, it ay cause genuine concern."
Betv/een 1960-61 and 1067-8, some signs of improvement were 
observed. The proportion of owned funds rose from ?.6.7 to 19.2 
and that of deposits also rose from 36.8 to 12.6. The proportion 
of borrowing decreased from L6.1 to 38.2. However, when the 
proportion of overdues to outstanding is observed, the financial 
p o s :  i o n  of central co-operative banks did not seem to be very 
satisfactory. The eroportion was '\7 in 1950-51, 12.5 in 1960-61 
and 2.6.9 in 1968-9. This shows that like primary credit societies, 
the ca tral co-operatives are also suffering from the problem of 
1 o an ad mi ni s tr at i on.
Sse 2^1 Bulletin, October,1961, PP.1591-1609, especially P.1607-
2 0 5
T’;e problem is no doubt serious and requires urgent measures. 
Otherwise, the viability of central co-operative banks may be 
seriously affected. It may, however, be mentioned that the fall 
1 r the number of central co-orerative banks is in line with the 
schemes for re-organization of these banks. The central 
co-operative barks largely depend for their funds upon the State 
co-operative banks and we will now consider the financial 
structure of State co-operative banks.
5.5. 2. C o m p o s :  tlon of VI c ’ k Ing C a pit al of State Co-operative banks: 
all-India: 1950 - 1969:
The State or Apex Co-operative banks occupy the top strata of 
the co-operative banking structure. These banks are situated in 
each state and between 1°51 ar.d 1969, their number has gone up from 
15 to 25. The State co-operative banks usually get loans from the 
Reserve Bank of I d4 a at a concessional rate to finance the central 
co-operative banks who in their turn finance the primary societies. 
Generally, tho State co-operative banks get loans from the Reserve 
Bank at a rate 2 per cent below the Bank Rate for current 
agricultural operations and. marketing of crons and !•£ per cent 
below the Bank Rate for medium-term as well as for other purposes.
The availability of funds at a concessional rate enables the State 
co-operative banks to finance central co-operative banks at cheap 
rate.
The change in the composition of working capital (see table 5.7) 
of State co-operative banks is interesting. The proportion of paid- 
up to working capital went up from L.S in 1950-51 to 8.2 in lQ60-6l
but fell slightly to 6.6 in 1968-9.
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The ry-oportion of reserves to working capital was 6.1} in 1950-51>
2.6 in l°60-6l and 6.6 in 1968-9. Thus, the nroportion of owned 
funds in wording capital was 11 in 1950-51 and I7.9 :* n 1968-9.
Ho' cver, the proportion of denosits went down from about 6' in 
1950-51 to 32.6 in lQ60-6l. There was a noded recovery in 1968-9 
when the proportion stood at 38. However, the percentage of 
borrowing rose sharply fro::: 2.5 to 57 between 1950-51 and 1960-61.
This indicated heavy leaning upon the Reserve Bank of India for 
funds. The pronortion of borrowing registered some decline in 
"'268-9 who" it stood at 48.6.
One notes that the nroportion of overdues to loans outstanding 
was 12 in 1950-51» 4*2 in 1960-61 and 5 in 1968-9. The decline in 
the proportion of borrowing and of overdues and rise in the 
pronortion of deposits and owned funds may be regarded as healthy 
signs for the financial state of the State co-operative banks and 
it may be stated that the over-all structure of assets and liabilities 
of -State co-operative banks is better than that of both central 
co-operative banks and primary credit societies.
5*5. 3* Bvalnation:
The upshot of the above analysis is to focus attention on the 
major problems which stand in the way of the efficient working of 
different tyres of co-operative credit societies. It anpears that 
the problems of primary credit societies are more acute than those 
of other types of credit societies since the composition of their 
workinr capital seems to be more vulnerable. It must, however, be 
admitted that despite heavy odds against them, the co-operatives 
have made some commendable progress in giving loans to cultivators.
20  8
But tho Major problem which was repeatedly highlighted is the
■orobier. of loan administration both at macro and micro-levels,
particularly the problem associated with increasing pronortion
of overdues :_n case of both central co-operative banks and nrimary
credit societyes. Any attempt to promote greater viability of
credit societies must include immediate attention to this nroblem.
Tt wrs s opposed to be solved by the integration of credit with
marketing. Such integration, by itself, is an important linkage to
promote recovery. Unfortunately, the record of performance of
co-orerosive marketing societies remained very unimpressive
2
between 1951 and 1964* A survey conducted for the years 1962-3 
revealed that 15 per cent of the total number of marketing societies 
did not report any tyre of business activity and the nroportion of 
sale through co-operatives was very low. It was observed: 
"Considering the three main objectives for which they were organised 
- advancing of nledge loans, marketing of agricultural produce 
and distribution of supplies - the actual performance of the 
Marketing societies was none too encouraging". This makes the task 
of developing the marketing system extremely important. This may 
require careful planning and state assistance, effective control of 
Markets and improvement of management, extension of trade credit, 
making the financially sound co-operatives the buyin~ agents of the 
government, promotion of storage capacity and helming the societies 
in processing agricultural produce.
1 See.T.C.Abbott,"Case Studies of Advances in Marketing in Tropical 
Countries" in ;ronthi •• Bull etln of Agricultural Economics and 
Statistics, Vol.19. Nos'. 7/3, ( FAO of the U.N.), July/August, 1970.PP. 1-5 
See also, H.P.Singh,"Farm Marketing and Green Revolution" in Yojana, 
vol.XIV, No.3.February,22, 1970,P.9.
2 BBI Bulletin, October,1961,P.1603.See also RBI Bulletin,May,1969, 
P.652.
3 RBI Bulletln, 'hay, 1969, P.652. 
b Ibid. P.6g2.
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So e direct indu<5ene-ts may be given to cultivators to sell their 
crors through the marketing societies. Progressive commercialization 
may also contribute to the success of marketing societies.
Th e developement of other linkages to render credit societies 
more viable includes package programmes like building up storage 
capacity and warehouses, which may serve the basis for developing 
negotiable credit instruments and the provision for easier and 
quick system of transport from producing to the consuming centres.
Obviously, the development of all these linkages may not be as 
fast as may be wished without adequate trained personnel, effective 
and sound management and co-ordination among all the successive 
stages from nroduction to d!stribution. The whole system is badly 
in need of considerable streamlining and necessary reorganisation 
without which even the theoretically ideal, nolicy may fall in 
practice. There need not be any universal rule regarding the actual 
implementation of different stems for such reorganisation in view 
of cons-1* denable regional variations. It is also important to 
realize that the financial structure of any credit mechanism depends
upon the over-all strength of the whole economy and the rate of
1
economic growth. The problems related to overdues, borrowings and 
mobilisation of deposits may largely depend upon the level and the 
rate of growth of income. Here the constraints upon the inrorovement 
of income, repay ents and deposits may be related more to the real 
factors than to the monetary factors. Nevertheless, where the 
s ^ s p e r  its and the extent to which credit may increase the 
availability of real resources, no effort should be snared to imnrove 
upon the present condition of the main credit mechanism through which 
the integration of the dual rural money market in India is sunposed 
to be brought about.
1 See, for exa .pie,Horace Belshaw, "Requisites of a Sound. Credit System 
for Agriculture’1! h h'lizabet’ K ^Bauer( ed)-Proceedings of the
ternational Conference on Agricultural & Co-operative Credit,vol.?. 
University og Cali fornia, Berkeley,California,1Q5?,PP.551-7.
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5. 6. Conclusioro:
The following conclusions may be drawn on the basis of our 
present study:
(1) There was considerable uneveness in the progress of primary 
creek t societies during the period of our study.
(?) "t the all-India level., the primary credit societies could not
satisfy the four financial criteria for judging viability of credit 
societies. Between 1948-9 and 1967-8, denosits as a pronortion of 
working capital fell from 12.4 to 6.7, pronortion of owned funds 
declined from it.6 to 26.8 whereas the pronortion of borrowing went 
ur from 43 to 66.5* The co nosite index used in audit classification 
shows a somewhat stagnant picture. Thus primary credit societies 
failed to lobil-1'ze internal resources and became increasingly 
dependent upon external, sources for funds. Though the co-operative 
credit societies may not have been very efficient in mobilizing 
deposits, in so e cases, they ach: eved good progress in advancing 
loans to the cultivators. However, since the proportion of 
agricultural taxation in India is very kw, the increasing 
dependence of credit societies upon external sources may add to the 
suspicion that a substantial rant of capital formation in the farm 
sector in India has continually been f~? "arced b,r a savings flow from 
the non-farm sector, "though the latter*s relative importance has 
been decreasing".^
(3) Although the primary credit societies have made substantial 
progress with regard to the coverage of villages, this result should 
be accented, 'with a grain of salt' because of the presence of many 
inactive societles in any states. As regards the coverage of 
borrowing members from co-operatives, the performance of the primary 
societies must be regarded as poor. Thus, judged by supplementary
tents, t' e performance of credit societies was unsatisfactory.
1’ -See,-for • example,Shigeru Ishikawd - Economic Development ’in Asian 
Perspective; Economic Research Series,No. e institute of" ' i.c 
Ltitsubashi University,KinoKuniya Bookstore Co,Ltd.Tokyo, 
1967 P.307.
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(4) The problems of loan administration and ability to repay reflected 
in the rising proportion of overdues in loans outstanding seems to be 
the major cause of concern for primary societies. The central 
co-operative banks are also suffering from the same problem and this was 
aggravated after 1960-61. Unless measures are adopted quickly to 
solve this problem, the credit machinery is in danger of being clogged 
and paralysed.
(5) The financial structure of State co-operative banks appeared 
to be in a much better state in comparison with both primary and 
central co-operative banks during the period of observation.
(6) In some states like Gujarat, Punjab and Maharashtra, primary 
credit societies appeared to be in a much better shape than those 
in Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir and Rajasthan.
This implied the necessity of taking some important steps in the 
lagging states for,
(a) reorganisation of the credit societies and
(b) supplementing the organized credit machinery with the help 
of other types of credit agencies like the Agricultural Credit 
Corporations.
(7) The desired integration between credit and marketing has not 
yet taken place and here the performance was, indeed, very poor.
The operation of the whole system at present is a cause of concern.
In the next chapter, we shall discuss in detail the nature of the 
main existing linkages between the organized and unorganized sectors, 
examine the role of main agencies for promoting such integration and 
suggest means for achieving further integration.
CHAPTER '/I 2 1
LINKS DRr~',rBBv TPS QROA T LED AND UNORGANIZED 
MONEy MARKETS IN THE IKPT AN RURAL ECONOMY:
PROBLEMS AND PROS?“.’GTS:
6.. 1. INTRODUCTION:
The promotion of linkages between organized and unorganized 
■ oney markets in India has been, highlighted as one of the major 
■roobler.s of our present study. In this context, the role of 
co-operatives has already been examined in the last chapter. In 
this chapter, firstly, we shall make reference to the existing 
literature which describes the links between the dual money markets 
Secondly, the nature and develop:! ..t of linkages w'11 be examined 
■m the si s of some indicators within the limits of availability 
of data. Thirdly, the role of existing organized agencies, 
co-operatives apart, will be analysed to show the extent to which 
th ose agencies were successful in promoting integration. Here, an 
attempt will be made to suggest some means which may be useful for 
promoting further integration. Finally, some conclusions will be 
drawn or the basis of our analysis.
6.2* 1. A reference to the Literature:
The problem of integration of the dual money market in India 
has been discussed for quite some time. Unfortunately, despite 
receiving much attention in the past, the problem has not yet been 
solved. Some reference to the existing linkages has been made in 
official reports.
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To quote: ”... the joint-stock be nks play little direct part,
and the Imoeriel Bank much less, in the supply of credit to the
agriculturists. These banks do not look upon agricultural finance
as part of their general business. Banks, however, do finance
agriculture indirectly by financing merchants who give advances
to the srna11 village dealers; and some banks lend direct on the
pledge of produce and valuables and on mortgage. This indirect
financing by intermediaries is, however, costly...u.~
It is, however, very difficult to make an exact estimate of the
amount of indirect financing of the unorganized sector by organized
financial agencies in M e  absence of reliable data. Further, the
money-lenders generally do not turn to the organized agencies for
borrowing since their own funds mostly cover the demand for their
loans. It is reported that only 28 ner cent of the village
money-lenders interviewed felt the necessity to get funds in
2
addition to their own resources. However, indirect financing by 
commercial, banks through urban money-lenders and some indigenous 
banks may exist.
Attempts have been made in the past to induce some of the 
indigenous financial agencies to come into the fold of the organized 
money market. It has been suggested that Indigenous bankers should 
be brought into direct contact with the Reserve Bank along with 
commercial and co-onerative banks and should be given rediscount 
facilities.^
1 RBI - A. I .R. C . S. vo1 .!!, P.lSO, on _cit., which cited Government
of India - The Indian Central Banking....(1911), P.191, op cit.,
2 RBI - A.I.P.C.S. vol.11, P.178, on cit.,
3 Government of India - The Indian Central Banking...(1931),
.PP.106-10, on cit. ,
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It is also recommended that should there be a link between the
'Reserve Bank and the indigenous bankers, these bankers should
formulate their business methods on lines similar to commercial
banks, and especially, should develoo de-nosit banking. Further,
such indigenous brokers should maintain oroper books of account and
have them audited by accountants and the Reserve B^nk should have
the right to inspect such accounts. It has been prorosed that
linkage raig’t be developed if trie commercial banks could discount
the bills of arrroved money-lenders -drawn for advances to
cultivators against rroduce. In such cases, the Reserve Bank should
consider the possibility of offering rebates for rediscounting such
2
bills when these are offered by commercial banks.
The Agricultural Finance Sub-Committe (lQ/;5), however, suggested 
the establishment of Agricultural Credit Corporations as alternative 
agencies for lending to the cultivators. ' The Co-operative Planning 
Co nittee (19^6) also recommended the establishment of such 
corporations to provide all types of agricultural credit.' However, 
the Co unit tee (1916) suggested, that for the grov/th of organized 
credit agencies in rural areas, there should be legal regulation of 
markets, establishment of licensed warehouses and an attempt should 
be made to make the receipts of such warehouses into negotiable 
credit instruments. In other reports, it is suggested that properly 
organized village co-operative banks might serve the purpose of 
bringing cultivators into closer contact with the organized rural 
money m ark e t s.'
1 RBI - Statutory Reports(1937)« P. 4-2 and PP. 56-8, on cit.,
2 Ibid. PJj-l.
5 Government of Irdi a-Reoort of the ft gr 1 cu3.tural Finance. . . (1915) ,
PP.37-9, on cit.,
!\ Government of Irdia-Rsport of the Co-on or ative Planning Committee, 
19/465 Bombay, 1946, P*71*
RBI - c o -00 or at j. v e V:k 1 r ~e ^ 0 nk s. Bombay, 1937, PP. 57-8.
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Suck contact could be made possible "if the v^dlaee bank dea"1 s 
with ‘to embers in a comprehensive manner, and can ensure the sale 
of their produce through its agency the recovery of crop loans will 
become easy, certain and quick’1. For promoting the links between 
village banks and co-operative union or commercial banks,
a 'ricultural bills were sought to be created to enable the Reserve
2
Bank to give funds.
As regards the problem of integrating the money-lenders, the 
Central Banking Corrnittee(1931) suggested that Co-operative 
societies of money-1enders could be formed and such societies should 
lend only to the primary societies and not to individuals.^ A 
similar suggestion was a1.so made later. Another writer suggested 
that the money-1enders could be transformed into agents of 
commercial banks.
After independence, the Rural Banking Enquiry Committee (1950) 
suggested the necessity of expanding the branches of commercial banks 
in a cautious manner and described the desirability of utilising the 
co-operative societies and the Post-Office Savings Banks for 
mobilising rural savings. The idea of developing Post-Office 
Savings Banks is apposite and it appears that if the Post-Offices 
could be transformed into some sort of village banks, then an 
important linkage iay be developed. However, there is little direct 
reference to the problem of developing linkage between different types 
of money markets in the Rura1 Banking Committee Report.
1 Ifrid. P.57. 2 Ibid. P.58.
3 C vernmert o^ India - The Indian Central Banking...(1931),
PP.91-3, o p c:t . ,
k Government of Madras - Report of the Economist...(19A6),PP.68-9, 
op clt .
5 See, K.K.Sharmp - Reserve Br..k of India and Rural Credit,
Premier Publish'".ng, Delhi PP. 38—9.
C Government of Indla-Report of the Rural. Bankinm. .. (1950) .PP. A2-3.
q t i  g - *  f .  t  a
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M- Crr'nr* thee or. P.’irnce "or Private Sector (1954) indicated a
few icasures Tor oromotinr integration between organized and
unorganized money markets." Specifically, ! t was recommended that
the shrofis or businessmen who generally carried out transactions in
sight himdis should decide upon the possibility of introducing
°0 dags hundis, if practicable. In order to support the use of
usance hundis, the government might have diminished the rates of
stamp duty on such hundis. The Reserve Bank could also offer
rediscounting facilities to Shikarnuri shroffs through commercial
banks, provided that the shroffs would be maintaining proper books 
?
of account.
It is difficult to understand how the links between noney-1enders 
and the organized agencies car grow unless the de; and for loans is 
increased considerably and unless the money-lenders start using 
negotiable credit instrumerts. It has been argued that to develop 
the links, it nay be necessary to create incentives for the 
money-lenders to increase the scale of their activity and to reduce 
interest rates and this may be done by changing the elasticity 
and/or the amount of der and for his funds or by lowering his unit
z
cost. Elasticity of derand for loans may be increased through 
increased comnetition among nney-1enders. But such a situation is 
difficult to visualize in the Indian context where the cultivators 
owe habitual allegiance to particular money-lenders.
1 RBI - Report of the Committee on F?.na ce for Private Sector,
Bo bay. 19:'\ PP* 68" - 70.
2 See, for example, G. P. Glint a - The Reserve Bank of India and
Monetary Management, Asia Publishing House, London,1959, PP.209-11.
3 Anthony Bottomley, "Credit Expansion aid Gr in Underdeveloped
Ural Areas*1 in The Indian Economic Review, vol.VI,No. 2, August* 1Q52
PP.125-1A3.
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It is argued that growth could take place if additional borrowing 
-? r s-oent "or productive purposes through improved methods of 
cultivation - methods which are suorosed to augment the demand for 
loans. Once the money-lenders' ~unds for supplying additional 
credit which would be demanded are exhausted, the central bank may 
think about sending officials round the rural areas who would act 
as "rediscount" salesmen. "These rediscount salesmen should be 
authorized to point out to money-lenders that the central bank is 
willing to rediscount reasonably well-secured loans, and they should 
also be allowed to explain the ways in which the money-lender can 
find an increased market for hi s funds through encouraging his 
clients to buy or rent, clear and cultivate more land, as well as 
more capital goods in their nroduction process". Money-lenders 
are reckoned as a 'vital factor of production1 in the rural economy 
and full utilization of their knowledge and talent is advocated.
It iay be argued here that until now, money-lenders have not 
shown much eagerness to co-onerate with organized agencies and it 
is doubtful to what extent they would abide by the laws of 
organized financial agencies should they be granted rediscounting 
facilities. Further, channelling of credit through the money-lenders 
rather than through the co-oneratives will strengthen the 
competitive ros; tion of money-lenders vis-q-vis the co-oneratives. 
This ’nay further imply that returns to co-oneratives may not rise 
whereas the appointment of so-called 'rediscounting salesmen' will 
inflate cost.
1 Ibid. P. 14.3.
2
The other suggestions which were made to link the indigenous 
bankers with the organized sector may he b r i e f l y  stated as follows:
a) TVie indigenous bankers should undertake and develop
bi!! 1-broking business and discharge the same functions in Indian
'.oney market as those which are done by b“ 11-brokers in the London 
1
mon ey market. ~
b) The indigenous bankers may be asked to submit regularly their
certified balance sheets and in exchange for this, they should be
2
offered some of the facilities provided to the scheduled banks.
c) The Reserve Bank should not insist on knowing in advance how
many indigenous bankers would be prepared to join the scheme for
3
integration that might be prepared by the Bank.
d) nhe indigenous bankers nay be allowed to keep a reduced 
amount of owned capital.
e) The tlon-banking business of indigenous bonkers need not bo 
sonerated from their banking activities at the beginning. However, 
different ae unts s ould be maintained for differ out types 
activities. These relaxations are regarded as necessary since 
indigenous bankers would be 'member banks1 and not scheduled banks.
However, the refinance and rediscount facilities would be available
to the indigenous bankers not directly from the Reserve Bank but from
<=,
commercial banks.
f) Instead of declaring the indigenous hundis as clean bills and 
thus ineligible for rediscounting, the Reserve Bank should declare 
those hundis as eligible for rediscounting which are genuine bills 
arising from such transactions as marketing and production and bear 
two signatures - one that of a scheduled bank and the other of some 
member bank.
1 S.G.Panandikar, on cit., PP.32-3. 2 G.P.Gunta, on cit., P.209.
3 Ibid. P.209.   ” --------
• 'hL.hica -Banking and Economic Growth(with- special reference ■ '
t'o 'India)Vora 8c Co. ,P il 3 Ls ers Private Ltd. • 1 ay,1967,PP. 1 84-85.
5 Ibid. PP. 18^-85.
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It ' s not clear fro- Nigam's writings how far t’ e Reserve Bank 
will be successful in attracting the indigenous fina cial a cies 
wi'hin the organized fold by asking thei to maintain a lower volume 
of owned capital since the entry of indigenous bankers is voluntary 
c-'nee these barkers ■nr^fer to carry out their transactions in 
camera. It ay also be nointed out that simple seperation of 
accounts by the indigenous banks ray not achieve much. "Liabilities 
-ncurred in respect of the one would have to be made good in the 
last resort for the assets of the other... It is obvious that even 
if they were legally separated an individ.ua1 who was conducting the 
two separate tyres of business could draw on the assets of the one 
to meet the liabilities of the other so that even though the balance 
sheets in resr ct of the banking department seemed oerfectly sound 
aid satisfactory, the assets night be found to have disappeared 
when a call ca. e to be made on them".
V.h' 1 e discus irg the sane problem Break: ananda argued that "one 
may not inu.ct too much upon the prior condition of differentiation 
of functions and of ceil inns on rates of interest on advances'.'
The commercial barks nay lend to the unorganized sector at an interest 
rate lower than what is charged on industrial borrowers if the 
indigenous f  cial oricies form consortia. Such lending to a 
consortia .ay bo regarded as similar to usance credit and this might 
lead to integration. Karkal, to promote such an end, favoured the 
encouragement of trade bills rather than accommodation bills, to 
standardize different hundis, to regulate the hundi business by 
■Introducing a sustem of licensed brokers and to recognise the
v
hundis as liquid assets to ensure greater flow of funds to
unorganized market.
1 RBI - Statutory Report., (1937), P. 52. op cit.,
2 See Gonal Karkal, o p  cit., P.X\n ?l.
3 .Ibid.. PP.. 122< .................................................. *
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It ’-my not o " course, be easy to form a consortia of indigenous 
>-o,Trfir»g. The eventual separation of banking from non-bank:.ng 
activities cannot be ruled out to prevent mis-use of funds,
Karkal !s 4 dea of improving the nature of hundi busi ness is relevant 
but without improving the qu?1 ‘ ty of hundis, it is difficult to 
understand how hundis could be treated as wholly liquid assets.
In rim, in order tode-elop the integration with the indigenous 
! fine cial age: cies, the Reserve Bark suggested that indigenous 
bankers should forego their non-banking business and formalize 
their ethods of business, oro; ote deposits and keep proper account 
books; should allow the Reserve Bank officials to inspect their 
accounts; and should furnl sh periodical information to the Bmk.
In return, the Reserve Bad- would allow the indigenous bankers to 
enioy rediscounting and other facilities with the Bank in line with 
other co tmercial banks. Since the indigenous bankers did not show 
much desire to satisfy the conditions laid down by the Bank, their
p
integration with the organized sector was not brought about. On
the other hand, the activities of money-lenders could not have been
controlled by passing various types of 1 « . el ati onsf, particul r"1 $
w3 en It was thought that with inadequate credit facilities, closure
of .-mt-i v\ti es of indigo ous firm, cial agencies would adversely
2
affect agricultural growth.
m' e nature ° id tyre of different types of Irinka between the 
orga 'zed ar.d unorganized money markets have not been examined very 
carefully in most of the writings related to the problem of 
integration,
-l g e,IMF: ?es( ' *cl par me t: c I I4 ops of India -
with special reference to the Mobilization of Domestic Resources for 
Development, 1950, P.10.
2 Bee, D.K.Rangnekar - Poverty and Capital Development in India, 
Royal T- stitute of I ter atic al fairs,Oxf rd Tr iversity Pi jss,
London, 195?, PP.57-8
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Karkal, However, used so e indicators.to analyse the ~rowth of
these 1iT!1r"r’e8. By using the data for rediscourting the bills
presented by tve shroff's, Karkal tried to indicate the nature and
trend of the linkage." Unfortunately, Karkal did not take the
total value of bills discounted for the shroffs either as a
rronortion of agricultural income or as a pronortion of total
advances made by the cozener cial banks. In fact, it is difficult
from Karkal1s analysis to say whether the linkages have changed
or not. We shall try to show later how far charge in this resnect
has taker nlace by using the sane tvoe of data.
In an important study, U Tun Wai examined the nature and
growth of linkages between the organized and unorganized money
2
markets in underdeveloped countries. The criteria to judge the 
linkages which war used con be briefly summarised:
(a) The extent to which the operation of commercial banks 
working in the organized sector helped to finance directly or 
indirectly the agricultural sector. The test may not be very 
perfect but it may be interesting to observe how this test works 
in India.
(b) The relative importance of institutional credit in the
unorganized money markets may be another indicator. Generally 
institutional credit is r”pplied by commercial banks, co-operative 
credit societies, land mortgage banks and other types of
z
agricultural credit institutions financed by the government."
While applying this test, Wai has compared the outstanding 
agricultural loans of such institutions with national income 
originating 1n the agricultural sector and with the currency in 
circulation, the test revealed that the link was weal: in most Asian 
countries thou k it was strong in some Latin-American countries.
1 Gopal Karkal, op cit., PP.77-8.
2 U Tun Wai, on cit., I! IF Staff Payers, November ,1957-,, PP.-80-112.
3' Ibid'. 'PP.9i.I5.
2 2 2
(c) The nronortion and. ° ount of money-1enders1 borrowing from 
the co -mercia.1 hr ks may b^ regarded, as yet another indicator of 
the growth of linkages. In the Indian context, very little data 
are available to apply this test/
(d) The borrowing of exporters and traders in agricultural
goods is stated to be another index of the growth of linkages to
the extent such borrowing takes rlace from commercial banks. Here
again, in the Indian economy, it is very difficult to a m p l y  this
2
test because of the nature of data.
(e) The other way to judge the development of integration of the 
dual money market is stated to be the proportion of agricultural 
bills discounted by the organized credit agencies. Wai said that 
Japan, has effectively linked the two markets by developing 
agricultural bills drawn by agriculturists and co-operatives which 
are discounted and rediscounted by the co-operatives and commercial 
banks to lake the funds available. In India, in the absence of 
agricultural bills, it is not possible to use the test to understand 
the linkages. Nevertheless, the Japanese example of the development 
of agricultural bills may be regarded as useful for the future 
development of the Indian rural money market.
(f) The nature of the central bank's supply of agricultural credit 
directly or through other agencies may influence the growth of 
linkages/- In India, the RHT has indirectly financed the 
agricultural sector in substantial amounts mainly through the 
co-operatives.
1 Ibid. PP. Q5-
2 Ibid. P. 96.
3 Ibid. P. 97.
Li P.
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The Merit of this type of linkage lies in the fact that the 
central bank nay influence more directly the cost ar.d. availability 
of credit in unorganized money market. However, the important 
disadvantage of such a linkage is that the central bank may be 
under noli tic al pressure not to restrict credit in unorg° ? zed 
money market even when an over-all credit restriction is required. 
Secondly, the centra1 bank could undertake such financing of the 
unorganized sector only to a limited extent in view of the immense 
responsibilities to discharge other types of central, banking 
activities.
The criteria which may be used to measure the size of 
organized money market may be of two types/
(a) The'liquidity preference1approach which considers the matter 
from the liability side of balance-sheet of banks and where the 
ratio of deposit-money to money suprly is taken as the yardstick;
(b) the'1 oanable fund'approach which treats the matter from the 
asset side and where the ratio of banking system's claims (which 
includes loans, advances and bills discounted) on the rrivate 
sector to national income is considered.
The first index may show the growth of the banking sector rather 
than the growth of money market. To the extent growth of commercial 
barking is equivalent to the growth of money market, the index may 
reflect the growth of money market. However, we shall point out 
the limitations of these two approaches when we shall apply these 
methods to measure the Indian money market.
1 See, U Tun Wai, "Interest Rates in the Organised Money Market in 
Underdeveloped Countries'! in IMF Staff Rarer s, vol.V, No. 2. August, 
1956, PP. 2Z:9-78.
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It has been shovr before how different nolle: es were formulated 
to accommodate the indigenous financial agencies within the 
organized money market. In contrast to the idea of bringing the 
indigenous agencies within the organized sector, a completely 
different view was expressed In the Rural Credit Survey (no51-2) 
rr ’.ort. To quote: MIt is certainly obvious that the money-lenders
can b e alloted no mart in this scheme, important or insignificant, 
notwithstanding a dominance which today is overwhelming. Thus, it 
would be a complete reversal of the nolic' es we have been advocating 
to n'.ve him a position in t' e co-operative banking structure, when 
the whole object of attempting to develop and strengthen that 
structure is to nrovide a positive institutional alternative to the 
money-lender himself, something which will compete with him, remove 
him fro the fore-front and put him in his place". In the same 
peoort, it : s said that the money-lenders might have served some 
useful purnose. But "the real point is not what the money-lender 
does, but wiat the State has omitted to do". It is believed that 
once a strong organized alternative agency is built up, most of the 
defects associated with the operations of money-lenders cou1d be 
removed. In the followin'- section, we shall try to evaluate the 
relative merits of different recommendations.
6.2. 2. Evaluation of the Recommendations:
The reference to the existing literature on the problems of 
linkages between the organized and unorganized rhra"1 money ^r7'ets 
suggest that there are broadly two approaches with regard to the 
Integration of the dual money market: either the indigenous financial 
ar’o cn‘ es s’ -u1 be supplanted by alternative institutional agencies 
or they should be accommodated within the existing organized sector 
with certain changes in the-’r operations.
1 c- ~ - A.I .R.0.S. vol.? 1,PP. 1 Si-°2, op cit., See also,3.K.!Iadan,
MI dia" -W,I«VCrick-(od)— Commonwealth Bankin J ~ / Clarendon Press,'
Oxford, l°6b, P.190.
2 Ibid. P.182.
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kccordin ; to tl e fj *st group/ a strong and. viable organized 
financial agency should be set up to provide an effective 
alternative to the money-lenders. According to the second group, 
in view of the dominant position of money-lenders in the rural 
ccono y, it -.ay be very difficult to replace then by any organized 
agency within a short-tine and since the alternative organized 
agency like co-operatives is not strong enough to become effective 
rivals of the money-lenders and since the loney-lenders performed 
some useful tasks, attention should be paid to the problem of 
changing the activities of money-lenders in such a way as to remove 
their aalpractices and to provide them sore incentives to join the 
organized agencies. The * ncento ves which are suggested may be 
bri e fly stated:
(a) relaxations of the conditions for segregating the banking 
fpom the non-banking business;
(b) treatment of the hundi as liquid asset eligible for being 
rediscounted by the Reserve Bank;
(c) formation of an association of indigenous financial agencies 
which would issue negotiable credit instruments against which loans 
may be granted, and
(d) formulation of a plan for providing accommodation to the 
indigenous financial agencies without insisting on knowing how many 
indigenous bankers and money-lenders are prepared to join.
It is hoped that if the RBI provides the above ince tives, then 
the money-lenders and indigenous bankers would sub it the reports to 
t e ^BI aid they should r'1 so a-1 low the RBI to audit their accounts.
2 2 6
Tl e RBI in its tum, should provide these financial agencies such 
rediscount and remittance facilities as the commercial banks 
men era1 ly enjoy. On th^ basis of our analysis, it appeared that 
although the co-operative credit societies were partly successful 
in providing loans to the cultivators, t h e y  faced the problem of 
loan administration, at the all-India level, and particularly with 
regard to certain states. r1' Ls problem has created considerable 
concern over the financial strength of co-operative credit societies 
especially since the limited gains that the co-operatives have made 
in giving loans are now at the danger of being neutralized because 
of the mounting problem of overduos. Notwithstanding the weakness 
of co-operatives, in order to promote integration, attempts nay be 
made to standardize the hundir a d to provide accommodation against 
then, so long as they are used for genuine, non-speculative 
transactions drawn by such reputed indigenous bankers as Multani 
bankers. In such cases, the hundl may not be treated as a wholly 
liquid asset. The condition of segregating the banking from the 
non-banking activities may be relaxed at the beginning, but the 
indigenous agencies must,in that case, maintain proper accounts for 
different purposes which the RBI could inspect and audit. However, 
once the transactions of indigenous agencies reach a level which 
could be decided by the RBI, these indigenous agencies would be 
asked to rescind wholly their non-banking activities. There is, 
o^ course, some wisdom in the argument that funds may not be used in 
a desira.’ le way even if the accounts are seperated. The 
implementation of the programme of segregation of activities may be 
made time-bound aid this may be helpful in allowing the RBI to 
evaluate periodically the effects of relaxation of the condition of 
segregation of activities.
2 2 7
m1’~ • 'or v: forming consortia of indigenous financial agencies 
has many racticable difficulties because of the heterogeneity of 
such ~ge ci es and diversity in their methods of operation. An 
interesting method for promoting linkage is to develop 
agricultural bills and here the role of some of the organized 
agencies will be considered later. Presently, we shall attempt to 
quest'fy the links between organized and unorganized agencies.
6.3. 1• Links between the Organized and Unorganized Soctors:
The Problem:
The tests of links between the organized and unorganized 
fin 'cial a e c?' es in tie Indian rural money market are imperfect. 
First, there is very little reliable data on assets and liabilities 
of indigenous agencies. Second, the type of tests which are 
generally carried out are not co orehensive. Such criteria are 
really partial and inadequate. Further, in some tests, assumptions 
regarding cha yes in output, money supply and income-velocity of 
money may not be entirely realistic. We may, however, try to 
understand the nature of the growth of two sectors by examining the 
progress of t’ e organized money market,, via either the 'liquidity 
preference' (ie. , deposit as a proportion of money supply) or the 
'loanable fund' (ie., claims as a proportion of national Income) 
approach. The'liquidity ppefere"ce' nethod is strictly an index of 
the growth of the banking sector and., as has been already stated, 
to the extent the growth of tl e banking sector coincides with the 
growth of orgr m'.zed money market, the index nay reflect the growth 
of orramized money market. In the 'loanable fund' method, it is 
assumed that the price-level and income-velocity of money remain 
fairly stable over the period of analysis.^
1 In fact, income-velocity in India remained fairly stable between 
lo30-tr and 1961-2. See, for details,Ramgopal Agarwala - An. 
Econometric Model'of India* 1918-1961, Frank Cass & Co.,Ltd. London, 
1970’, P,'3. P~. 60. PP. 87-9 and P.91.
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6.3- 2. The Data:
Most of the data which are considered here are derived from 
RBI1 s annual Report on Currency and Finance, pr,I “’ulletins, and the 
Economic Surveys of Government of India. The other sources are the 
Estimates of National Inco ie published by the Central. Statistical 
Or .-"a i nation on behalf of the Government of India and the 
International Financial Statistics published by the International 
Monetary Fund. So :e of the tests which have beer mentioned earlier 
can.no be applied because of the absence of the type of data which 
would be required to carry out those tests. There is a genuine 
need to gather more in format 5 on in this field to nrovi.de a basis 
for better -judgement.
5.3* 3* Growth of the Linkagest The t. qsis:
(a) To examine the nature of growth of linkages, we shall, first, 
consider the nronortion of commercial banks' loans going to 
agriculture. It is r evealed in table 6.1 that ba.uk credit to 
agriculture as a nronortion of its total loans was 2.1 in 1930-51,
1 1  in 1961-62 ~ d 2.2 1967-8. Loans given by con ercial banks
to agriculture included loans to plantation. It seems, judged by 
this test, that t1 is link between organized and unorganized sectors 
is very weak.
(b) The second test is to consider the prorortion of lending by 
or rant zed agencies like commercial banks, co-operative credit 
societies and the government in the total borrowing of cultivators.
It is revealed that this or nortion was 7.3 in 1951-52 and 
13.7 in 1961-62.1
1 Se , RBI -A.I.R.C.S., vol.11, p.167, op cit..and also RBI.Bulletin
September, 1965, P. 1.309.
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Little reliable information is available -'.out this pr-rortion
for the current period. At rrescnt, the co-ooeratives may be
lending about one-fifth to one-fourth of the total, borrowings of
cultivators, but this again, will make the share of organized
agencies about one-fourth to one-third of the tot-1 borrowings of
cultivators. In this resnect, perhaps the links are growing, but
the rate of growth is quite slow.
(c) Tt has been argued that t^ .e amount of advances by commercial
banks to shroffs may be one of the indicators of the growth of
2
links between the two sectors. This might have been the case if
z
the ratio (and not simply the amount) ' of commercial banks1 
advances to shroffs had been increasing. In table 6.1, it is shown 
that the proportion of advances of the scheduled commercial banks to 
shroffs has actually declined from 2 to l.Zf between 1951 and 1961 
though the absolute amount of advances has increased. The 
nronortion of advances of the non-scheduled banks registered a 
slight rise from 1.1 to l.lf in the same period. Thus between 
1951 and 1961, the proportion of advances by commercial banks to 
shroffs is so low and stagnant that it hardly sur-ests any 
strengthening of the links between organized and unorganized sectors.
The other tests which are aorlied here to deoict the growth of 
the orgar.ized money market consist of considering: (a) the 
proportion of deposit to money supoly and (b) the proportion of 
claims on the nr' vate sector by commercial and co-operative backs.
1 See, RBI - Organizational Framework. .. (1969), P. 5*78, on cit. ,
2 Gopal Knrkal cit., PP. 77-8.
3 Italics mine.
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By using test (a), we discover that between 1951-52 and 1961-62, 
the uroport-i on of de-posits to money supply went down from 32.55 to 
27.73. However, in 1968-9? the proportion went up to 36.29. Hence 
during the sixties, there is one indication to suggest that the 
size of organized money market might have increased.
The second test revealed that between 1953-^i and. 1960-61, the 
proportion of claims on the private sector by commercial and 
co-operative banks to national income rose from 5*1^ - to 9.78 .
In 1968-9, it went up further to 11.0 (see table 6.1). This may 
again, suggest the increase in the size of organized money market.
The above tests are not enough, but they seem to suggest 
growth of the organized sector to a limited extent in rural money 
markets as reflected in the greater proportion of loans given by 
the organized agencies to cultivators. The size of the whole of 
the organized money market might have increased as shown by the 
’loanable fund’ and ’liquidity preference’ approaches. However, 
in the absence of any rigorous measurement of the total size of 
the rura1 money market, it is very difficult to pass any final 
judgement about the exact degree and nature of change of the size 
of two types of rural money market in India.
6.1. 1. Role of the Organized Agencies for Promoting the Linkages: 
In order to examine the role played by the organized agencies 
in promoting integration between dual money market,' we shall first! 
analyse the role of the Reserve Bank of India and secondly that of 
the commercial banks. Since the analysis of the workings of 
co-operative credit societies has already been made, no attempt is 
made here to examine their role again. Finally, the part which 
other financial agencies could Play will also be described.
23 2
6.Zj.. 2. Sole of the Reserve Bank of India?
Ever since the estab7 ' shre \t of the Reserve Bark of India 
(RBI) in 1935 as the Central bank, it has demonstrated keen interest 
in promoting ' ntegration of the different types of money market.
The proposals made by the RBI for linking the indigenous financial 
agencies with the orga imed sector have already been described. It 
has been observed that since the basic condition of segregating 
banking "row non-banking activities among Indigenous financial 
agencies has not beer, accepted by indigenous bankers, the desired 
integration did not take place. Nevertheless, the RET continued to 
evince interest in the problem and it was under its auspices that a 
massive rural credit survey was undertaken for the w! ole of India 
fo^ * the years ">951-2. The Rural Credit Survey Committee, however, 
declined to offer any role to the money-lenders and indigenous banks 
and reflected that although, the' co-operatives have failed, they must 
succeed as effective rivals of money-lenders. An integrated system 
of agricultural credit was supposed to be brought about by linking 
credit with arketing and processing activities as also by 
developing adequate personnel. The Committee also drew attention 
to the need to develop negotiable credit instruments by building up 
warehouses and proper storage facilities.
The Indian government broadly accepted the proposals of the 
Rural Credit Survey Committee. The activities of the RBI increased 
considerably since it had to co-ordinate the work of different 
aspects like credit, marketing, warehousing and training.
1 See RE~ - ' ^ lo of the Reserve Bank of I ~g' a in Rural Credit,
", 19 6^  , PP.9-12. See also, R^"’
Functions and Working, Bombay, 1958, PR.76-7.
2 3 3
Furt’ er, the RBI established the Notional Agricultural Credit
(Lon~-term operations) Fund in 1956 following the recommendations
of the Survey Cornittee. This was to provide long-term loans to
different state governments to enable them to participate in the
share capital of different types of co-ooeratives, irclud'ng
land-mortgage banks with an initial contribution of Rs.10 crores,
and a sum of at least Rs. 5 crores was to be added each year to the
Fund out of the RBI's profits in the first five yeans. In May,I960,
the Committee on Co-operative Credit recommended that the amount of
annua? contribution be raised to Rs.10 crores per years in 1959-61
and to Rs.ll crores for 1961-4.” The same Committee(1960)also
reco -mended the relaxation of conditions for granting credit to the
credit societies by enlarging the definition of owned funds to mean
not only paid-up share capital and statutory reserve fund, but also
carton other reserve and funds of a permanent nature created out
of profits. The RBI also established the National Agricultural
(Stabilization) Fund in June, 1956, with an initial contribution of
Rs. 1 crore and Rs. 1 crore being contributed to it per year since
then from Bank's profits. For making medium-term advances to State
Co-ooerative banks, loans could be obtained from the Fund to enable
the co-operative banks to repay loans in case of default owing to
2
drou^ t, flood or natural, calamities." The reason for the creation 
of the Agricultural Credit Fund was mainly to provide financial 
support to the co-operative agencies to make them strong and 
effective competitors of Indigenous agencies.
1 Ibid. PP.12-1A•
2 Ibid. PP.16-17.
J
/
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At the highest level of the co-operative banking structure, the 
RBI was Primarily interested in setting up one State Co-orerative 
Ban1' in each state and at the district level, the Ba.ik tried to set 
up only one central co-operative bank for each district. At the 
primary level, the RBI has been trying to form viable societies. 
After the rural credit survey of 1950-1, the RBI carried out 
follow-up surveys from 1956'** to I960. The RBI also established in 
1951 the Standing Advisory Coinittee on Agricultural Credit to 
review the progress of co-ooerntives. The RBI published the 
Statistical Statements and reviews related to the co-operatives in 
Indi a each year.
The amount of the flow of funds from the RBI to co-operatives 
between 1955-6 and 1967-8 is shown in table 6.2. Loans for both 
short and medium terms increased, substantially though the 
proportion of highest level of loans outstanding to loans 
sanctioned declined from 90 to 6A and this may partly be explained 
by the rise in overdu.es. The RBI generally lends to co-operatives 
at rates varying between 2% and 1^% below the Bank Rate.' The RBI 
indirectly finances on a long-term basis by contributing to the 
debentures which are floated by central land mortgage banks and 
guaranteed by state governments.
The RBI provides cheap remittance facilities to co-operative 
be. ks. It audits and inspects the accounts of the co-operatives 
arart from rendering advice to them about their loans and assets 
adjustments and the rate of interest that could be charged.
The RBI is now relaxing rules for extending more credit for the 
develop ert of the Intensive Agricultural District Programmed ADP).
1 Ibid. PP.24-25•
2 TtCTT PP.30-31.
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Since one of the basic conditions for the development of this
nrogramme is the provision of adequate and timely credit to farmers
on tv e basis of the:r production plans, the RBI takes into account
the credit needs of t’ e Stote and Central co-operative banks for
financing the area “Included in the programme on a special footing
and the central co-operative banks within IABP are permitted to
ask for special credit limits. The RBI has also taken various
stens for the training of personnel for co-operatives." On the
-■r-eco”1 endation of the Rural Credit Review Committee( 1969)} the
Standing Committee on Co-operative Credit was converted into
2
Agricultural Credit Board in February, 1970.
6*4. Evaluation of the work of the RBI:
The RBI has, no doubt, tried to link the organized money market 
with the unorganized money markets in different ways. The attempt 
has been mainly of two types: (a) laying down the conditions for 
indigenous financial agencies to join the organized sector, and
(1) strengthening the co-operatives financially and organizationally^ 
to make them effective competitors of money-lenders. Regarding the 
first approach, it has already been observed that the main condition 
which was lar-d down by the RBI for integrating the indigenous 
agencies with the organized sector was the segregation of non-banking 
from banking activities among the indigenous agencies. A.s the 
indigenous bankers refused to accent that condition, integration 
along t’-’ese lines did not take place. The indigenous bankers may, 
however, be allowed to operate both banking and non-banking activities 
provided they keep seperate accounts for the two different tyres of 
activities and the RBI will have the right to audit and inspect the 
accounts regularly to prevent any possible malpractice.
1 RBI - The Reserve Bank of India, PP.87-9 or cit.,
2 MSI - Annual ReportT 1970, P.79. See also,Agricultural.Situation 
in' India, 'March', 1970, PP. 1105-1106.
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After a few veers, the indj venous bankers could be asked to drop 
their no -banking activities. It appeared that one of the main 
reasons why the indigenous bankers refused to shed non-banking 
activities stemmed from their apprehension that they would not have 
enougblbusiness turnover to cover their costa. But this argument 
would be weakened once they are allowed to work on condition that 
they could combine banking with other activities for some years. 
Further, once the indigenous bankers are allowed,to operate within 
the organized sector, the FBI will assume enough power over them 
to control their activities. Should any indigenous banker be 
found to lake wrong use of the FBI loans, he may be expelled from 
the list of member-banks. The RBI may also take proper steps to 
o + - t / ' o  hundjs which may be used as an Important linkage. 
Little attention has so far been devoted to the improvement of 
hundi business. It is also disheartening to find that the use of 
other typer of negotiable credit instruments like warehouse receipts 
has not yet become popular.
The approach of the RBI regarding t’’.e development of 
co-operative credit societies is important. The RBI has liberalised 
many conditions for Providing short and long-term finance to the
/
rural sector. The rise in the amount of loans gra'ted. to the 
co-operatives between 1956 and 1968 by the RBI is substantial. TT~ e 
RBI has taken some useful steps towards re-organizing the 
co-operative structure and improving the quality and operational 
effeciency of co-operative banks.
1 RBI - Re ort of the All-India Rural Credit (1969), PP. 927-2°,
op cit«h
Ibid. P. 698. It is stated that deposit insurance scheme was 
introduced in the case of co-operative banks in 1965 and State 
Co-operative bs ks were given the status of scheduled banks in 1966.
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3nt the i "inertant noirt which may he raised here is that although
the PIT was, to some extent, sueceesf 3 lnjeei la fund© i -'to the
rural re tor through co-onerstives, it has also created a built-in
bias, nhing co-onerative banks more dependant upon the RB I. It
hac been ie .tioned that the RBI lends to co-oner "••'rive banks at 2$
below the Bark R°te. But the borrowing, ie, deposit rate of
co-oneratives was higher than the rate at which they could borrow 
1
from the Bank. It may be argued that the built-in bias in favour 
of being denendant unoh the RBI may adversely affect the keeness of 
eo-operatives to mobilize deposits. Altering loan rates on RBI loans 
rn?,” affect ~he deposit gathering power of co-operatives. Here a 
system of incentives and dis-incentives may be created to reward 
those banks (say, by allowing them to borrow at the rate of 2% below 
the Bank Rate) which ape successful in mobilising deposits and by 
imposing penalties on those banks win ch fail to mobilise deposits 
by charging a rate ; say, 1% below the Bank Rate.1; . Similar other
measures may be adorted to provide incentives for deposit
2
mobilisation. After rJ n , the case for subsidizing the co-oaerative, 
sector at the cost of the rest of the econo'ly for an indefinite 
number of years, does not seem to be very convincing on economic 
grounds.
1 P.716 and PP. 728-9.
2. d. PP. 729- ’2. See also, Harold A.Tiles, "Outlook for Farm 
Credit in I diaw in YO J All*, vol.3Q.ll, ho. 20. October, i960,
PP. 11-12. Miles argued in favour of raising both d.eoosit and 
lending rate.
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Hovrever, should thero be another agency to lend to the co-onero'.ive! 
the] the degree of dependence on the "RBI may be reduced. In 
view of the success of tl - s Timercial banks in mobilising deposits 
it seeing po jsible that these commercial banks may undertake the 
task of financing the co-operatives. This could form an important 
linkage between the commercial and co-operative banks. There is 
special room to develor a t-yoe of co-operative paper in areas 
whic’ are included in IADP and HYV projects where the demand for 
credit is expected to rise and the RBI may take appropriate 
measures to inject more funds in those areas by relaxing the rules 
for granting credit.- But such relaxation must be combined with 
satisfactory performance in the repayment and here a flexible loan 
policy to take care of seasonality is required.
In fine, in order to bring about greater integration of the 
dual money market, the RBI ay take the following stens:
a) remove the Impediments in the way of greater use of hundls
2
by taking stews to improve the quality of hundis;
b) ensure greater flow of funds through the IADP and HYV nrojects 
via the co-o^erafives;
c) develop greater use of agricultural bills by ororaoting the 
use of warehouse receipts or other forms of negotiable credit 
instruments;
d) create conditions so that th -■ co1 meroial banks may provide 
more funds to co-onerot‘ve hr ks on the basis of, say, co-owerative 
paper;
1 See, Report of the PeptIIiser Credit C o n ’ttee( 1968) ,P. BBS, cited 
in t ■ ort f the India Rural Credit Review Committee,
(19 0, n . r'°'’ p cit e also, G er e t of I dia? Lnl strj of 
Food, Agriculture,Community Development and Co-operation - Reports 
of the HI gh-Yt el dino Varieties Prograrme ,ITew Pol hi, 1967,PP. 55-7•
2 It is r.rgued that the RBI should try to bring hundl into the Bill 
market scheme. See, for exanple,H.N.Roy, on cit. .P.91.
3 For a discussion of the difficulties that the RBI faced in 
executing th'.s policy, See,7R.BT - Studies .in Agricultural Credit, . . 
Bombay, lnr70, P.rk.
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e) -Fornulate credit policy in such a way as to take care of the
e] e- e t of seasonal ity in the srhere of agricultural finance;
f) relax sore of the conditions( for a fixed number of years) 
which it initially stipulated for the entry of indigenous bankers:
It ';'av/ hov/ever, <b£^ admitted}that there is a built-in bias in 
the loan policy of the RBI in favour of borrowing by co-operative 
ba~>ks. Such b * as r ay be re oved through a scheme of incentives 
and dis-incentives by altering the loan rates of the RBI. The RBI 
•ay also formulate a differential interest ^ate policy in the 
rural sector. To attract more deposits from rural areas, the 
primary credit societies may be asked to raise the borrowing rate.1 
This will, however, push ur the lending rate as the margin of 
profit vdl1 be squeezed. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the 
oney-i e :iers! rate may still be higher than the increased 1 e ding 
rate, there seems to be room for considering; the case for 
increasing the lending rate. The exact level of such rates in 
different regions may be worked out by the R^I. As regards the 
robi 2 f str ri ;t i© ting the co-operatives as alternative agencies 
of rural credit, every attempt should be made by the Bank to examine 
carefully ° d to take ’.ensures to improve upon operational 
effeciency, loan administration and scale of activity of primary 
credit societies as well as of central co-operative banks. This 
may require a greater role by the RBI in the management of 
Co-operative credit societies.
1 See, for example, Anand G.Chandavarkar, on cit. ,IMF Staff Papers 
3.971. PP.* - 2.
tvl
6.'-. %  Role of the Commercial ’ :
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The commercial "banks have hitherto played a very insignificant 
role in the field, of agricultural credit. The commercial banks, 
however, could provide funds to the rural sector in a number of 
ways: ( a) by r*rn tin - credit to tie co-operatives; (b) by increasing
the scale of their activities through the opening of more branches, 
and, (c) by providing production, investment and distribution 
credit.
It is argued that commercial banks were more successful than
p
the co-operatives in mobilizing deposits in the semi-urban areas.
The results of the special survey conducted by the RBI revealed that 
the number of accounts in respect of advances the co-operatives 
formed only less than 1 ner cent of the total number of accounts 
and about 1 aer cent of the amount lent in all the centres studied. 
This demonstrates a very weak link between the commercial and 
co-orerative banks in the sample surveyed. There are, however, two 
prob?cms in connexion with commercial banks lending to co-oreratives.
First, since t- e RBI lends at a concessional rate to co-onerstives, 
it beco es doubtful how far the co-operatives will turn to the 
commercial banks, which will not charge such concessional rates, 
except when the co-oneratives suffer fro; an acute shortage of funds.
Secondly, since some of the co-operatives have failed to utilize 
the credit n  Its sanctioned by t' e RBI ch~ efly because of their 
mounting overdues, it is not certain whether these co-operatives 
will make demand for additional credit requirements. '
1 See,for details,RBI-Financing of Agriculture...(1969)op cit., 
See aldo,G.T.Huchapna, "Commercial Banks and Agricultural Finance" 
in The sian Rconom.lc Review,vol.X.No.I.May,1968,PP.201-210.
2 See, RBI-Report of the A11-India Rural Credit...(1969),P •331• 
oji? cit. ,
3 Ibid. P.33k.
4 RBI - financing of Agric u 11 ure... (1969) ,P. 219, ojy ci t. a
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Nevertheless, commercial banks may still lend to co-oreratives 
dor financing distribution, storage, marketing and rural 
electrification. Where opportunities exist, there is no reason 
why the links between commercial banks and co-operatives should 
not improve.
As regards the expansion of the scale of activities of
commercial banks, it nav be said that the expansion of rural
banking has achieved some success.' The story of rural branch
expansion should, however, be interpreted cautiously because many
of these branches are established in semi-urban and newly urban
areas. Between 1°55 end 1967, the scheduled commercial banks
including-the State Rank of India and its subsidiaries were
successful in opening up 3303 offices of which 1139,1©, 31m were
opened in those centres which did not have any commercial banking
facilities before, though such centres might have offices of
co-operative banks. The comparison here between the State and
co- mercial banks appear to be revealing in the sense that in the
case of the State Banks, between 1955 and 1967, 43% of the new
offices opened were in unbanked centres whereas in the case of
scheduled banks, the equivalent figure is only 21%, However, the
progress with regard to branch expansion by the State and commercial
o
banks during 1968-9 was regarded as significant. Despite such 
expansion, there is still a considerable number of districts without 
banking facilities.^
1 See, P.N. Joshi, $ king in Rural India" in The Journal of Indian
Institute of Bankers" vol. 40.No .1. JaEuappy-lfa *ch,1969iPP« 40-41*
g.r- a] t";1e, 6.1. See also,RBI Bui 1 etin(Supfrleraent) ,November, 1970»
2 RBI-Report of the A? 1-India Rural Cr edi t .. (1969). PP. 329-31, op cit.
3 See, HAH.Jakhade and H.B.Shivamaggi, "Inter-District Comparison 
of Agricultural Development and Spread of Banking Facilities In t1 e 
Rural A.reas" in RBI Bulletin,October,1969,PP. 1559-1615.
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There is also a marked degree of uneven ess in the spread of
■bankin'" among the different states. It is reported that "none of
the districts from Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Orissa,
Uttar Pradesh and Wc~t Bengal falls in the group of top 50 districts
ranked for spread of banking according to the per bank centre
position. On the other hand, S out of 9 districts in Kerala,
15 out of 25 districts in ! a ^  'ashtra, 9 out of 17 districts in
Guiarat and 6 out of 19 districts in Mysore fall in this top group”.
There is also considerable scope for commercial banks to expand
their branches in those districts which are agriculturally
relatively well-developed but suffer from inadeouate banking 
2
f acilities.
Other linkages could be developed if the commercial banks 
could lend more to the rural sector directly or indirectly by 
urovtding investment, distribution and marketing credit. 
Traditionally, the commercial banks, have financed urban biased 
trade and industry and neglected the agricultural sector, though in 
recent times they have provided some loans for agricultural purposes. 
The diversion of a small proportion of loans to agriculture was not 
unlikely since the commercial banks did not nossesr any exoert 
knowledge about the rural, economy nor did they have strong con- exion 
w4 ' h indigenous financial agencies working in tie rural, sector.
1 Ibid. P.1574.
2 lb? d. P.1575.
3 RBI - Report of the All-India Rural Credit...(1969)<PP.355-36, 
on cit., See also, J.S.Varshney, ” Financing of Co-operatives by
the State Bank of India and its Subsidiaries" in State Bank of India 
,'ortbly Review, vol.VI11,No.7. July, 1969,PP.253-39.
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Nonetheless, the co nercia1 banks provided loans to traders in
agricultural poods and contributed to the debentures :>f central
laj ' d lopment banks. But the beneficiaries of commercial banks’
lending: wore mostly the plantation estates and big farmers who
operate on business lines.'"
Direct financing of agricu1ture by commercial banks posed
nary problems because of the long gestation period in the returns
on agricultural investment, wide fluctuations in agricultural
income and prices, the absence of proper records of land ownership
2
and of other good collatera1 . Indeed, the basic problem is
related to the nature of economic growth and rise in farmer’s 
income. Once the farmer's income is raised above the level of 
subsistence, it will be possible for the cultivators to save and 
accumulate assets which could be used as good collateral. In this 
context, promotion of agricultural bills deserve special attention. 
T-Tere, mainly three types of agricultural bills may be promoted:
(a) warehouse .recejnts, (b) co-operative paper, and (c) hundis.
The growth of such bills will minimise the degree of risk in 
agricultural lending, reduce tie risk premium and ensure greater 
flow of funds. The noint is thus, how best commercial b~ ks can 
provide production and investment credit that will increase farmer's
g
income and repayments as well as rural deposits.
1 Ibid. P.336.
2 See,for example, A.H.Elias,"Operational Problems of Commercial 
Banks in the Rural Sector" in The Journal of tie Indian Institute 
of Bankers, vol.37, No.3. July,1966.PP.240-/il.See also, ?. .
or cit., P.A2. See also, D.K.Rangnekar - Agricultural Finance...
P.5 op cit..
3 The hr ks ay have to study saving-investnert behaviour in- 
selected rural areas through low-cost branches. See,for example, 
Subhas J. Rele,"Strategy for Rural Banking" in YOJAMA,vol.XI11 ,No.l3,
Ju? y, 13,1969.Sec a] so,D.K. Rangnekar - Agricultural Finance 
PP.10-11 on cit. , ~
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It seems ulausible that, with the spread of IADP and HYV projects, 
the do and for fertilizers, seeds, pumpsets etc., will rise 
substantially over the next few years. Comm ere? al banks here could 
play an important role in providing credit for distribution of these 
incuts which have direct production and income effects. So e of the 
commercial banks are already undertaking such types of financing 
though the scale of activity may be increased substantially.
To illustrate the ways in which commercial banks may lend 
directly to agriculture, the experience of the Syndicate Bank 
deserves attention. The Syndicate Bank in 1961 established an 
Agricultural Finance Department to carry out research into 
nroduction possibilities in some rural sectors via improved methods 
of cultivation with credit aid as a first step towards direct 
financing of agriculture. Experimental farms were sot up for 
demonstrating the production and income-effects and soil-testing 
laboratories were established to assist the farmers to determine 
fertilizer requirements. These measures helped the Syndicate bank 
to accummulate experience and diversify its activities in the 
rural sector. The bank began to provide loans for financing the 
raising of hybrid seeds and ourchase of different tyres of 
agricultural machinery. Generally, 75% of the total value of 
machinery is financed and money is sent to the suprlier of the 
machinery directly on the receirt of the delivery of goods. The 
interest rate varied between 8 and 9 aer cent ner annum. In 
South Canara district, the small farmers are issued ’Agri Cards’ 
which helped them to obtain required seeds, fertilisers, pesticides 
and the snare rarts for machinery from arproved dealers on credit.
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Dairy, poultry and fishery development scher.es are also financed
by the ba k and it also provided services through trained farm 
1
representatives. Of late, the State Park has also directly
2
financed two agricultural projects.
T1 e major lines of approach which emerged in the course of 
our discussion for the future role that commercial banks car play 
for the promotion of links between organized and unorganized sectors 
are the fallowing?
a) Greater financing of co-operative cred: t societies by 
developing some co-operative bills.
b) kora active role in the direct financing of agriculture by 
helping the cultivators to buy inputs against hypothecation or 
mortgage of such inputs as well as by lending on the basis of crops."
c) Greater indirect financing for the distribution of inputs like 
fertilizer as well as for the promotion of services " 'd este-m on in 
rv^s'1 areas. Hero, apart from developing warehousing, processing 
and storage facilities, the lead bank scheme may be introduced to 
promote the lin1" between credit and marketing.'
1 RBI-Report of the All-1 La Rural Credit...(1969)PP.538-9,op cit., 
See "Iso, RBI -  Financing of Agriculture. . .  (1969) , PP. 160-6? ,  op cit . _ j
2 T.R.'Varadachary, ’’State Bank Assists to Green Revolution” in State 
Bank of India Monthly Rcvi ew, vol. Vlll, No. 3. March, 1969.PP. 92-99.
3 RBI - Report of the A3 j_-T^dia Rural Credit. .. (1969),PP. 927-°,
Op cit., It is reported that banks do noJ~. consider the warehouse 
recejots as negotiable instruments. Here is a case for clarifying 
the legal problem to facilitate the use of such receipts. For some 
defects of the crop-loan system, see, S.N.Jatar, "Operations of the
j / Crop Loan System in Maharashtra” in Ar t h a VI dr an a, Vo 1. XI. N o . k .
/ December, 1969, PP.611-50. ^
!' See,C. A.Pai ’’Regional. Distribution of 3a k Credit: / Critical 
Review1* in Economic and Political Weekly Vol.V.No.11 .October 10, **970. 
PP.1691-1699.
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d) Increasing’ the scale of financing by opening up new branches.
e) Higher provision of funds in IADP and HYV areas as these are 
the i end in sectors in t' e rum"1 economy. Here credit nay also be 
supplied in kind but this requires an efficient distributive 
mechanism.
f) Larmer contribution to the State El ectricity Boards for 
enablin • t] era to irapleraent rural olectrification pro marines.
In sorc recent reports, it is suggested that there had been a 
considerable rise in the commercial bank*s lending to agriculture.
Wh-t is nor necessary is proper co-ordination between commercial 
a d co-operative banks and their Joint 9 3 positiv ole for greater 
Inte n the d tail raone^  market* The short-run effect of
c'-'mere'of honks' '.nor wring norticlnation in the rural economy 
ma*7, 1 sod to ° flow of funds from, urban and semi-urban to rural 
areas. In the long-run, such flow of funds is expected to increase 
the degree of monetization of the rural economy, create a greater 
volume of financial assets in rural areas and thereby enable the 
ba ks to mobilize a financial surplus which wopld emerge with the 
r i s e  in farm nroduction and inco ie. However, to find out the vif 
viability of the new branches in semi-urban and rural areas, 
commercial banks may have to undertake cort-benefit studies.
1 See,RBI Bulletin, April,1969, PP*529-30. Expansion ■ -ay,however, 
require functional a: d structural adaptation. See, for example, 
N.P.Kurup,"~making in the Fourth Plan: Adaptations to meet new 
Challenge" 'n YOJAHA, Sept.l, 1968,P.8. Schemes for structural
r e-organizat' on have also been drawn up. See, for exam.ple,N. M.Choksi , 
"Structural Re-organization of Indian Banking: A Scheme11 and 
F.K.F.Narire , "Rural Branch Expansion" in FBI-Organizational 
Framework...(1969)* PP.A.34 - A.15, on cit.,
2 See,Economic and Political Weekly, vol. iv, No. 37, Sept. 13,1969, PI 4-66.
3 See,V.M.Jakhade and M.V.Gadgil,"Product ' on-ahd-Repaymei t-Capacity 
Orient o'’ ] ling for Farm Inves ne it" in RBI Buin ?tin« T~ u. nr y, 1970, 
PP. 56-77. For a critique,see,Samuel Paul, "Invest1:’ent in Agriculture:
aly sew Lc Itical 1 , No.
May,16, 1970.PP.'808-8ll• See also,M*'NarasimhaiEt, "National 
Agricultural Credit Pol icy "in Economic and Pol:'tic al V/eekly, vol. .VI ,
N o .2,Ja u ry 9,1971* PP.101-102. asimham warns that "credit 
creation b e g r d  a point has Inflationary, potential", P.,10,2.
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Such studies may he useful in arriving at decisions related to 
the scone of branch expansion programmes because there is a danger 
in stretching the branches too far for fina .cial and administrative 
reasons. However, apart from the commercial banks, some other 
organized financial agencies have recently been established and in 
the next sections, their role will be examined.
6.4. §. Role of Agricultural Finance Corporation:
The Agricultural Finance Corooration (AFC) was set up in 
April, 1968 with an authorized capital of Rs.100 crores, to 
supplement the work of the co-operatives as well as of the 
commercial banks, in order to ensure a greater flow of funds to 
the rural sector. At the beginning, Rs. 1.0. crores have been issued 
out of which Rs.5 crores have been pai d up. The major aims of the 
Corporation are to help the financing of:
/  a) the distribution of agricultural out^put and inputs like 
fertilizer, pesticides and agricultural implements;
b) the development of markets, warehouses, food industries and 
forest products;
c) promotion of livestock;
d) production, supply and distribution of agricultural goods.
The AFC can provide credit both directly and indirectly.
Direct financing to cultivators for production was limited to only 
a few selected areas. The major aim of AFC is to develop the 
infra-structure for the growth of the agricultural economy.
1 See,V."\ Pillai, "Partial Nationalisation not Enough" in 
Government of India,Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Nationalisation of Banks,19701 PP.12-17. For an 'action-oriented' 
programme,initial policy formulation by Lead Banks on the basis of 
available data and 'personal feel' is regarded necessary, See,for 
example, V.V.Bhatt, "Lead Banks:Action Oriented Approach " in 
Economic and Political Weekly.vol.4.No.40,Oct.3,1970,PP.1639-1641. 
For progress of Lead Bank Scheme,Bee, 51.Bulletin Nov.1970.
PP.1917-1928. .................
2 • RBI-Fihahcihg 'of Agriculture'.. .(1269) .PP. 228-32, op pit.11,
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The main schemes financed by the AFC so far included energization 
of irrigation wells in so me states like Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, 
Bihar, area development in some regions of Bihar,reclamation of 
sandy oil and production of an export variety of banana in Tamil 
Nadu.1' The AFC has also established "national, state and district 
level consultative committees for co-ordination between the 
co-orerative and the co mere1'"I banks, developing the expertise of 
the member-banks in dealing with agricultural loan applications, 
formulating projects...for the benefit of member-banks and 
establishing a technical consultancy service for helping the banks
p
to appraise and finance agr: cultural projects"."-
The AFC is established not only as an agency for financing 
agriculture directly s d indirectly, but also for promotional 
activities. It appears that the AFC is in a vital position to play 
■! ts role as the co-ordinator of any agricultural financing agenci.es, 
apart from being a source of funds for the rural sector.''’ It is, 
howover, too early to .judge how far the AFC has played its role in 
expanding the organized sector of the rural m o n e y  market.
. . 6 .
In view of the limited progress of the co-orerative credit 
societies in some of the Indian states, an Informal Group on 
Institutional Arrangement for Agricultural Credit was set up by the 
ICI in 1961 and this group recommended the establishment of an 
Agricultural Credit Corporation^ACC)in each of the states of Bihar, 
Assam, West Bengal, Orissa and RajastHan and different corporations 
for the Union Territories of Trirura and Me linur.
1 FBI-Report of the All-India Rural Credit(1969). . .PP. 311 -12,
PP.600-601, on cit.,
2 Ibid. P.342.
3 The need for co-ordination is also stressed by other writers.
See,for example, P.K.Bhargava and A.K.Jain,"Changing the Structure 
.of Agricultural Finanee -in India"- in * Agricultural SitUa'ti'oh jn * fhdi 
November,1970.PP.829-39.
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The Indian Government accented the proposal and passed the State 
Agricultural Credit Corporation Bill in 1968. The Act permitted a 
Corroratlon to be set up in any state or union territory on 
condition that no corporation can be set up in the states or 
territories save those stipulated by the Group sreent s  t1' the 
rrior annroval of the RBI and the central government.
The fund of the ACC would. consist of the contributions of the 
hi1!, the State Bank, Food Corporation of India and the banking 
companies which will be the shareholders of ACC. With the spur oval 
of the RBI, the ACC might take deposits from the local, authorities, 
government or any other person. A board of seven directors will be 
responsible for its management, anoointed by the central government 
in consultation with the State government.
The ACC may provide loans up to a period not exceeding five 
years for agricultural operations to cultivators and also for 
agricultural arketiiig and processing societies, central co-orerative 
banks, co-orerative farming societies and rrimrry agricultural 
credit societn‘ es. The ACC is also authorized to act as an agent 
for carrying out marketing and distribution functions. The RBI will 
have the right to inspect and determine loan policies and interest 
rates, provide general guidance and make periodic review of its 
working every three years. Areas were demarcated for the proper 
functioning of ACC in co-ordination with central co-operative banks. 
However, in this sphere, it is necessary to avoid overlapping of 
functions and close co-oreration is needed with the .State 
Co-operative banks. Sufficient flexibility in demarcating the area 
of operation of the ACC is regarded as necessary.1
1 RBI -Report of the ATI-India Rural Credit. . . (1 ° 69). P653. o_p ci t. ,
2 52
Similar flexibility in determining the norms of potential, 
viability of credit societyes is also required. In disbursing 
loans, the ACC should try to lend to cultivators first as a member 
of the group and then as a member of co-operatives. The ACC must 
be careful about loan utilization and recovery of sue1’ loans. It 
■’ however, enjoy those rights and privileges which are now 
enjoyed by the co-operatives. The ACC should take active steps to 
link credit to marketing.' Needless to say, to function smoothly, 
utmost co-operation is required between the ACC, Co-ooeratives and 
government agencies.
The idea of setting u p  the ACC in those states where 
co-operatives did not make good progress is not unreasonable.
However, little information is available until now about the 
nature and scale of activity of the ACC. In connexion with their 
work, the following points deserve special attention:
a) I'aximum co-oreration and co-ordination is required between 
the ACC and other organized financial agencies to ensure flow of 
funds in the rural sector.
b) Overlapping of functions should be avoided as far as possible 
to avoid any damare to the growth of co-operatives.
c) It is extremely important to minimise the problems of loan 
administration. This is one of the major problems that the 
co-operatives have faced so far. This could be done if strict 
supervision is maintained over loan utilization and loan recovery.
In the case of all these agencies, there is no provision for 
taking special care of small farmers who are generally deprived of 
organized credit facilities* In the next section, we shall examine 
the attempt that has been made to remove a part of that criticism.
1 Ibid. PP.653-57.
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6. . 4. Snail Farmers Development Agency:
The Snail Farmers Development Are cv (SFBA) has heon
recommended by the All-India Rural Credit Review Committee(1969)
as an organization which should be set up for the benefit of those
cultivators who own small holdings yet potentially viable if they
can get necessary innuts by obtaining credit. The schere does not
include the sub-marginal farmers and agricultural 7 ->bour or s. The
SFDA is recommended to be set un in some 30 districts as nilot
projects particularly where the prorortion of small farmers is quite
1 or "■ e and which are included in IADP or HYV nrojects and where
2
co-orerative credit societies are working satisfactorily. Broadly, 
V'e SFDA will investigate and identify the problems of small 
farmers to enable them to obtain necessary inputs and services 
from the different orranized agencies like co-operatives as also to 
ensure the implementation of these nlans by nroper supervision to 
raise former's production and Income. The Central Co-operative and 
Land Development banks will obtain substantial funds from SFDA for 
disbursing credit to small farmers as well as for their effective 
supervision. It is honed that the scheme would benefit 1 .^million 
farmers in 30 districts by 1973-*f.' The scheme has been included 
in the Fourth Five Year Plan.
1 Ibid. Ch.18. PP.537-89. See also, Government of India - Fourth 
Five Year Plan, 1969-7*:-, New Delhi, I960, P.151.
2 Ib-\cL P“ 58h.
3 Ibid. PP.587-89.
k By June, 1970, eight such agencies in four states were annroved, 
See.P.31 - Deport on Currency and Finance,1969-70iP.l!6.
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The idea of helming the small farmers through SFDA is 
interesting. The establishment of SFDA would not only form one 
1? rk in the ch^in of or^" izod flow of funds to the rural sector, 
but also involve socio-oolitical implications in so far as it 
seeks to redress one of the basic grievances of snail farmers: 
that they are generally deprived of institutional credit. What 
is no less important is the effective utilization of funds and its 
repayment through necessary production and -income-effects of credit.
6.i. $. Impact of the Organized, Ar o “cles uron The Rural Honey 
Market:
'Vh r discussion of the establishment of a number of organized
2
agencies like ACC and AFC ' and the expansion of the activities of 
co' ercial banks in rural money markets begs the question of their 
impact uron the unorganized sector. It seers probable that the 
increasing scale of loan orerations undertaken by the nationalized 
commercial banks as also by the State Bank will 1ead to a fall in 
the size of the unorganized rural money market. Between 1961-62 
and 1968-9, us a ororortion of national income, commercial and 
co-operative banks1 claims on the rrivate sector went up from 
10.76 to 11.00. Between 1991-2 and 1961-2, the ^rooortion of 
cultivators' borrowing fro-- all the organ!zed agencies went ur fro n 
about 7 to about 13 a d this figure was, perh^rs, 13 in 1967-8.
1 See, for example* Henry W,Fairchild*’’Improving Institutional Farm 
Credit Systems to Support Rapid Agricultural Development " in FAO. 
of the Unit'd Nations - Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics 
and 31atistlcs, vol .19,No. A. April, 7 970, PP. 1 -7. The wiriter 
particularly emphasized the rroblem of collectin'" loans as one of 
the mein weaknesses of institutional credit system in underdeveloped 
countries.
2 The analysis of the workings of the Agricultural Refinance 
Corporation is not -ade here because this agency mainly nrovid.es 
medium and long-term loans to agriculture. For details, see RBT - 
Benort of th ~ All-India Rural Cremit...(106°),PP.800-818, on clt.,
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The nronortion o* total credit made available by institutional
a"ercies in the estimated total credit requirements was 33*5 in
1967-8. In 1961-2, this was only 12.6. However, institutional
credit as a percentage of national incone originating in
agricultural sector was 2.7 in 1961-2 and 3.8 in 1967-8. All
f -c-e indications - ay suggest a relative growth of the organized
sector though it must be admitted that it is extremely difficult
to estimate this relative growth because of lack of reliable and
precise data on the total S3 ze of the rural money market. It
should also be reckoned that the establishment of different tyres
of organ!zed agencies in the rural sector has the potentialities
of being transformed into important linkages between organized and
unorganized sectors. What is desirable is proper co-ordination of
the different agencies and their sound management. A multi-agency
approach is required not only to nromote linkages, but also to
dcvelor competition which will render credit allocation more
effective and efficient by compelling the different agencies to
become more viable. Greater efficiency of the organized agencies
and stronger linkage may require a realistic an nr ai sal of their
interest rate rolicy and this may necessitate a raising of both
denosit and lending rates for optimum credit allocation.~
Given the estimated demand for credit in Indian agriculture
in the near future, it seems unlikely that the entire demand could
2
be met by organized agencies.
1 See, An and G. Chandavarkar, or c k M  IMF Staff Parers, March, 1971, 
PP.60-72."The maintenance of nominal interest rates in the organized 
sector below their true economic level results in a steady attrition 
of organized finance".P.72. See also,Gunnar Myrdal - Asian Drama, 
vol.Ill, Pantheon,New York,1968,apoendix,8,P.2093. The author argues 
in favour of raising interest rates in the organized sector 
substantially to break the financial dualism.See also,H.Myint- 
Hconomlc Theory and the Underdeveloped Countries. Oxford University 
Press, Ire. lT. ° . A. 1971, P. 333.. ~ *" “
2 RBI - Report of the All-Indian Rural Credit...(1969)PP.8l-96 
a" cit•.
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This imnl-5 es a great er scope for utilising the existing a'~crc-: os 
to a fuller extent and to develop other tyres of linkages."
Pro: otion of such linkages may not only be helpful in mobilising 
the financial surplus, but also, in rendering monetary policy more 
effective in the organized sector.
6.9. C one lu si o nsj
The foil owing conclusions may be dr awn on the basis of our 
uresent analysis:
a) There is considerable difficulty in measuring the exact 
nature of the unorganized rural money market in India and its 
linkages with the organized money market because of the nature and
inadequacy of data.
b) The rough estimates which are used here reveal that the links 
between the organized and unorganized sectors arc weak and the size 
of the unorganized money market is probably declining though the 
rate of decline is very slow. Again, some of the linkages which 
were expected to be developed did not show appreciable growth. Any 
firm judgement about the nature and rate of decline of the size of 
.unorganized market must den end upon more ri gorous analysis of 
further empirical evidence of the tot si size of the rural money 
market and such judgement cannot be passed with the evidence 
available up until now.
1 See, .S.Kesava Iyengar, " The Co-operative Caravan: A Casual 
Causerie" in The Asian Economic Re view, vol.X! , No.if, August.-, 1969* 
PP.363-^04, especially, P,%05. The writer make® a special plea 
for abo^r. r V ng ^nten 'ediaries between primary credit agencies and 
the ultimate borrower.
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c) It appeared that although the RBI is aware of the problem of 
integration, it has not taken sufficient steps either for the 
promotion of hundis or for the entry of indigenous bankers within 
the organized sector. The RBI may, perhaps, lay down more 
flexible conditions for the entry of indigenous bankers. In view 
of the increasing demand for credit in coming years with the 
technological changes taking place in Indian agriculture, the RBI 
may take appropriate measures for the promotion and development of 
hun_di business which may form a very important linkage.
d) The role of commercial banks in the rural money market was 
poor though some expansion of their activities has been observed 
recently. There seems to be room to ensure a flow of funds to the 
rural sector from commercial banks directly or indirectly via the 
co-operatives against the creation of co-operative bills. Direct 
financing by commercial banks may be preceded by careful farm 
planning and feasibility studies by their agricultural credit 
departments.
e) It is too early to judge the impact of the activities of newly
established organized agencies on the rural money market. The
establishment of these agencies may be regarded as desirable in
view of the poor performance of the co-operatives in some of the
Indian states and low absorptive capacity of the agricultural 
1
sector.
1 See also, Horace Belshaw, op cit., in Elizabeth K.Bauer(ed)- 
Proceedings, op cit., PP. 551 - 552.
CHAPTER VI1 2 5 8
CONCIVSTOH:
The lajor conclusions of our study are summarised briefly 
n the following paragraphs:
(? ) The Indian rural money arket is characterised by duality with 
organized a d unorganized sectors in the market. On the supply side, 
the unorganized sector largely dominates even today notwithstanding 
some growth of the organized agencies between 1951 and 1968 as it 
still supplies about two-thirds of the total borrowing of the 
cultivators. The nature, composition and operation of both sectors 
illustrated a good deal of contrast and -positive steps are 
required to oro-ote their integration.
(9) The pattern of borrowin'" rand debt remained broadly the same 
between 1951-2 and 1961-2. One of the important conclusions which 
followed on the basis of our statistical estimates of the factors 
affecting the demand side of agricultural credit is that it is 
carital rather than family expenditure which is the more signifies :t 
explanatory variable affecting the demand side in most periods of 
our study. This may imply that higher levels of borrowing and debt
are correlated with larger capital expenditure while lower levels of
borrowing/debt are correlated with greater family expenditure at 
both state and district levels. Evidence also suggested the great 
importance of -personal security against which loans were either 
borrowed or outstanding in all periods. This implied the dearth of 
different tyres of collateral in the agricultural credit markets and 
the desirability of divers:' fying the nature of cultivators' assets 
with the rromotion of their income and wealth. However, seasonality 
was observed in both borrowing and debt and this may imply the
necessity of adopting a flexible credit policy,,
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(3) No definite conclusion could be drawn on the changes in the 
duration of borrowing between 1951 and 1962 because of lack of data.
However, the tendency to incur relatively more intermediate 
rather than short-term debt in 1961-2 in comparison with 1951-2 
has been observed in our study.
(4) Little change in the pattern of borrowing and debt was 
observed when it was classified according to interest rates.
(5) The hypothesis that rural interest rates in the Indian economy 
are always very high is not generally substantiated on the basis
of our study. The average rural rate varied between about 17 per 
cent and 15 per cent between 1951-2 and 1961-2. As the price level 
during this period went up by about 30 per cent, the fall in the 
real rate must have been higher. However, interest rates higher 
than 20 or 30 per cent did exist in some areas.
The analysis of the cost side of interest rates showed that 
such rates could largely be explained by the risk and uncertainty and 
administrative cost involved in lending to agriculture. Monopoly profits 
in rural rates might have existed only in some cases.
(6) The hypotheses about positive correlation between income and 
repayments and negative correlation between rate of interest and 
income and repayments are empirically justified though there is
room for further investigation. Further, the level of interest rate 
was inversely related to the degree of monetization of the rural 
economy. x*----
(7) Although the relative difference between the Bombay Bazaar rate 
and Bank Rate did not diminish substantially between 1951 and 1968, 
such reduction appeared to be significant so far as the difference
<een the Bank Rate and the Calcutta Bazaar rate is concerned. The 
fference between the hundi rate and Bazaar rates in both 
Calcutta seemed to have declined substantially.
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(?) At the early period of our study, the Be hay Bazaar rate 
remained higher than the Calcutta Bazaar rate though by 196c-7, 
suet difference vanished either because of greater flow of funds 
between the two markets or because of changed economic conditions 
- - either Bombay or Calcutta. The econometric analysis of the
s Delation bet - n azaar rate and Bank Bate indicated that it is
perhaps more likely that Bank Bate influenced the Bazaar rate '.ore 
signifi cantly while the Influence of Bazaar rate upon Bank Bate 
amea''ed to be insignificant. This could imply that a section of 
the unorgarired money market is influenced by the organised money 
market.
(°) It is argued that c rise in the farmer's income will enable 
him to accumulate more and better tyoes of assets the use of which 
in the 1oan market is expected to reduce the rural interest rate by 
reducing the risk-premium and monopoly profit wherever it exists.
B:' sk--nremium nay also be reduced by diversification of assets, 
adoption of improved technology and crop insurance.
(10) As regards the operations and progress of the orimary 
agricultural credit co-ooerc' "' ve societi es, it was observed that 
their growth was marked by uneveness between 1971 and 1968. From 
tl e all-India standpoint, the primaries generally failed to satisfy 
the different criteria of financial viability so far as the 
composition of their financial structure and loan operations are 
concerned. Increasin gl* greater dependence on borrow’ng, failure 
to mobilise deposits appreciably as well as mounting overdues became 
the'r chief problems although they mig^t have been partly successful 
in. some states in granting more loans as well as in cover-ng more 
villages. T’.e basic weaknesses of t’ e workings of the credit 
societ es thus lie in the poor quality of loan, administration and 
management as well as in the inability .to. mobilise, deposits.........
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Considerable regional variations were observed in the 
on ©rations of the urlm-’ry credit societies and in states like 
Rujarat, Maharashtra and Punjab, credit soclet;' es appeared to be 
in much, be’ter shape than those in Assam, West Bengal and Bihar. 
TM.s underlines the necessity to reorganise these societies on a 
more viable bo.sis as well as to strengthen them through the 
activit'es o r other tyres of financial agencies in the lagging 
slates. The co-oeeratives a-1 so failed to link o.ppreciably t- e 
system of credit and marketing and this failure considerably 
weakened the task of rromoting necessary \nt eyrat:’on between 
organized and unorganized money markets.
(11) The measurement of the precise nature and size of the 
unorganized Indian rural money market with its links with the 
organized sector proved to be very difficult because of the 
naucity of adequate reli-ab], e cfata. The rough estimates which we 
have made probably suggested some slow decline 4n the size of the 
unorganized market though this conclusion should be rega-d d as 
tentative and subject to further rigorous tests on the basis of 
fresh data as tbi becomes avai1 able. T’ a 1 inks between the two 
sectors did "at an near to be improving strongly. Here the role 
of the Reserve Bank of India has been criticised on the ground that 
it did not take adequate steps either to oromote hundis or to make 
the entry-rules of the indigenous financial agencies within the 
organized sector, sufficiently flexible. Similarly, the 
commercial banks' approach to the agricultural sector, until very 
recently, has been considered as conservative and. it is argued 
that an important linkage ray be developed should the commercial, 
banks start financing the co-operatives on the basis of some 
co-operative bills.
1
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Other ways to improve linkages could also be developed by 
increasingly more direct financing by the commercial banks in 
selected areas after making necessary farm planning and by 
setting up organized financial institutions to help directly 
and indirectly the agricultural sector. Here it is very necessary 
to ensure productive use of funds by more efficient loan 
administration and supervision and greater co-ordination with 
other financial agencies. Active steps should also be taken to 
promote the quality of hundis. It is possible that a 
multiple-agency approach will be quite useful to promote further 
integration.
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TABLE A3.10 CASH LOAMS BORROWED DURING THE YEAR JULY 1961 JUNE 1962
ALL-INDIA
Average per reporting household 
Asset Group (Cultivator) (Rs.)
Less than Rs. 500 99
Rs. 500 - Rs. 1,000 147
Rs. 1,000 - Rs. 2,500 200
Rs. 2,500 - Rs. 5,000 291
Rs. 5,000 - Rs. 10,000 449
Rs. 10,000 - Rs. 20,000 693
Rs. 20,000 and above 1356
Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, September 1965 :
p.~T3067
SHARE OF EACH ASSET GROUP IN THE AGGREGATE CASH BORROWINGS 
OP'ALL RURAL HOUSEHOLDS" FROM CO-OPERATIVES - ALL-INDIA
r
Asset Group 
Less than Rs. 500 
Rs. 500 - Rs. 1,000
Rs. 1,000 - Rs. 2,500
Rs. 2,500 - Rs. 5,000
Rs. 5,000 - Rs. 10,000
Rs. 10,000 - Rs. 20,000
Rs. 20,000 and above
Average per reporting household 
(Cultivator) (Rs.)
103
138
160
214
293
415
899
Source: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, September 1965 :
p. 1311.
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